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Abstract
The objective of the research presented in this dissertation is to detect misbehavior in vehicular ad hoc
networks (VANETs) and to identify the responsible attackers or faulty nodes in order to exclude them
from active network participation. Vehicles and roadside units use wireless ad hoc communication in
VANETs to increase traffic safety and efficiency by exchanging cooperative awareness information and
event-based messages. Considering both presence and status of vehicles moving in a defined range
drivers can be notified instantly about upcoming potentially dangerous situations such as a sudden
braking action of a vehicle driving in front or the tail end of a traffic jam ahead. VANET nodes fre-
quently broadcast mobility-related information (i.e. absolute values for position, time, heading, and
speed) within a communication range of several hundred meters to establish a cooperative awareness
of single-hop neighbors. Due to the ad hoc communication between network nodes traffic safety appli-
cations become feasible that have low latency requirements.
The protection against external attackers in VANETs is provided by applying cryptographic meth-
ods. Only registered nodes of the VANET are equipped with valid keys that are certified by a trusted
certificate authority. Internal attackers who possess appropriate hardware, software, and valid certifi-
cates must be considered as a dangerous threat. Attackers who either extract valid keys and certificates
from a communication unit or install a malware on VANET devices on board of vehicles or on roadside
units are able to send bogus messages that are accepted by unsuspecting vehicles. We demonstrate
that the processing of fake information may affect the safety and efficiency of the overall traffic in the
attackers’ single or multi-hop communication range.
Most existing solutions in the context of misbehavior detection in VANETs are based on data-centric
plausibility and consistency checks. We propose in this dissertation new methods and frameworks to
evaluate the behavior of VANET nodes based on cooperatively exchanged location-related information.
Most existing solutions are only tested within simulations. In contrast we analyzed the applicability of
misbehavior detection in VANETs under real conditions. Long-term experiments in outdoor field op-
erational tests and dedicated trials with test vehicles revealed new insights with respect to misbehavior
detection and attacker identification which are presented in this dissertation. Based on this knowl-
edge a novel strategy has been developed that consists of three main contributions: local misbehavior
detection, local short-term identification of potential attackers, and central long-term identification of
attackers.
The concept for local misbehavior detection on VANET nodes is based on different information
sources such as received packets or sensor measurements to perform data consistency and data plau-
sibility checks. In case of detected inconsistencies or implausible movement characteristics the suspi-
cious node is observed and its trustworthiness is locally evaluated.
The contributions for local short-term identification of potential attackers consider explicitly the
frequent change of neighbor node identifiers as stipulated by European standards and international
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industrial regulations. Based on test results gained from a large field operational test a concept for
the local misbehavior evaluation of neighbor nodes is proposed. The resulting node trustworthiness
is further used to generate misbehavior reports that are transmitted to a central evaluation authority.
Consequently, the central authority is informed about suspicious nodes and hence potential attackers of
the VANET.
The third main contribution is the processing of misbehavior reports for central long-term identifi-
cation of attackers. If sufficient evidence is reported by a significant number of independent VANET
nodes the central misbehavior evaluation authority is authorized to request information whether differ-
ent pseudonymous IDs contained in related misbehavior reports belong to the same suspicious node.
This process is supported by the central certificate authorities which ensure the consideration of drivers’
privacy while processing critical information. After the assessment of the reported suspects the cen-
tral misbehavior evaluation authority is able to identify the attacker and exclude his or her from active
participation in any VANET communication.
Based on the knowledge gained from our practical experiments with test vehicles we developed
an effective concept to enable the secure and reliable long-term operation of VANETs. Attackers
and faulty nodes can reactively be excluded from the network after independent network nodes have
locally detected their misbehavior and a central authority has identified the offenders. This approach is
more effective in terms of long-term attacker exclusion and minimization of false-positive detections
compared to related approaches that are only deployed on VANET nodes. Consequently, the proposed
concept will help to minimize the motivation of potential attackers to aim on VANETs. Due to the
detection of abnormal node behavior even novel attack methods that may emerge in the future should
be effectively counteracted by applying these concepts.
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Zusammenfassung
In dieser Dissertation werden Methoden ausgearbeitet, die die Erkennung von Fehlverhalten in Vehic-
ular Ad-hoc Netzwerken (VANETs) ermöglichen, sowie die Identifizierung der verantwortlichen An-
greifer oder fehlerhaften Knoten. Das Ziel ist es, die störenden Netzwerkknoten langfristig von der ak-
tiven VANET-Kommunikation auszuschließen. Fahrzeuge und Infrastruktureinheiten am Straßenrand
nutzen die drahtlose Ad-hoc-Kommunikation um Informationen zur Verkehrssicherheit und Effizienz
mit benachbarten Netzwerkknoten auszutauschen. Durch den konstanten Austausch von Statusinfor-
mationen sind Netzwerkknoten in der Lage ihr Umfeld in einem definierten Bereich wahrzunehmen.
Bei potenzieller Gefahr können Fahrer rechtzeitig über bevorstehende Verkehrssituationen, wie zum
Beispiel den plötzlichen Bremsvorgang eines voraus fahrenden Fahrzeugs oder ein nahendes Stauende,
informiert werden. Die Knoten des VANETs verbreiten regelmäßig präzise Informationen bezüglich
ihres eigenen Standortes und ihrer Bewegung innerhalb einer Funkreichweite von mehreren hundert
Metern. Unter anderem wird die absolute Position, die Fahrtrichtung und die Geschwindigkeit in
Verbindung mit einem Zeitstempel per Broadcast versendet. Durch die Ad-hoc-Kommunikation zwis-
chen den Netzknoten werden im Besonderen verkehrssicherheitsrelevante Anwendungen ermöglicht,
die eine niedrige Latenz beim Informationsaustausch voraussetzen und daher durch eine mobilfunkbasierte
Kommunikation nicht realisiert werden könnten.
Der Schutz vor externen Angreifern wird in VANETs mit Hilfe von kryptographischen Verfahren
sichergestellt. Nur registrierte Netzwerkknoten sind mit gültigen Schlüsseln und Zertifikaten ausges-
tattet, die von einer vertrauenswürdigen Zertifizierungsstelle ausgestellt werden. Interne Angreifer,
die entsprechende Hardware, Software und gültige Schlüssel bzw. Zertifikate besitzen, stellen eine
Bedrohung für das Netzwerk und den drauf basierenden Anwendungen dar. Ein Angreifer, der en-
tweder gültige Schlüssel mit den dazugehörigen Zertifikates aus einer Kommunikationseinheit ex-
trahiert oder eine Malware auf einem VANET-Knoten installiert hat, ist in der Lage gültige Nachrichten
mit gefälschtem Inhalt zu senden. Diese Nachrichten werden dann von ahnungslosen Fahrzeugen
akzeptiert und können zu Falschmeldungen und fehlerhaften Entscheidungen der Fahrer führen. In
dieser Arbeit wird gezeigt, dass die Verarbeitung von gefälschten Informationen Einfluss auf die Ver-
kehrssicherheit und Effizienz des gesamten Verkehrs im Kommunikationsbereich des Angreifers haben
kann.
Die meisten existierenden Lösungen anderer Autoren im Bereich der Fehlverhaltenserkennung in
VANETs basieren auf datenbezogenen Plausibilitäts- und Konsistenzprüfungen. Wir schlagen in dieser
Dissertation neue Methoden und Konzepte vor, die das Verhalten von Nachbarknoten in VANETs
unter Nutzung von positionsbezogenen Informationen bewerten. Da die meisten existierenden Lö-
sungen nur in Simulationen unter Verwendung von theoretischen Annahmen getestet wurden, fehlen
Erkenntnisse bezüglich der Fehlverhaltenserkennung unter realen Bedingungen. Dagegen konnten
wir durch unsere Langzeitexperimente in einem Feldversuch neue Erkenntnisse bezüglich der lokalen
Fehlverhaltenserkennung und Angreiferidentifizierung gewinnen. Basierend auf diesem Wissen wurde
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eine neuartige Strategie entwickelt, um den Gefahren durch interne Angreifer zu begegnen und um
damit die langfristige Zuverlässigkeit der VANET-Kommunikation zu erhöhen: Die lokale Erkennung
von Fehlverhalten durch Knoten des VANETs, die lokale kurzfristige Identifizierung potentieller An-
greifer und die zentrale langfristige Identifizierung von Angreifern.
Der Ansatz zur lokalen Erkennung von Fehlverhalten auf VANET-Knoten nutzt verschiedene Infor-
mationsquellen. Primär sind das die empfangenen Datenpakete der Nachbarn, aber auch Messungen
lokaler Sensoren werden zur Durchführung von Datenkonsistenzprüfungen und Plausibilitätsprüfun-
gen verwendet. Sobald Inkonsistenzen oder ein unplausibles Bewegungsverhalten eines benachbarten
Knotens detektiert wurden, wird dessen Verhalten lokal bewertet.
Bei der lokalen kurzfristigen Identifizierung potentieller Angreifer werden explizit die kurzzeitig
gültigen und regelmäßig wechselnden pseudonymen Identifizierer der VANET-Knoten berücksichtigt,
wie sie durch europäische Standards und internationale Industriegremien gefordert werden. Basierend
auf Testergebnissen eines umfangreichen Feldtests werden Konzepte und Mechanismen zur lokalen
Auswertung von verdächtigen Nachbarknoten vorgeschlagen. Die resultierende Vertrauenswürdigkeit
der jeweiligen Nachbarknoten wird lokal verwendet, um Berichte über beobachtetes Fehlverhalten zu
generieren. Diese Berichte werden anschließend zur einer zentralen Auswertungsbehörde übertragen,
um langfristig verdächtige Knoten und damit mögliche Angreifer des VANETs zu identifizieren.
Der dritte Hauptbeitrag ist die Verarbeitung von Fehlverhaltensberichten für die zentrale langfristige
Identifizierung von Angreifern. Wenn eine ausreichend große Anzahl von Berichten mit entsprechenden
Beweisen von unabhängigen VANET-Knoten an die zentrale Auswertungsbehörde geschickt wurden,
ist die Behörde berechtigt den möglichen Zusammenhang verschiedener pseudonymer Identifizierer
von verdächtigen Knoten aus unterschiedlichen Fehlverhaltensberichten zu untersuchen. Dieser Schritt
wird benötigt um Angreifer zu identifizieren, die ihre pseudonymen Identifizierer wechseln um ihr
Fehlverhalten zu verschleiern. Der Prozess wird durch die zentrale Zertifizierungsstelle unterstützt
unter Berücksichtigung der Anforderungen zum Schutz der Privatsphäre der Fahrzeugführer. Nach
Auswertung der gemeldeten Fehlverhaltensberichte und der Bewertung der verdächtigen Knoten ist die
zentrale Stelle in der Lage den Angreifer von der aktiven Teilnahme an der VANET-Kommunikation
auszuschließen.
Basierend auf dem Wissen, das durch die praktischen Experimente erlangt wurde, haben wir ein
effektives Konzept entwickelt, mit dem der sichere und langfristige Betrieb eines VANETs ermöglicht
wird. Angreifer und fehlerhafte Knoten können reaktiv aus dem Netzwerk ausgeschlossen werden
nachdem unabhängige Netzwerkknoten ihr Fehlverhalten erkannt haben und eine zentrale Stelle die
Verursacher identifiziert hat. Dieses Konzept ist effektiver bezüglich des langfristigen Ausschlusses
von Angreifern sowie der Minimierung von Falsch-Positiv Erkennungen im Vergleich zu Mechanis-
men, die nur auf VANET-Knoten eingesetzt werden. Durch die drohende Gefahr langfristig erkannt und
aus dem Netzwerk ausgeschlossen zu werden, können potentielle Angreifer bereits im Voraus davon
abgeschreckt werden Angriffe durchzuführen. Da die vorgeschlagenen Mechanismen auf der Erken-
nung von abnormalem Knotenverhalten basieren, sollten auch zukünftige Angriffsmethoden erkannt
werden, die derzeit noch nicht bekannt sind.
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The world is a dangerous place, not
because of those who do evil, but because
of those who look on and do nothing.
Albert Einstein
Part I.
Background
1

1. Introduction
The detection of misbehavior and the identification of the corresponding offender are topics that con-
cern both security and safety aspects in vehicular ad hoc networks. This chapter serves as an introduc-
tion to these topics. By focusing on security aspects we substantiate why these mechanisms are needed
in order to make vehicular communications more reliable for long-term operation. After a general mo-
tivation, related key terms are defined in Section 1.2 and a dedicated problem statement is discussed
in Section 1.3. Subsequently, the goals of the work are presented in Section 1.4 and the scientific
contributions are summarized in Section 1.5. A discussion of the dissertation structure concludes this
chapter.
1.1. Motivation
In principle, a cooperative system is based on rules that are commonly agreed on to ensure correct pro-
cesses for information processing, proper interactions between all system entities and fair distribution
of rights and responsibilities. This principle is not necessarily restricted to technical communication
systems. For example, in social communities laws are created to organize a fair cooperative living. Vio-
lating the rules could endanger the overall system goals or may leverage single entities to get additional
advantages at the expense of others. In general, a well designed system may prevent illegal action such
as fraud through integrated countermeasures. In complex systems, however, it may be impossible or
extremely costly to guarantee the absence of faults and vulnerabilities in the design. Moreover, due to
costs and disproportional effort it may not be reasonable to include all available counter mechanisms
in a system design to prevent misuse. Therefore, mechanisms for misbehavior detection are used in
cooperative systems in addition to basic instruments that aim for misuse prevention. In politics for
example, processes typically do not prevent misbehavior by design but inspections are scheduled that
discover people or legal entities that do not follow the rules. Similarly, in cooperative information
and communication technologies (ICT) monitoring systems are used to detect abnormal behavior and
misbehavior based on predefined signatures.
As a result, in different systems (not exclusively in the domain of ICT) mechanisms are used to
monitor the system quality and its long-term reliability. Especially in systems with a long life time,
the design may not be able to consider all future developments that could endanger the system’s func-
tionality and reliability. In ICT, for example, attacks could become possible due to new technologies
and inventions such as side channel attacks or quantum cryptography whereby implemented security
mechanisms become obsolete. A misbehavior detection mechanism that observes the activities in the
cooperative system is able to detect abnormal behavior and may identify the initiator of problems such
as an attacker. Depending on the kind of misbehavior, appropriate reactions may be triggered, e. g.
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prosecution of the user, technical deactivation of the ICT entity or revocation of cryptographic creden-
tials.
A vehicular ad hoc network (VANET) is affected in particular as its long-term operation is an im-
portant aspect. Usually vehicles are operated over long periods of time in contrast to other ICT devices
such as mobile phones for instance, and they are not controlled and observed by a central entity. An
owner may be able to customize his or her own vehicle with additional communication hardware or
install individual software that could affect the functionality of the overall cooperative communication
system negatively. However, proactive security mechanisms (i. e. encryption and digital signing of
messages) that aim to prevent unintended system usage are an essential measure in order to exclude
external attackers from the network. Nevertheless, these measures are not able to prevent misbehavior
of internal attackers who are in possession of valid credentials of the security system. With reference
to the mandate of the European commission [Com09] and the memorandum of understanding of au-
tomobile manufacturers [Con11] it can further be estimated that after the initial deployment phase has
passed, the number of connected vehicles will likely reach several million nodes. Due to the scale of
a VANET and its decentralized character, full control of each and every node in the network becomes
unlikely. An attacker is not necessarily a malicious hacker that tries to disrupt the cooperative system’s
functionality. Even ordinary drivers might be motivated to selfishly misuse vehicular ad hoc commu-
nications in order to free the fast lane on a highway or switch a traffic light to green. As a result, a
reactive mechanism is needed that constantly observes the system functionality and ensures fairness in
the network.
We concentrate in this dissertation on two aspects:
a) How can misbehavior and possible vulnerabilities be detected and identified as early as possible?
b) How can the initiator of misbehavior be identified in order to react appropriately (e. g. exclude
the attacker or faulty node until the problem is solved)?
With the two measures of misbehavior detection and subsequent attacker identification the long-term
reliability of proper VANET functionality can be ensured.
1.2. Misbehavior in Inter-Vehicle Communications
In general, misbehavior can be defined as an action of someone who is behaving inappropriate. With
respect to cooperative ICT, misbehavior are active and passive actions performed by communication
end points that are not behaving according to predefined rules. Active misbehavior is for example the
distribution of wrong information, while passive misbehavior is for example the illegal collection of
specific information of individuals.
According to Buchegger [Buc04] misbehavior detection is not restricted to any particular kind of
misbehavior as long as it is detectable, i. e. observable and classifiable as such with a high proba-
bility. A classical intrusion detection system (IDS) observes network links and endpoint systems to
detect predefined attack signatures or anomalies differing from a predefined normal state. A misbe-
havior detection system (MDS) is related to cyber-physical systems (CPS) that handle physical input
and output. A CPS can be described as a system of collaborating computational elements controlling
physical entities. In addition to IDS misbehavior detection approaches are extended by measurements
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of physical sensors and contextual information such as time and location. The mechanisms discussed
in this dissertation focus on the detection of active misbehavior performed intentionally by attackers
or accidentally by faulty network nodes that show abnormal behavior. However, in productive systems
detected anomalies that differ to some extend from expected normal states are not necessarily misbe-
havior. Inaccuracies must be considered in order to avoid false detections and consequently possible
false reactions. The threshold between valid and invalid behavior may be vague in real-world vehicular
ad hoc networks. Furthermore, vehicles in an exceptional state such as involved in a traffic accident
might distribute abnormal information.
In this dissertation we focus on abnormal behavior considering aspects of location-related informa-
tion distributed and processed within the domain of traffic safety and efficiency.
1.3. Problem Statement
Coping with misbehaving nodes in communication networks is important in order to guarantee trust-
worthy exchange of information. Accordingly, different mechanisms are applied to ensure the most
important security goals: sender authenticity and authorization, message integrity and confidentiality.
As argued in the motivation the application of cryptographic mechanisms can ensure the adherence of
common rules of the cooperative network. Internal attackers, however, possess valid credentials and
necessary communication technology to overcome these proactive security mechanisms. To reduce the
risk of internal attackers the systems of the communication endpoints can additionally be protected by
firewalls and trusted computing solutions [HAF+09,OYN+08]. Nevertheless, manipulation of vehicu-
lar systems cannot be prevented since side channel attacks [Tar10] and malicious software manipulation
(e. g. flashing of system software [MBZ+12] or exploiting vulnerabilities) are additional risks. In any
case, securing the complete network of vehicles is costly and challenging since data have to be pro-
tected seamlessly on their way from the source of information such as a sensor to the destination such
as a display or transmitter. For example, in the use case Emergency Electronic Brake Lights [ETS09],
information from a braking vehicle has to be transmitted to neighboring vehicles whereupon the sender
has to secure every component, interface, and network between the brake sensor and the transceiver.
Additionally, the receiving vehicle has to secure every component, interface, and network between the
transceiver and the human machine interface (HMI) in order to be sure that an attacker has not manip-
ulated the information [HAF+09]. Full protection of data on the way between the source component of
the sender (e. g. braking sensor) and destination component at the receiver (e. g. display) is very expen-
sive with respect to complexity, overhead, and cost. However, even if all channels are fully protected
by means of cryptography the physical manipulation of sensor inputs cannot be prevented. An attacker
could for example manipulate the global navigation satellite system (GNSS) signal that is received and
processed by the VANET nodes.
Hence, detecting attackers with malicious behavior is important to impede their negative influence
and ensure long-term reliability of VANETs functionality. Applying an IDS as security mechanism
is a well-known concept in different kinds of computer networks. However, VANETs have unique
characteristics and features, hence different requirements have to be considered compared to wired
networks, classical wireless networks, or mobile ad hoc networks (MANETs). The main challenges in
VANETs are:
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a) decentralized character due to rare infrastructure connections,
b) possibly short connection times between network nodes (e. g. vehicles or roadside units),
c) frequent change of temporary pseudonymous node identifiers,
d) handling of physical input and output,
e) imprecise and not synchronized data originating from different nodes.
Additionally, detecting adversaries is challenging, especially since no practical experience from a real
network is available in the current status of VANET deployment.
1.4. Goals
As addressed in the motivation and the problem description, reactive security mechanisms in form of
misbehavior detection and long-term attacker identification are important to ensure the reliable long-
term operation of vehicular ad hoc networks. The main goal of this work is to develop mechanisms
to detect faulty vehicles and attackers in the wireless ad hoc communication by applying autonomous
data consistency and plausibility checks on every node in a VANET.
It has to be considered that the structure of communication networks is usually organized in layers
(cf. open systems interconnection (OSI) model) [Tan03]. In general, every layer is responsible for a
different functionality and upper layers can rely on services provided by lower layers. For example,
the packet routing functionality is provided by the network layer and applications on upper layers
assume that outgoing packets are equipped with appropriate routing information so that they are routed
correctly through the network to the destination. In principle, the check of information plausibility is
reasonable for the individual data on every layer. However, in this work we focus on location data-based
plausibility checks that validate the correctness of mobility information (i. e. absolute position, heading,
speed and time) of neighboring network nodes. This kind of information is exchanged frequently
(i. e. with a frequency up to 10 Hz [ETS10d]) and basically all VANET applications rely on location-
related data received from neighbors [ETS09]. Consequently, network nodes that attract attention due
to repeatedly non-plausible behavior should be detected and considered as potential attackers.
Since privacy protection plays an essential role in VANETs, the design of a mechanism for long-term
attacker identification has to consider different privacy preserving requirements. In order to protect the
driver privacy, vehicles use temporary pseudonymous identifiers in the wireless ad hoc communica-
tion that are changed randomly [GG07]. This privacy protection mechanism aims to hinder internal
and external attackers to create long-term traces and traffic profiles based on recorded communication
traffic. In the same way, single central entities should not be able to link pseudonymous identifiers to
long-term vehicle identifiers. A credential provider, for example, should not be able to link on its own
pseudonymous identifiers from wireless communications to a number plate or a vehicle identification
number (VIN). Likewise, the measures for misbehavior detection and attacker identification must not
weaken the driver privacy.
Figure 1.1 shows our proposed general strategy for misbehavior detection and long-term attacker
identification in VANETs. The attacker vehicle A and the benign vehicle B communicate through
a VANET using cryptographic credentials such as asymmetric keys and certificates that ensure the
authentication and authorization of the sender as well as the message integrity. After a while, vehicle B
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Figure 1.1.: Strategy for misbehavior detection and attacker identification in VANETs
detects a potential misbehavior of vehicle A based on mobility data consistency and plausibility checks.
As soon as the suspicion is substantiated vehicle B reports the misbehavior to the infrastructure for
attacker identification. It has to be considered that vehicles can frequently change their pseudonymous
identifiers in order to preserve drivers’ privacy. Therefore, it may be necessary to involve the credential
provider such as a public key infrastructure (PKI) in order to identify the source of misbehavior. After
the identification of the attacker, the credential provider revokes the attacker’s credentials or rejects
certificate renewal requests originating from the identified attacker. The disturbing network nodes
should be prevented to actively participate in VANET communications until their correct behavior can
be ensured. Furthermore, it has to be ensured in this process that attackers are not able to discredit
benign nodes with faked misbehavior reports.
In addition to the reporting of misbehavior, the results of mobility data plausibility checks can be
used locally by vehicular applications on upper layers to decide whether received information can be
considered trustworthy or if information provided by suspicious neighbors should be handled with
caution.
1.5. Contributions
We address specific scientific challenges by dividing the topic into two separate steps: misbehavior
detection and attacker identification.
In the first step different mechanisms for misbehavior detection are analyzed that are based on in-
coming messages originating from neighboring nodes as well as local sensor data of the own node.
Based on generic approaches and frameworks of published research (cf. Section 3.1.2 and 3.1.3), we
propose several distinct frameworks for plausibility checking of mobility data received from neighbor
nodes. Since most existing solutions are only evaluated within simulations we comprehensively an-
alyzed the applicability of misbehavior detection in VANETs under real conditions. By participating
in a large scale field operational test and performing dedicated trials with test vehicles we gained new
insights with respect to misbehavior detection and attacker identification. Based on this knowledge
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we developed the framework illustrated in Figure 1.1 that considers the local detection of misbehavior
on VANET nodes and the central long-term identification of attackers and faulty nodes. As a result,
we can show that plausibility checking by means of probabilistic instruments is applicable in VANETs
under consideration of realistic system requirements and privacy protection aspects.
In order to increase the detection rate of non-existing, so-called “ghost” vehicles, we propose in this
dissertation a new mechanism to detect conflicting location claims of nodes within single-hop com-
munication range. The proposed mechanisms enable the detection of location-based attacks without
creating additional communication overhead on the wireless ad hoc channel and without requiring spe-
cific hardware sensors at the network nodes. We evaluated our contribution by means of simulation
and by using movement and message data from recorded real vehicle traces. Moreover, the applica-
bility of the misbehavior detection system has been analyzed with test vehicles on dedicated test areas
and public roads. In these tests, our framework was deployed over 15 weeks on 220 different sta-
tions and approximately 17 billion messages were checked. The evaluations have shown that attacks
on the VANET communication can be detected reliably by nodes of the VANET using our proposed
mechanisms.
In the second step the applicability of results from the local misbehavior detection system is analyzed
in order to temporarily identify the attacker on the decentralized VANET node. An optimal MDS
would allow to immediately exclude attackers as soon as they are detected without exchanging further
information with other local or central entities. We demonstrate a mechanism to evaluate neighbor
node trustworthiness based on received location-related data and observed behavior. The resulting
information about node trust can be used by VANET applications in order to support their decision-
making process in critical situations. If, for example, a vehicle B receives from an ahead driving vehicle
A an emergency braking notification while the misbehavior detection system at vehicle B rates vehicle
A not to be trustworthy, the application on vehicle B might suppress a driver notification until further
trustworthy information is collected. However, we show that a reliable long-term attacker identification
on the network nodes is not possible due to the dynamic topology of VANETs and applied privacy
enhancing technologies (PETs). In particular, the VANET nodes can identify other nodes only based on
their pseudonymous identifiers that change frequently. Our evaluations, based on recorded real vehicle
traces, substantiate the fact that locally on the VANET nodes a long-term identification of attackers is
not possible (as intended by the applied PET).
As a consequence, it is analyzed whether attackers can be identified more reliably at a central entity.
Based on this analysis we developed a new mechanism for the centralized evaluation of misbehavior
reports and the subsequent exclusion of attackers. In the context of VANET security our centralized
mechanism is unique as it takes operational aspects such as scalability and node identification into
account while considering necessary privacy protection requirements. In this concept, VANET nodes
detect misbehavior based on local data plausibility checks and create misbehavior reports that are trans-
mitted to a central misbehavior evaluation authority (MEA). The central entity is able to filter fake
reports that are created by an attacker aiming to hide its malicious behavior or blame benign nodes ar-
bitrarily. This is possible as the MEA can check whether two pseudonyms from related reports belong
to the same node. In order to support the latter function, the integration of a privacy-friendly pseudo-
nym resolution protocol with the pseudonym credential provider infrastructure (i. e. PKI) is proposed.
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Based on simulation we show that the detection of attacker nodes is possible even if colluding attackers
are reporting fake misbehavior reports.
The main research questions answered in this dissertation can be summarized as follows:
(1) How is it possible to detect internal misbehaving network nodes?
It is analyzed whether the inspection of mobility data is sufficient to distinguish messages sent by
faulty or malicious nodes and messages sent by benign nodes. Considering realistic movements
of network nodes including abrupt driving behavior is important. Moreover, outstanding traffic
events such as accidents should not lead to an exclusion of involved vehicles. In this dissertation
the hypothesis should be verified that location-related abnormalities introduced in Section 1.2
can be detected as long as the abnormal behavior happens within a sensor observed area of a
benign single-hop communication neighbor.
(2) Are VANET nodes able to identify attackers under consideration of privacy protection
mechanisms?
In order to protect the privacy of drivers, the identifiers of the different layers of the vehicular
communication system (e. g. MAC address on data link layer, IP address on network layer, sta-
tion ID on application layer) change frequently by applying a simple random algorithm [GG07]
or a more sophisticated context-based algorithm [ESG+10]. In this dissertation the hypothesis
should be verified that attackers cannot be excluded permanently from active participation in
VANET communications as long as the pseudonymous identifiers can be changed frequently.
We assume that linking information related to different pseudonymous identifiers must not be
exchanged between the nodes of the vehicular ad hoc network in order to protect the drivers’
privacy.
(3) Is a central identification of attackers feasible in order to support the long-term operation
of the VANET?
Local MDS running on the decentralized VANET nodes are able to detect potential misbehavior
but, however, a reliable long-term identification of attackers may only be possible at a central
entity. It should be investigated whether a central mechanism is able to exclude faulty nodes
and attackers from active VANET participation in order to support the operational reliability of
the network. The hypothesis should be verified that faulty and malicious nodes can be excluded
having a majority of benign independent misbehavior reporters. On the other hand, false-positive
detections and fake reports should not lead to an exclusion of benign nodes.
(4) Is it possible to apply a central attacker identification scheme that meets relevant privacy
protection requirements?
According to the privacy protection requirements in VANETs third parties must not be able to
arbitrarily track vehicles. Additionally, internal security entities such as credential providers
should not be able to track and identify vehicles over long periods of time. Therefore, the central
misbehavior report evaluation authority has to be designed privacy-friendly. It should be studied
how misbehavior detection and evaluation effect the drivers’ privacy. The hypothesis should
be verified that the central processing of misbehavior is possible without revealing long-term
identifiers of benign nodes.
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Moreover, the fundamentals of location-related data checking are analyzed in detail in this disserta-
tion. Based on these checks, the principle possibilities for misbehavior detection, temporary attacker
identification, long-term attacker identification, and attacker exclusion are evaluated in the context of
VANETs. Beyond the consideration of basic fundamentals, relevant practical requirements such as
reliability, efficiency, scalability, and applicability are taken into account in our proposals.
Our research results might also be relevant for other ICT domains since detection and identification
of internal attackers is desired in most communication systems. However, the IDS applied in enter-
prise networks is only partially comparable with mechanisms for misbehavior detection in VANETs
as discussed in Section 1.2. More relevant are cyber-physical systems that handle physical input and
output. For example, the aerospace and automotive domain primarily focus on location and mobility-
related data. However, other CPS domains such as manufacturing, chemical processing, energy, or
transportation may focus on other system and environmental information such as power consumption,
temperature, pressure, composition of material, liquid or gas. In this context our research results may
be relevant to improve misbehavior detection and attacker exclusion. Although we focus on the pro-
cessing of location-related information our proposed methods for misbehavior detection are flexible
by means of input data, cf. Sections 3.2 and 3.6. Moreover, with the local and central evaluation of
node trustworthiness under consideration of PETs we contribute to the research in the context of CPS
security. For instance, CPS devices applied in domains energy, entertainment, consumer electronics,
or home automation may be equipped with short-term pseudonymous IDs in order to protect the users’
privacy. Although we focus on VANET communications in this dissertation our work is aiming for con-
tributing to the general scientific research in the field of flexible and adaptable security architectures
with respect to misbehavior detection and attacker identification.
1.6. Structure of the Dissertation
This dissertation is arranged in three main parts. In Part I we introduce and motivate our work and
provide necessary foundations of misbehavior detection and attacker identification in VANETs. The
main contributions of our work are presented in Part II and Part III. First we provide our contributions
to the local misbehavior detection that are applied by autonomous implementations on network nodes.
Subsequently, the contributions to the attacker identification both performed locally on network nodes
and centrally at a misbehavior evaluation authority are detailed. In Part IV we conclude the dissertation
and provide appendices to our work.
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2. Vehicular Ad hoc Networks
As motivated in Chapter 1 the detection of misbehavior is an important aspect in order to increase
the dependability of communication networks. This chapter introduces the vehicular ad hoc network
(VANET) as the field of application for our research on misbehavior detection and attacker identifi-
cation. A definition of the VANET-specific participants and communications is given in Section 2.1.
Section 2.2 introduces general security and privacy mechanisms that aim for network protection against
external attackers in VANETs. Finally in Section 2.3 different attack types are discussed and the adver-
sary model is presented.
2.1. Characteristics, Participants and Communications of VANETs
A vehicular ad hoc network aims to enable for vehicles a wide range of new traffic safety and effi-
ciency applications but also multimedia and convenience applications. In addition, a VANET exhibits
unique characteristics compared to mobile ad hoc networks (MANETs) and wireless sensor networks
(WSNs) that require specific measures for misbehavior detection and attacker identification. It is as-
sumed that every node of the VANET is aware of its own current position. Vehicles are equipped
with a global navigation satellite system (GNSS) receiver, for example of the global positioning sys-
tem (GPS), to determine their absolute position. Vehicles may further correct positional errors using
differential GNSS services, dead reckoning technologies based on movement information from local
sensors (e. g. velocity sensor, angle of steering wheel), and information derived from digital maps. The
main characteristics of VANETs are summarized in Table 2.1 in combination with their challenges for
misbehavior detection and attacker identification.
Table 2.1.: Relevant characteristics and challenges of VANETs with respect to misbehavior detection and at-
tacker identification
Attribute Description Challenges
Synchro-
nization
Information from different sources is
received at different times in different
intervals.
Updates of own sensors such as the GNSS
position or radar measurements must be
synchronized with received location in-
formation.
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Attribute Description Challenges
Scalability The communication range covers a
radius of up to 1 km [ETS10b,IEE10]
and more than 100 nodes are assumed
to be in reception range. Theoretic
models and simulations show incom-
ing packet rates of 1,000 packets per
second [SBK+11].
The communication systems and the ap-
plications running on the nodes have to
handle a large number of incoming mes-
sages without adding large delays.
Mobility Vehicles are possibly driving with
high speeds and the behavior of the
driver is not necessarily predeter-
mined.
The connections between vehicles are
ephemeral.
Bandwidth
and
connectivity
limitations
The bandwidth of the wireless chan-
nels is limited to the frequency
band of VANET communications
[ETS10b]. Additionally, a permanent
connection to the infrastructure can-
not be assumed.
Security solutions that need to coopera-
tively exchange data with neighbor nodes
are not able to broadcast a large amount
of security related data such as neighbor-
hood tables, radar detections, etc.
Pseudo-
nymity
In order to protect the privacy of
drivers the node identifiers (i. e. ve-
hicle identifiers) are changing fre-
quently and unexpectedly.
Applications running on the nodes cannot
rely on long-term node identifiers and the
use of pseudonyms impede a long-term
observation of the node’s behavior. At-
tackers could misuse this feature to hide
malicious behavior by frequently chang-
ing the node’s ID.
Main participants of the VANET are vehicles and roadside facilities that aim to support the ad hoc
communication between vehicles. The access points at the roadside act as gateways between the ve-
hicles and backend services (e. g. central traffic management or fleet management) and additionally
support multi-hop packet routing between distant vehicles. Access to cellular networks that may be
used by vehicles to communicate with backend services are not assumed to be available in all vehi-
cles. In this work, we focus on three participants in VANET communications: vehicle station, roadside
station, and central station as depicted in Figure 2.1.
The representation of participants and communication channels in this figure is based on the de-
scription of the intelligent transportation system (ITS) architecture provided by the U.S. Department of
Transportation [RA12] and ETSI [ETS10a]. Since these participants form a network with the depicted
communication channels the participants are further named node of the VANET and station of the ITS.
In the following listing, the main participants of a VANET are discussed including their most important
components.
• Vehicle stations consist of an on-board unit (OBU) that is running the VANET applications, the
communication facilities (i. e. radio, communication stack, etc.) and connects to the on-board
network. The security subsystem of the station is connected to the OBU or comes as part of it.
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Figure 2.1.: Participants and communication links of an Intelligent transportation system architecture [ETS10a,
RA12]
The subsystem provides security services to protect the on-board communication and the external
VANET communication. A hardware security module (HSM) is used in the security subsystem
to store cryptographic credentials (e. g. private keys) and accelerate cryptographic operations. In
parallel it acts as a trust anchor.
• In the field, the most important participants are roadside stations:
– The roadside station, also known as roadside unit (RSU), consists of the same compo-
nents as a vehicle station (i. e. OBU, security subsystem, HSM). The roadside station is
able to act as gateway between the vehicle communication and fixed point communication.
• The central stations provide the backend services. In our work, we focus on the installation
application server and the security management:
– The installation application server provides software for vehicle stations and roadside
stations (i. e. OBU and security subsystem). Possible operators of the server may be vehicle
manufacturers or suppliers. The server is able to communicate with vehicles via wide area
wireless communications (e. g. UMTS, LTE) or via fixed point entities such as RSUs.
– The security management in the backend is running a security credential provider such
as a PKI that is used to protect the VANET communication against external attackers. The
security management is connected to the vehicles via fixed point communications or wide
area wireless mobile communications. Additionally, the security management may contain
a misbehavior evaluation authority (MEA) and a privacy protection authority (PPA). The
MEA is responsible to process misbehavior reports that are provided by vehicle stations or
roadside stations via fixed point communications. The PPA is responsible to verify that in
the related processes all privacy policies are followed.
According to Figure 2.1 different communication channels are used in VANETs. However, we focus
in this dissertation on the wireless ad hoc data transmission between vehicles (V2V) and between
vehicles and the infrastructure (V2I). This kind of communication is further denoted as V2X. It is
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based on the IEEE standard 802.11p [IEE10] and the European profile standard for ITS operating in
the 5 GHz frequency band [ETS10b].
On top of the access layer, a geographic networking routing protocol is assumed to be applied as
depicted in Figure 2.2. This routing protocol is based on position information of neighboring nodes in
order to forward multi-hop messages to distant nodes as unicast packet or towards a geographic area
as multicast or broadcast packet [Mai04]. On top of the network & transport layer a facilities layer is
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Figure 2.2.: Communication stack of VANET nodes based on ETSI [ETS10a] showing exemplary functions,
message types, and technologies
located that is responsible for V2X message generation and processing.
Two basic message types are further considered in this dissertation. The cooperative awareness
message (CAM) [ETS10d] is broadcasted periodically by all VANET nodes with up to a frequency of
10 Hz in order to publish their current position and operating state to single-hop neighbors. The decen-
tralized environmental notification message (DENM) [ETS10e] however is only created and sent
when a specific event occurs, for example in case of an emergency braking notification or a post crash
notification. The interfaces shown in Figure 2.2 are used to hand over data between the communication
layers. Additionally, orthogonal layers (i. e. management and security) are connected via interfaces to
add security information to packets or update management information.
Figure 2.3 illustrates the generic message format of a V2X message that is structured in blocks. The
elements of the message with a colored background are involved in the data consistency and plausibility
checks discussed in this dissertation. The identifiers are highlighted with a dark blue background and
the mobility data is highlighted with a light blue background. The payload shown on the right hand
side of Figure 2.3 is created by the application or facilities layer. After payload generation the packet
is handed over to the next lower layer. Here, the transport header and the network header is added by
the network & transport layer. The position of the security header inside the packet may vary since it
depends on the data that should be protected by the signature. Finally, the access layer adds a MAC
header in front of the packet and a MAC frame check sequence to the end of the packet before it is sent
to single-hop neighbors.
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Figure 2.3.: V2X packet format used in ITS communications [ETS10d, FGJ+10, IEE13]
The combination of the wireless data transmission technology and the frequent broadcast of position
information of neighbors enables V2X applications that may increase the safety and efficiency of future
driving. In contrast to other environment sensors such as cameras or radar, wireless communication is
not restricted to the line-of-sight environment. At the same time a relatively large amount of data can
be transmitted with low latency. According to the IEEE standard 802.11p [IEE10] messages can be
transmitted within a communication radius of several hundred meters by the use of one transmitter.
However, this single-hop communication range can be increased to several kilometers by the use of
multi-hop message forwarding techniques. As a result, V2X communications enable new applications
that require low latency data transmissions between VANET nodes as described in the ETSI basic set
of applications [ETS09] to create a cooperative location awareness of neighbors.
2.2. Security and Privacy in Vehicular Ad hoc Networks
In contrast to wired networks, the access to wirelessly transmitted data in VANETs cannot be restricted
in general, since messages can be received by every transmitter that is tuned to the respective fre-
quency. Consequently, a wireless network is more vulnerable to attacks from external attackers than
a wired network. In order to exclude external attackers appropriate security mechanisms must be in-
tegrated [ETS13c, GFL+05]. Relevant protection mechanisms are extensively discussed in scientific
research papers [LSM07, PBH+08]. These mechanisms have been refined to be applied in field opera-
tional tests as discussed by the author of this dissertation in [BSM+09], [MBS+09], and [SBK+11].
With cryptographic security mechanisms in place, access to message content can be restricted as
discussed in Section 2.2.1. Nevertheless, internal attackers, coming as nodes that are in possession
of valid cryptographic credentials, are still able to distribute bogus information. In order to detect
authenticated but misbehaving nodes, the VANET security architecture shall consider data plausibility
checks according to emerging standards [ETS10c], [ETS12a], and [ETS13a]. Data plausibility checks
are subsequently discussed in detail in Section 2.2.2.
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2.2.1. Cryptographic Mechanisms
The protection of wireless networks by means of cryptographic credentials is a common approach.
Classical wireless networks that use a central access point and that are based on IEEE 802.11 a/b/g/n
are mostly protected by the IEEE 802.11i security protocols or the comparable protocols from the Wi-Fi
alliance (i. e. WPA and WPA2). These security protocols basically support two different strategies for
user authentication. Furthermore they usually encrypt the traffic which is possible due to unicast com-
munication and the centralized topology. By using WPA-Personal for user authentication, a pre-shared
key (PSK) is used. However, using the second option, WPA-Enterprise, a RADIUS1 authentication
server is required. Applying IEEE 802.11i security mechanisms in VANETs is not reasonable due to
the following reasons.
a) A connection to a central authentication server is not available as used in IEEE 802.11i and
WPA-Enterprise.
b) After the initial deployment phase, likely several million of nodes may belong to a VANET.
Sharing a long-term PSK with all nodes as done in WPA-Personal cannot be protected against
attacks. The introduction of short-term PSKs would result in a complex management and, at the
same time, may require a periodic connection between vehicle nodes and the infrastructure.
c) The extensible authentication protocol (EAP) as applied in WPA-Enterprise for key exchange
may introduce high delays in the ad hoc message exchange. VANET nodes have to exchange
messages with low latency also under consideration of a fast changing topology, since vehicles
enter and leave the communication range of adjacent nodes very fast.
d) Basic V2X messages (i. e. CAM and DENM) are broadcasted. In this case, only sender authenti-
cation and integrity of the message content is required, but the confidentiality of the transmitted
data is not needed.
As a result, a customized security solution for VANETs is proposed by IEEE [IEE13] and ETSI [ETS10c,
ETS13b] that is based on asymmetric keys and related certificates issued by a trusted third party. In
order to ensure sender authentication and message integrity, the sender of a V2X message signs the
payload (e. g. CAM) with a private key. The signature and the related certificate with the public key
are appended to the packet to enable a verification at the receiver. Figure 2.3 shows the essential parts
of the security header containing the signer information in form of a certificate and the signature. All
receivers of the message are able to check the authentication of the sender by verifying the contained
sender certificate. Additionally, the receivers have to check that the certificate is issued by a trusted
third party. Subsequently, the receiver is able check the integrity of the message content by verifying
the signature with the public key of the provided certificate.
In addition to the cryptographic mechanisms that care for sender authentication, message integrity,
and optionally for data confidentiality, the privacy of the driver has to be protected. That means, a
receiver of V2X messages must not be able to track and identify another node over long periods of time
by monitoring the wireless channel. Consequently, the nodes frequently change all their identifiers
contained in outgoing packets. According to Figure 2.3 the nodes can be identified by the MAC ad-
dress, the network header node ID, the security signer information, and the station ID inside the CAM
1The remote authentication dial in user service (RADIUS) provides a centralized authentication, authorization, and account-
ing service for network nodes.
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or DENM. Since the security signer information contains the sender’s certificate, several unlinkable
certificates have to be managed by the nodes which are denoted as pseudonym certificates (PCs).
The PKI concept of the Car-to-Car Communication Consortium2 (C2C-CC) was jointly developed by
the members of the task force in which the author of this dissertation was essentially involved. Several
parts of the conceptional work of the C2C-CC PKI task force were driven and organized by the author of
this dissertation [BSS+11]. Figure 2.4 illustrates the architecture of this PKI that issues the certificates
aiming for protecting the V2X communication [BSS+11,ETS10c,oTRA12]. Three different certificate
authority (CA) types are defined for the PKI. The root CA (RCA) is the trust anchor of the VANET
and it issues certificates for the long-term CA (LTCA) and the pseudonym CA (PCA). Since all nodes
of the VANET trust the root certificate of the RCA, the nodes consequently trust the certificates of the
LTCA and PCA as well. Before a node is allowed to request new PCs for the V2X communication,
it has to be enrolled at the LTCA. In the enrollment process every node is equipped with a long-term
certificate (LTC). This LTC must only be used to sign requests of new PCs that are sent to the PCA. If
the PCA can successfully verify the validity of the LTC, a set of different PCs is issued and provided to
the requester. An equipped node can use the PCs to authenticate itself in the V2X communication and
can protect at the same time the driver’s privacy by frequently changing the PC and all other identifiers
in outgoing packets.
Root CA 
RCA 
LTC 
LTC 
PC1..n 
Long-Term CA 
LTCA 
Pseudonym CA 
PCA 
PC4 PC3 PC2 PC1 
Pseudonym 
Certificates 
PC1…PCn 
Legend: 
 Issuance of CA certificates 
 Enrolment of ITS station 
 Pseudonym certificate acquisition 
time 
Figure 2.4.: Security and privacy in VANETs using public key cryptography [BSS+11, ETS10c, oTRA12]
2http://www.car-to-car.org/
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2.2.2. Data Consistency and Plausibility Checks
As motivated in Chapter 1 this dissertation focuses on data plausibility checks in order to detect faults
and misbehavior in the single-hop communication range. This mechanism is designed to be applied in
addition to cryptographic mechanisms. An important information element in VANET communications
is the position of adjacent nodes because most applications rely on it. Functions such as the geographic
routing on network layer or the V2X applications require genuine, accurate and reliable location data
of neighbors. As a result, we propose to verify the consistency and plausibility of location-related
data of adjacent nodes that are broadcasted frequently as CAMs or geo-networking beacons. In order
to be able to compare all location-related data contained in a packet it is reasonable to perform the
consistency and plausibility checks on facilities or application layer. Since several V2X applications
require information about the movement plausibility of neighbor nodes, the integration of a single
instantiation of a location data-based check may be reasonable to save valuable resources.
Figure 2.3 shows that information about a sender’s position may be placed at different parts of a
V2X packet. The network header contains a common header with ID as well as location and timing
information of the sender [FGJ+10]. The security header contains the signer information and possibly
also a generation time and location according to the IEEE 1609.2 standard [IEE13] or the ETSI TS
103 097 standard [ETS13b]. Finally, the payload (e. g. CAM [ETS10d] or DENM [ETS10e]) contains
the sender’s ID and location with a related timestamp. In order to perform data plausibility checks
and consistency verifications a standardized way is required to represent this relevant information from
packets irrespective of specific message formats. The relevant information is denoted as Position Vector
(PV). Table 2.2 summarizes the PV contents.
Table 2.2.: Content of a position vector
Entry Description Example
Identifier The pseudonymous identifiers of a neighbor
node are provided with every V2X message. The
IDs on the layers of the communication stack
may have different formats but should be derived
from the certificate ID that is created by the
security layer. The certificate ID can be
generated by hashing the bytes of the certificate
according to IEEE 1609.2 [IEE13] or ETSI TS
103 097 [ETS13b]. Since these identifiers
periodically change, the IDs can only be used to
temporarily distinguish the neighbors.
Certificate ID:
0ec6e51b5a7a722a
MAC address:
5a:7a:72:ff:fe:2a
Network layer node
identifier:
1064790267564552746
Station identifier:
7564552746
Timestamp
The absolute timestamp is derived from the
GNSS and is therefore synchronized between all
VANET nodes. It shows the number of
milliseconds since a defined point in time, for
example since 1st January, 1970 (UTC).
11 September 2012
17:30:59.000 =
1347377459000
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Entry Description Example
Position Absolute position encoded as world geodetic
system coordinate (WGS84) or as universal
transverse mercator (UTM) coordinate.
WGS84: latitude =
49.871654°, longitude =
8.638208°
UTM: easting =
474002.49m, northing =
5524423.53m, zone = 32U
Heading Course angle of the position. 0° = north,
90° = east, 180° = south, 270° = west.
Driving direction towards
north-west = 45.00°
Velocity
Optionally, the velocity reported by neighbors
can be used. Alternatively, it is calculated based
on the driven distance between two messages.
30m/s
Yaw velocity
The yaw velocity describes the speed of a vehicle
rotation around the yaw-axis (z-axis). A value is
positive if the rotation is in counterclockwise
direction from the bird’s eye view.
0.5 rad/s
Lateral
acceleration
Describes the linear acceleration parallel to the
lateral axis of the node. A positive value is given
if the node turns left and a negative value is given
if the node turns right.
1.2 m/s2
Longitudinal
acceleration
Describes the linear acceleration parallel to the
longitudinal axis of the node. A positive value is
given for accelerations and a negative value is
given for decelerations.
-3.5 m/s2
In addition to the information included in messages received from V2X neighbors, the consistency
and plausibility checker requires mobility information of the own station. At minimum, a frequently
updated PV of the own system is required in order to verify the plausibility of received information. To
increase the quality of plausibility checking the framework can further leverage different independent
sources of information that confirm or disprove a specific situation. Table 2.3 describes secondary local
information sources that may be used to check whether a stated position of a neighbor node is plausible.
Table 2.3.: Secondary local information sources used by data plausibility checks
Information source Description
Digital road map Digital maps provide accurate representations of a particular area, detailing
most road arteries and further give other traffic related information.
Environment
sensors
Cameras, radar, lidar or ultrasonic sensors are able to provide information
about the environment in line of sight. For example, a lidar or two camera
arranged side by side allow a three dimensional recognition of the
environment.
Directional
antennas
Antenna arrays or directional antennas allow a rough position estimation of
senders in wireless networks, cf. [SJWH11].
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2.3. Adversary Model
This section presents the adversary model which serves as a basis for the development of counter-
measures within this dissertation. The severity of a threat caused by an adversary depends on its
abilities, technical knowledge and methods on accessing the attack target. Different types of at-
tackers can be clustered into different groups according to their possibilities, motivations and situ-
ations [MBS+09, SBK+11]. Therefore different motivations for attacks on VANETs are discussed
in Section 2.3.1. Further, different variants and situations can be distinguished as presented in Sec-
tion 2.3.2. However, this dissertation focuses on misbehavior detection that is caused by location-based
attacks. Therefore, this kind of attack is presented in detail in Section 2.3.3.
2.3.1. Attacker Motivation
Understanding the motivation of an attacker is important to determine the risk of specific attacks.
Table 2.4 categorizes the motivation of possible attackers and provides examples for a related at-
tack [SBK+11]. In this dissertation we focus on incentives that may motivate location-based attacks.
Table 2.4.: Classification of attacker motivations
Motivation Examples
Physical harm,
vandalism, terrorism,
robbery, kidnapping
Causing an accident
Denial of Service of VANET nodes and communications
Reduce trust in V2X communications by provoking false
driver warnings
Reducing road traffic efficiency such as provoking traffic
congestions in order to reroute the traffic
Financial incentives
Insurance fraud: After an accident, the vehicle owner
could try to manipulate the recorded location data stored
in the vehicle in order to obscure liable behavior
Create and distribute personal advertisement without
agreement of the receiver
Infringement of car manufacturer’s intellectual property
Non monetary personal
motivation
Gain reputation as hacker
Get the ability to run own malware on VANET nodes
in order to increase the hacker’s reputation or to prepare
other attacks
Enhancement of the attacker’s traffic conditions, e. g.
freeing the fast lane on a highway
2.3.2. Attack Variants
In general, different different attack variants can be distinguished: passive vs. active attacks, online vs.
offline attacks, and external vs. internal attacks.
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Passive vs. Active Attack In a passive attack, the attacker is not able to manipulate the attacked
system. For instance, an attacker could eavesdrop critical data such as private keys or certificates
containing privacy relevant information. In an active attack, however, the attacker actively interacts
with the system to be attacked. Typical examples for active attacks are the injection or alteration
of software as well as the modification of stored data on system endpoints such as VANET nodes.
Moreover, active attackers may inject or alter transmitted data within the communication between the
nodes.
Passive attacks are relevant for the privacy in VANET communications as the extensive collection of
wireless transmitted data within large areas may enable attackers to create movement traces of vehicles
that can be linked to individuals. However, we focus in this dissertation on the detection of active
attackers that actively transmit fake information. According to the definition in Section 1.2 misbehavior
must be observable and classifiable. A passive attacker that does not emitting signals may only be
indirectly detectable utilizing side channel information.
Online vs. Offline Attack For performing an offline attack, the attacker requires physical access to
the hardware under attack. As the attack type already indicates, the system under attack is offline. That
means that the software environment is not running. The attacker may access the storage of the attacked
system by the use of another computer or by transplanting certain hardware components into a system
controlled by the attacker. Both ways may allow for the manipulation of files or databases. Conse-
quently, the attacker may be able to access or modify sensitive data, e. g. credentials or account data,
that are not protected by appropriate mechanisms such as a Hardware Security Module [WWZ+11]. In
addition, the code of V2X applications or the operating system could be modified by an attacker, which
allows him to disable parts of the software or significantly change the functionality of the software.
In online attacks the executed software of the system under attack is not manipulated but vulnerability
in the operating system or the applications are exploited. A vulnerability may be used to bypass a
security enforcement system or to inject malicious code that is subsequently executed on the system.
This may result in a temporary or permanent change of the system behavior.
We assume that an attacker is able to use both, online and offline attacks to perform location-based
attacks.
External vs. Internal Attack External attackers are not authenticated and authorized to actively
participate in the network. By the use of cryptography external attackers can be excluded from the
network. In this case only authenticated network nodes can be equipped with valid cryptographic
credentials that are not accessible by external attackers. As a result, external attackers can passively
tap the communication but are not authorized to transmit messages. However, if an external attacker
sends an invalid message, the receiver can detect and discard it since only messages from authenticated
and authorized senders are verified successfully. In contrast, an internal attacker is equipped with valid
cryptographic credentials in order to participate as a valid network node. Using only cryptographic
security mechanisms, malicious activities cannot be detected and bogus messages are accepted by the
receivers.
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2.3.3. Location-Based Attacks in VANETs
In this section the attacker model is presented that is applied as basis for the remaining dissertation.
Only with an substantiated attacker model appropriate countermeasures can be developed. In contrast
to the situation given in wired networks, Wifi networks, and MANETs typically location-related in-
formation is distributed within VANETs. Therefore, we focus on internal active online attackers that
distribute false position data. In particular, the attacker can simply broadcast fake CAMs with a false
position vector but with a valid digital signature. Consequently, the illusion of a vehicle can be created
that exists not in the reality. We denote this kind of simulated node further as ghost vehicle. In general,
location-based attacks can be used to create a fake event (e. g. emergency braking of a non-existing
vehicle) or, in contrast, to deny a real event (e. g. denying the existence of a present traffic jam). Fig-
ure 2.5 exemplary shows a location-related attack. The ghost vehicle A1 is created in front of a real
vehicle R and performs a virtual emergency braking action. If the driver of R brakes as a reaction on a
warning it could be endangered by the truck T that may not be equipped with a V2X communication
unit.
Victim endangered 
due to actions of 
ghost vehicle A1 
R 
Attacker A 
T A1 
Ghost 
vehicle 
Figure 2.5.: Location-based attack: Ghost vehicle A1 is created and placed by an attacker A in front of
a real vehicle R
Furthermore, it is assumed that an internal active attacker might be able to present multiple identities
in parallel to create the illusion of several ghost vehicles at the same time. This kind of attack is named
Sybil attack and was first described by Douceur [Dou02]. Even though a central trusted authority (i. e.
PKI, cf. Section 2.2.1) is used in V2X communications, VANET nodes may be equipped with a set
of pseudonym certificates that have overlapping periods of validity. As a result, an attacker could use
multiple pseudonym certificates in parallel to mount a Sybil attack.
In the following subsections we demonstrate the impact of location-related attacks on the traffic
efficiency and on traffic safety applications. In addition to the simulation of the attacks with a traffic
and communication simulator real V2X communication equipment is used to demonstrate the impact
of location-based attacks.
2.3.3.1. Simulation of Location-Based Attacks
Compared to highly complex and expensive real field tests a simulation framework allows the study
of effects on the traffic flow in larger scenarios with multiple variations. The simulator allows the
evaluation of different scenarios with flexible configurations such as several test runs with different
V2X communication unit equipment rates at involved vehicles. The evaluations can also be repeated
using the setup described afterwards in this section in order to reproduce the evaluation results. For
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these reasons, a software simulator is used to particularly demonstrate the impact of location-based
attacks on road traffic efficiency. The design and concepts of the simulated attacks were elaborated
by the author of this dissertation [BSRS11]. The subsequent implementation of required software
components and the configuration of the simulation framework was supported by Christian Schmidt as
part of his Bachelor thesis [SSB10] which was supervised by me.
In fact, the simulations are used to study different driver behavior schemes. However, traffic simula-
tion itself is complex as most mathematical traffic flow models are incomplete [KHRW02]. Moreover,
according to Schünemann et al. [SMR08] traffic simulation itself does not suffice for the field of V2X
communications. To study the impact of attackers, a wireless communication network simulator is
needed and own applications have to be executed on the simulated VANET nodes. Therefore, the
framework V2X simulation runtime infrastructure (VSimRTI) [fAITI13, QSR08] was used that allows
the integration of several simulators. The objective is to verify the hypothesis that an internal attacker
is able to negatively affect the road traffic efficiency in order to motivate the application of appropriate
countermeasures. As far we know this kind of evaluation of possible attacker’s impact on road traffic
efficiency has not been performed previously. The authors in related work mostly focus on malicious
impact on packet routing in VANETs [HRM10,LS06]. In order to quantify the influence of the attacker
we measured the travel time of vehicles between a starting point and a destination location.
The VSimRTI system architecture is inspired by the IEEE standard for modeling and simulation
(M&S) high level architecture (HLA) [oEE00]. However, the complexity of the HLA standard and its
implementation exceed the scope of a V2X simulation framework. Instead, a subset of the standard
and some of its fundamental concepts were used to realize the V2X simulation framework. Hence,
a lightweight framework for simulator integration was created by the Daimler Center for Automotive
Information Technology Innovations [fAITI13] that facilitates the simulation of V2X communication
scenarios. Communication among the simulators is enabled by the VSimRTI which is accessible by
ambassadors similar to the HLA standard.
This simulation environment is further used to implement and execute attacks on the VANET by con-
sidering a subset of possible driver reactions. In the following scenarios, an attacker A is broadcasting
bogus V2X messages in order to negatively affect the traffic efficiency.
Scenario 1: Attacker creates ghost vehicle on single lane road In the first scenario as shown
in Figure 2.6, the attacker has a fixed position at the road side. The transmitter of the attacker is
located approximately in the middle of an urban road segment of 1200 meters in length. A laptop, a
compromised RSU or a parked vehicle could be used to broadcast messages with bogus content. In this
first scenario, vehicles drive with 50 km/h on one lane of the road segment. Due to the mobility model
applied in the traffic simulator, vehicles are not allowed to overtake by using lanes of the opposite
driving direction. As a result, slow vehicles slow down also following vehicles on the same lane. As
argued by Schmidt et al. [SLH09] a fixed roadside attacker can be assumed to be realistic due to the
minimal effort for the attacker. In this first scenario, the attacker A is periodically broadcasting bogus
CAMs and DENMs stating a ghost vehicle A1 in an abnormal state such as being involved in a traffic
accident. Vehicles in approximately 300 meters distance to the attacker receive the bogus messages and
react immediately by slowing down.
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Roadside attacker broadcasts 
bogus information 
Faked hazard 
on the road 
< 
Vehicle brakes due 
to received warning 
Uneqipped vehicles 
may be hindered 
Unequipped vehicles 
have to slow down 
Figure 2.6.: Active internal roadside attacker creates a ghost vehicle A1 on a single lane road
Scenario 2: Attacker creates multiple ghost vehicle on multilane highway In a second simulated
scenario, illustrated in Figure 2.7, a Sybil attack is executed on a highway by a roadside attacker
similar to the first scenario. In this case a road segment with a length of 1700 meters is configured.
The static attacker located approximately 1100 meters behind the starting point broadcasts CAMs with
different identifiers and faked positions in order to simulate a traffic congestion on a highway with 3
lanes per direction. It is assumed that vehicles equipped with a V2X communication system detect
a congestion if the speed of a vehicle in the transmission range is below a defined threshold and its
distance to another vehicle is smaller than the usual safety zone. In our simulations, we assume that
vehicles driving slower than 10 m/sec and exhibit, additionally, a safety distance smaller than 9 meters
are involved in a congestion. Vehicles that detect such a situation on the same road segment in front of
their own position react on this event by slowing down such as shown in Figure 2.9.
Roadside attacker broadcasts CAMs 
in order to fake a congested area 
< 
Vehicle brakes due to 
detected traffic congestion 
Faked traffic congestion 
with ghost vehicles 
Unequipped faster 
vehicles may overtake 
A1 A2 
A3 A4 A5 
Figure 2.7.: Active internal roadside attacker executes a Sybil attack on a multilane highway
Evaluation of attack scenarios A major challenge for the evaluation of attacks is the definition of
appropriate driver behavior. The behavior can not be statically defined due to the fact that different
drivers may have different perceptions. Consequently two possible behavior schemes of the driver are
considered in order to evaluate the impact of the attacks.
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In the first scheme, the driver reduces its speed permanently to 8 m/sec as soon as the road hazard is
detected. This reduced speed is kept until the end of the simulated road segment is reached. This kind
of driver behavior may reflect cautious drivers who reduce their speed for a longer period of time even
if no real danger can be identified on the road. The first graphs in Figures 2.8 and 2.9 represent this
permanent reduction of the vehicles’ velocity.
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Figure 2.8.: Impact on single lane road traffic efficiency with an attacker in communication range
In the second scheme, the speed of the vehicle is reduced as soon as the transmission range of the
attacker is entered and malicious messages are received. The communication simulator is configured
to a communication radius of approximately 300 meters per node. Vehicles that approach the attacker’s
communication range are immediately informed about the road hazard and reduce their speed for ap-
proximately 250 meters to 8 m/sec. This scheme is probably the normal behavior because vehicle
drivers in the real world approaching and passing a faked danger spot would see that no real danger
exists and accelerate to normal speed until they have passed this area. The second graphs in Figures 2.8
and 2.9 represent this temporary reduction of the vehicles’ velocity.
The graphs in Figures 2.8 and 2.9 show the effect on the overall traffic that is analyzed with increasing
numbers of reacting vehicles. The figures show the average of driving time of 10 vehicles that is
required between the starting point and the destination. In order to measure the reference trip time no
simulated vehicle is equipped with a V2X communication unit and consequently no bogus message is
processed. Further, a vehicle equipment rate of 20 %, 40 %, 60 %, 80 %, and 100 % is considered in
independent simulation runs. Unequipped vehicles do not reduce their speed and may overtake slower
vehicles if there is a free lane available.
As shown by the results in Figure 2.8 the impact on the overall road traffic is already significant
if only 20 % of all vehicles are equipped with V2X communication units on a single lane road that
is attacked (cf. Figure 2.6). Due to missing opportunities to overtake, drivers that are assuming a
hazard on the road will also slow down following vehicles on the same road segment. As a result, even
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unequipped vehicles may be influenced by the attacker. This impact is similar for both reaction types
as distinguished by the different graphs in Figure 2.8. With 20 % equipped vehicles, the mean travel
time increases up to 21 % in case of permanent speed reduction and 6 % in case of temporary speed
reduction. The maximum delay exceeds 31 % and 16 % to vehicles that slow down permanently and
temporarily, respectively.
Similarly, in the second scenario, depicted in Figure 2.7, vehicles equipped with a V2X communi-
cation system react as soon as they detect the congested road segment based on received bogus CAMs.
However, in contrast to the single lane road segment, unequipped faster vehicles are allowed to over-
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Figure 2.9.: Impact on multilane highway traffic efficiency with an attacker in communication range
take the slow vehicles. As a result, Figure 2.9 shows a linear increase of driving time. The minimal
mean travel time for all vehicles from the start point to the destination is used as reference. Compared
to the first scenario a different road length and another road type is used in this second scenario. Con-
sequently the difference between normal travel speed and reduced speed due to received warnings is
higher in this second scenario. For the equipped vehicles that detect the faked traffic congestion, the
delay of mean travel time exceeds 71 % in case of permanent speed reduction and 30 % in case of
temporary speed reduction. However, if only a subset of vehicles react on bogus information, attacks
on multilane roads may have a limited impact on the overall traffic efficiency because vehicles without
having a V2X communication system may not be affected.
Both kinds of attacks may exhibit an even larger impact on the traffic if faked hazard notifications are
forwarded via multi-hop communication to distant nodes which take another route to their destination.
In this case, the attacker may be able to reroute other vehicles in order to get a less occupied road.
Nevertheless, with this experiments we have demonstrated that internal attackers are able to negatively
influence the road traffic efficiency by broadcasting fake V2X messages. As a result, countermeasures
have to be applied that are able to detect the attacks and identify the responsible attacker nodes.
26
2.3. Adversary Model
2.3.3.2. Real Location-Based Attacks
Since the calibration of the simulator requires detailed knowledge of parameters related to communi-
cations, vehicle movement, driver behavior, and the environment the performance of real world ex-
periments are indispensable. As a consequence we analyzed the attacker’s possibilities concerning
the distribution of fake location-based information using three test vehicles equipped with prototypical
V2X communication units on a dedicated test track. With these experiments we analyze whether at-
tackers are able to send false traffic safety warnings that are accepted, processed and displayed as driver
warnings at vehicles in communication range. In our test setup the attacker was able to control the V2X
communication system of a vehicle. The attacker manipulated only the contents of the position vector
(cf. Table 2.2 on page 18) which may result in abnormalities as defined in Section 1.2.
As far we know location-based attacks on VANET communications have not previously been per-
formed in real world scenarios. The attack variants presented in the following have been elaborated and
designed by the author of this dissertation [BSP+13]. Henrik Schröder implemented and performed the
experiments and evaluated subsequently the test results as part of his Master thesis [SWB13] which
was supervised by me.
Our experimental location-based attack deploys a malware on the application layer of a vehicle that is
equipped with a V2X communication system. This malware is able to create messages (e. g. CAMs or
DENMs) with forged content that are sent out via facilities layer, network & transport layer and access
layer (cf. Figure 2.2 on page 14). Without appropriate misbehavior detection and prevention mecha-
nisms in place an application layer attacker does not need to modify the communication stack to send
valid V2X messages containing faked PVs in the application payload. The PVs of the security header
and the network header are not affected as they are created by the security subsystem and network layer
implementation, respectively. Assuming a strict separation of layers, every layer has to cryptograph-
ically protect its own data by adding a dedicated security header. In practice this strategy would dra-
matically enlarge the packet size and would impede reliable high frequency broadcast communication.
Consequently, a single security header is considered per packet as depicted in Figure 2.3 and targeted
by field operational tests (FOTs) [Wei09, Sch13], related security projects [WWZ+11, SBK+11] and
industrial consortia [WBF+13]. The applications on the receiver station consequently consider only the
PV of the payload (i. e. generation time, station ID and reference position of CAMs and DENMs). An
application layer attacker is able to even forge the movement paths of multiple stations by using dif-
ferent station IDs. However, more powerful attackers who control the complete communication stack
including the security subsystem would be able to send messages that contain consistent PVs in all
headers of a V2X packet.
An application layer attacker requires only limited access to components of the OBU to impact the
traffic safety of other nodes when misbehavior detection is not applied. A malware on application layer
can use well defined interfaces to get mobility data of the own station (i. e. time and position). Such
a malware can further use the communication channels to send fake messages, has access to the local
navigation support and gets the list of V2X neighbors. The developed experimental malware creates
ghost vehicles by forging the PV of self generated messages. Due to the navigation support and access
to the V2X neighbor list, the malware can automatically select a location on the road where a ghost
vehicle has most impact on neighbors. Since the malware aims to affect V2X functions that rely on
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single-hop CAMs and DENMs, the attacker has to make sure that malware-generated CAMs do not
conflict with CAMs generated automatically by the facilities layer.
V2X Application: Emergency Electronic Brake Lights In order to demonstrate the impact of
an application layer attacker misuse scenarios for the emergency electronic brake lights (EEBL) are
discussed in the following. The EEBL application is specified by ETSI in its basic set of applica-
tions [ETS09]. Instead of using simulations, as done by most related work, an implementation on
real vehicles is used in this dissertation to demonstrate the feasibility of location-based attacks. Conse-
quently, the detailed specification of the functionality of the application has to be known by the attacker.
The results of this location-based attack are applicable to several other location-related applications
specified by ETSI [ETS09].
• Slow vehicle and stationary vehicle warning
• Wrong way driving warning
• Signal violation warning
• Overtaking vehicle warning and lane change assistance
• Pre-crash sensing warning
• Co-operative glare reduction
• Across traffic turn and merging traffic turn collision risk warning
• Intersection collision warning
• Co-operative merging assistance
• Co-operative forward collision warning
• Intersection management combined with traffic light optimal speed advisory
• Co-operative adaptive cruise control and platooning
• etc.
The co-operative road safety application EEBL aims to warn following vehicles of a sudden slow-
down of the traffic to limit the risk of longitudinal collisions. A strong braking vehicle, equipped with
a V2X communication system, immediately broadcasts a DENM that informs the receivers about a
panic braking action. After the reception of the DENM, the EEBL application on single-hop neigh-
bors calculates whether the braking vehicle is in its area of relevance. If it is relevant, the application
calculates its individual time-to-crash (TTC). The relevance area is spanned in front of the receiver’s
vehicle with an angle relα and a length rell as depicted in Figure 2.10. If the DENM sender is inside
the relevance area of the receiver R, an information or warning is shown to the driver depending on the
TTC value. In case the receiver’s velocity is above a defined threshold and TTC ≤ T TCwarn then the
driver is warned. Otherwise, a less important EEBL information is displayed. In the experiments, the
EEBL configuration is used as shown in Table 2.5.
Without appropriate misbehavior detection and prevention mechanisms, false EEBL warnings can
be provoked at unmodified victim vehicles as illustrated in Figure 2.10. The malware deployed on
the attacker’s vehicle A analyzes the V2X neighborhood and automatically selects a victim as further
detailed in the following paragraph. Subsequently, in front of victim R a ghost vehicle A1 is created
that pretends to drive in the same direction with a valid movement. After a lead time attacklead the
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Attacker A creates 
ghost vehicle 
< 
Benign victim R   
gets EEBL warning  
relα rell 
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Figure 2.10.: Simulation of braking ghost vehicle by singe driving attacker
attacker broadcasts in the name of A1 an EEBL-DENM that informs about the fake braking action. The
DENM and subsequent CAMs from the attacker contain each a PV with aligned position data and a
negative acceleration value of attackdec. Since A1 is modeled in the relevant safety area of R, the EEBL
application of the victim displays a false driver warning. This may lead to an unexpected and possibly
dangerous reaction of the driver.
Victim Selection The application layer malware deployed on the OBU of A is designed to trigger
the unmodified EEBL application on equipped neighbors. The malware is working autonomously with
data from the attacker’s OBU without manual interaction or support of external entities. As soon as
there is at least one single-hop vehicle station, the malware checks whether the neighbor’s distance to
A is below attackrange (cf. Table 2.5). If several neighbors fulfill the conditions, the vehicle with the
most straight trajectory and the highest speed is selected as victim. The malware starts to iteratively
attack this vehicle for a time attackdur until another victim with better conditions is found. This means
that the ghost vehicle is replaced after attackdur to a position in front of the victim.
Table 2.5.: EEBL application configuration and attacker’s malware configuration
EEBL Application Attacker
Parameter Value Parameter Value
relα 90◦ attackdec -7.5 m/s2
rell 400 m attackrange 500 m
T TCwarn 5 sec attackdur 4 sec
attacklead 1 sec
Implementation of the EEBL Attack For the experimental analysis of the exemplary location-based
attack three test cars were used that were fully equipped with a V2X communication system. At one
of the vehicles the malware application was installed and the original CAM generation of the facilities
layer was deactivated. All remaining components and functionalities on this attacker station were left
unchanged. The other two cars were not modified at all and served as victims.
The OBU of the test cars provides interfaces to the vehicle’s CAN bus, GPS and the wireless ITS-
G5A channel based IEEE 802.11p. The applications are executed in a Java OSGi framework [All13]
which provides an vehicular API to access information about the own station and the communication
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channels. The application execution framework is separated from the communication stack implemen-
tation on a automotive grade personal computer with an Intel Atom D510 processor at 1.66 GHz and 2
GB of RAM.
The experiments were conducted on a dedicated test area where low speed and high speed tests could
be done without endangering public road traffic. Although different test variants were performed in the
experiments the next paragraph focuses on the evaluation of a test situation as illustrated in Figure 2.10.
Evaluation of the EEBL Attack The sent and received messages of the attacker and the victim as
well as the mobility information of both vehicles were recorded while the tests. This enabled us to
replay the attack scenario subsequently with V2X communication units in a laboratory environment.
However, since only two vehicles were used in the experiments the results can easily repeated using
the setup information provided in this section.
In the selected attack scenario an unmodified vehicle R is driving on a straight 2200 meters long road
with constant speed of 14 m/sec. The attack outcome on unprotected receivers is shown in Figure 2.11
with time and distance on the diagram axes. The diagram shows the attack over a time of 70 seconds.
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Figure 2.11.: Attacker A creates a braking ghost vehicle A1 that provokes false driver warnings at receiver R.
The victim R is not running location data-based misbehavior detection mechanisms.
At the beginning of this test, vehicle A with the running malware drives 350 meters behind the receiver
vehicle R outside its communication range. The first curve shows the distance between attacker A
and receiver R over the test time. As soon as A enters the communication range of R, the malware
automatically detects R as victim and executes the EEBL attack by creating the ghost vehicle A1.
Shown by the filled blue curve in Figure 2.11, the attacker creates CAMs for a ghost vehicle A1 at time
k0 and waits attacklead before an EEBL warning is broadcasted in the name of A1. At this point in
time A1 is placed approximately 30 meters in front of R. After the time attacklead the ghost vehicle
simulates an emergency braking action, decelerates and sends an EEBL-DENM at k1 which is received
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and displayed by the victim R. Since the driver of R is not (intentionally) reacting to the false warning
the vehicle passes the position of the ghost vehicle a few seconds later.
As soon as the malware detects that the ghost vehicle’s position is passed by the victim, it places a
new ghost vehicle in front of R at time k2 and starts another emergency braking attack. As a result,
the victim R gets a new warning at each iteration. This attack is repeated until A leaves the single-hop
communication range of the selected victim at time k3. Figure 2.12 illustrated the sequence of actions
and related events at time k0, k1, and k2.
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Figure 2.12.: Sequence of a ghost vehicle attack created by Attacker A
This evaluation shows that real attacks on V2X applications are possible by using an application
layer malware. As long as the receiver is not protected appropriately by misbehavior detection mecha-
nisms, an attacker can misuse the OBU with its communication stack including the security subsystem
that handles valid cryptographic credentials. The attacker analysis of Bißmeyer et al. [BSP+13] has
considered in addition to the application layer attacker more sophisticated attackers who are able to
control the complete communication stack or parts of it. Attackers who control for example the CAN
bus interface could forge the GNSS position and the movement of the local station. This attacker would
additionally be able to manipulate the PV of the V2X network header and the security header without
manipulating the communication stack implementation. An unrestricted attacker that is for example
using a laptop is assumed to be the most powerful adversary. It operates a complete V2X commu-
nication system and possesses valid cryptographic credentials. In this dissertation we aim to detect
location-based misbehavior created by all kinds of adversaries.
Extension and Limitation of the Location-Related Attacks Our experimental attack is relatively
simple since the attacker does not consider the environment of the ghost vehicle. A more sophisticated
attacker would probably try to imitate plausible movement of the ghost vehicle. First, the attacker
would probably aim to create the ghost vehicle at the border of the communication range of the victim
in order to avoid the sudden appearing of the node. However, with other vehicles in the attacker’s
communication range there is a high chance that other vehicles detect the ghost vehicle to be suddenly
appearing. Moreover, the attacker might aim to avoid vehicle overlaps and position jumps as depicted
in Figure 2.12 at time k1 and k2, respectively. This, however, might become challenging with increasing
traffic density. The attacker has to maneuver the ghost vehicle through the road traffic without creating
overlaps with other vehicles by avoiding at the same time position jumps.
In conclusion, we have demonstrated the impact of location-related attacks performed by active inter-
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nal attackers. Since location and time information is consumed by most V2X applications an internal
attacker is able to trigger false driver warnings at neighbors in single-hop communication range. Due
to our experiments with test vehicles we confirm in this dissertation for the first time the hypothesis
that internal attacks are the reality if the following conditions are given. The attacker is able to install
a malware application on vehicles that is equipped with appropriate communication devices and secu-
rity credentials. Additionally, the receivers are not appropriately protected by misbehavior detection
systems such as consistency and plausibility checks.
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3. Local Misbehavior Detection on VANET Nodes
The detection of misbehavior in VANETs is essential in order to exclude internal attackers that are
in the possession of V2X transceivers and valid cryptographic credentials. This part of the thesis is
dedicated to mechanisms for consistency and plausibility checks of mobility data that are received
from single-hop neighbors via CAMs or DENMs. The evaluation of these approaches is discussed in
this chapter in relation to the single messages but also in relation to its sender node.
After the discussion of related work in Section 3.1, misbehavior detection algorithms are classified in
Section 3.2. General criteria for the evaluation of the proposed mechanims are discussed in Section 3.3.
Our main contributions are discussed in the subsequent sections. A module-based misbehavior de-
tection framework is proposed in Section 3.4 using different kinds of checks. Basic message-based
value range checks and consistency checks are performed at first in this scheme. Subsequently, node-
based checks are used to verify the movement of neighbor vehicles by performing a tracking based on
Kalman filters. The framework has been tested and evaluated with 120 vehicles and 100 RSUs over a
period of 76 days. A new scheme for detecting abnormal vehicle overlaps, is developed in Section 3.5.
Finally, a misbehavior detection framework based on particle filters is presented in Section 3.6. The
particle filter-based framework allows the integration of incoming data for plausibility checking and
simplifies consequently the local misbehavior detection.
3.1. Related Work
Data plausibility checking and misbehavior detection in V2X communications is discussed in several
publications since 2004. In the following three subsections related work regarding location-based at-
tacks, detection mechanisms and related frameworks is discussed (Sections 3.1.1, 3.1.2, and 3.1.3). In
Section 3.1.4 an evaluation of this related work with respect to this dissertation is presented.
3.1.1. Location-Based Attacks
Reactive misbehavior detection mechanisms are required to detect location-related attacker in a VANET
as analyzed in [ETS13c, LHSW04, LSM07, SBK+11]. Leinmüller et al. [LHSW04, LSM07] identified
that the application of classical network intrusion detection systems is limited because they primarily
base on signature and anomaly detections. In contrast, a context-related verification of position and
timing data is more promising in VANETs. The authors further argue that reactive concepts such as
plausibility checking and misbehavior detection are key security concepts for securing active safety
applications. The authors in [LSS+08] and [LSKM05] showed that position forging attacks with cre-
ated ghost vehicles are most severe for VANET security. They assume that an attacker is able to apply
the following attack variants: forging single positions, forging multiple positions with different IDs,
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forging a movement path of a single node or forging multiple movement paths with different node IDs.
Similarly, Papadimitratos [Pap08] argues that the most dangerous adversary is an internal attacker that
possesses cryptographic keys and credentials to participate in V2X communications.
3.1.2. Location Data-Related Plausibility Checking
In order to detect ghost vehicles, the following context-related mobility data plausibility and con-
sistency checks are proposed by different authors of research papers [FCCP13], [Ger10], [GGS04],
[LMSK06], [LSK06], [SLH09], [SLS+08], [Sch09] and within research projects such as SEVECOM
[Kun08] or simTD [MBS+09]. In the following listing related mechanisms are presented in an unstruc-
tured manner. A categorization of relevant mechanisms is subsequently proposed in Section 3.2.
• Different authors of related work propose to consider an acceptance range related to received
messages in order to detect senders that are not inside the receivers communication range. This
test has been first proposed by Golle et al. [GGS04]. The behavior related to this attack is also
known as wormhole attack in wireless networks [HPJ06]. In addition to the position freshness
check, the authors of IEEE 1609.2 [IEE13] and ETSI TS 102 731 [ETS10c] propose to check the
freshness of timestamps in order to detect replayed messages.
• Leinmüller et al. [LSK06] and Gerlach [Ger10] propose to observe the mobility of nodes in order
to detect implausible movement traces that contain for example position jumps.
• Yan et al. [YOW08] propose a concept that is used to verify position claims of single-hop neigh-
bor nodes with omni-directional radar sensors. Several authors of related work propose to use
context and environment information in order to verify mobility data provided by neighboring
VANET nodes.
• Douceur [Dou02] proposes to verify the maximum vehicle density in order to detect Sybil at-
tacks.
• Leinmüller et al. [LSK06] and Gerlach [Ger10] propose to verify the stated positions provided
in V2X messages in relation to digital maps.
• Jaeger et al. [JBSH11] propose to verify of the maximum beaconing frequency in order to detect
denial-of-service (DoS) attacks.
• Different authors of related work propose to eavesdrop messages in order to monitor the forward-
ing behavior of neighboring nodes. A first mechanism is described by Marti et al. [MGLB00]
in the context of MANET routing. Kozma et al. [KL08] and Tian et al. [TWLY10] adopted this
approach to perform intrusion detection in VANETs. However, only the related work is relevant
that consider geographic routing protocols because ETSI standards focus on this type of packet
forwarding in the multi-hop routing strategy of V2X communication [ETS11].
• The proactive and reactive exchange of neighbor tables for consistency verification is proposed
by different authors, such as Leinmüller et al. [LSK06], Schmidt et al. [SLS+08], and Yan et
al. [YCO09]. In particular, in [YCO09] Yan et al. propose the distribution of a list that contains
radar confirmed neighbor vehicle positions in order to detect Sybil attacks cooperatively.
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• Schmidt et al. [SLS+08] propose the check of a minimum moved distance in order to identify
static roadside attackers. The authors argue that location-related attacks performed by static
attackers are more likely than attacks performed by mobile attackers due complexity reasons.
• Schmidt et al. [SLS+08] propose also the detection of suddenly appearing nodes in the receiver’s
vicinity. The authors aim to detect in particular static attackers with this mechanism.
• Hubaux et al. [HCL04] are the first that propose to detect invalid location claims based on a
received signal strength indicator (RSSI). The protocols proposed by Hubaux et al. [HCL04]
and Demirbas et al. [DS06] need at least four static RSUs that analyze the transmission power
of a sender in order to detect false position claims and Sybil attacks. Unfortunately, the RSSI-
based position estimation technique is not very accurate. Therefore, Laurendeau et al. [LB09]
and Xiao et al. [XYG06] propose to consider only the direction of the signal source. Ren et
al. [RLY+09] propose further a relative location verification by using directional antennas to
distinguish between vehicles in front and behind.
• Fiore et al. [FCCP13] propose an active protocol for neighbor position verification based on
time-of-flight radio frequency ranging technologies. This active challenge-response protocol can
be used to reliably detect attackers who fake their location. However, this protocol might need
an additional communication channel in order to exchange the challenge-response messages.
The authors of [LHSW04] and [ODS07] propose to consider additionally application-specific knowl-
edge for misbehavior detection. In the latter reference, the authors focus on misbehavior detection
based on received hazard messages by comparing notifications about the same event from different
originators. Gosh et al. [GVKG09] propose to check the consistency of post crash notifications in or-
der to identify false warnings. They compare vehicle trajectories and driving habits in order to detect
application specific misbehavior.
In order to detect Sybil attacks, the authors of [CWHZ09], [PATZ09], [XYG06], and [ZCNC07]
assume a dense network of RSUs that can assist the verification of stated vehicle positions. These
approaches assume that a tracking of vehicles is possible over a large area so that RSUs can recognize
a vehicle at different locations. However, the authors of [ZCNC07] propose to use a trusted third party
that allows only RSUs to recognize the vehicles. In a similar way, the authors of [CWHZ09] assume that
RSUs broadcast frequently special messages and certificates that are used to detect Sybil nodes based on
timestamps contained in the signed RSU messages. Anonymous credentials are another kind of specific
certificates that are used in [CNW11, SWS+12] to detect Sybil nodes based on a cryptographically
protected usage restriction of the credentials. This approach allows a reliable detection of Sybil nodes
as the sender is allowed to use only one credential per time. However, the schemes suffer from increased
overhead and bad performance compared to the elliptic curve cryptography which is considered by
ETSI [ETS13b] and IEEE [IEE13] in their draft standards.
In Section 3.2 we propose a strategy to categorize the aforementioned mechanisms with respect to
misbehavior detection in VANETs.
3.1.3. Misbehavior Detection Frameworks
In this section related misbehavior detection frameworks are discussed that are based on the methods
to verify location-related data discussed in the previous section .
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In [SLS+08] Schmidt et al. describe a VEhicle Behavior Analysis and Evaluation Scheme (VEBAS)
that combines misbehavior detection approaches in a module-based security system. This scheme
maintains different positive rating modules and negative rating modules that implement a selection
of the previously mentioned data plausibility checks. In a further step the outcomes of the different
modules are weighted and aged by a function called exponentially weighted moving average (EWMA)
before they are aggregated within the respective group of positive and negative ratings. Finally, the
authors propose to combine the aggregated ratings in order to get a local trust value for the evaluated
node. This extensible module-based structure is designed to calculate reputation values for neighboring
nodes. It allows also the exchange of locally generated recommendations with neighbors.
In a similar way, in [Ger10] Gerlach proposes a scheme that evaluates the trustworthiness of received
messages based on different modules (here denoted as observers) whose results are aggregated by a
Bayesian network (BN). Every observer contains a rule for evaluating the given mobility data and
translates the results into entries of a conditional probability table. By querying the BN, a trust value
of a single message can be obtained as well as the trustworthiness of the related node. A unique
attribute of this framework is the consideration of confidence values within received mobility data such
as position + confidence, speed + confidence, heading + confidence.
3.1.4. Evaluation of Related Work
Most descriptions of adversary models given by authors of related work are in line with our assumptions
about internal attackers. Single or multiple ghost vehicles could be generated by an attacker in order
to fake traffic safety-related events. Even if the generation of a single ghost vehicle is more likely than
multiple Sybil nodes that are generated simultaneously, it is assumed that an attacker with sufficient
knowledge and control of a V2X communication system is able to create a Sybil attack. As argued by
the author of this dissertation [BSP+13] an internal attacker might be able to forge multiple IDs at the
same time when the sender and receiver do not apply appropriate consistency checks.
The mechanisms presented in Section 3.1.2 are partially based on different assumptions. In this
dissertation, we do not focus on eavesdropping and monitoring the routing behavior as discussed
in [KL08], [LSK06], and [TWLY10]. However, we aim to generally detect fake location claims of
single-hop neighbor nodes. Geographic routing protocols benefit from this detection since they rely on
correct location information of single-hop neighbors in order to forward packets correctly and reliably.
The proactive and reactive exchange of neighbor tables as discussed in [LSK06] and [YCO09] is
another critical issue. All received data from neighbors can be equally trusted as long as valid crypto-
graphic credentials are used to sign the messages. Therefore, attackers would also be able to distribute
faked neighbor tables. Moreover, the exchange of additional data for security purposes would increase
the load on the wireless channel dramatically. According to Schoch [Sch09] the reactive exchange
of position information creates unacceptable communication overhead and the verification does not
profit much or even suffers from it. Increasing the load of the wireless V2X communication channel
is critical since the security overhead is already substantial due to relatively large security creden-
tials [BSS+11, ETS13b, IEE13]. Additionally, the exchange of security-related data may create new
vulnerabilities and attack vectors that could be misused. As a result, we argue to avoid or at least
minimize the amount of additional redundant data that are transmitted for plausibility checks.
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In contrast to the authors of [CWHZ09], [PATZ09], [XYG06], and [ZCNC07], we argue that a
comprehensive network of roadside infrastructures cannot be assumed in VANETs due to its large
area and consequently high costs [KCD+09]. Mechanisms that require a constant connection to the
infrastructure may only be applicable in urban scenarios with a dense network of RSUs. In our system
model defined in this work (cf. Figure 2.1 on page 13) only a sporadic field-vehicle communication
via RSUs is assumed. Moreover, it is unlikely that all vehicles in a VANET are equipped with cellular
network transceivers that can be permanently used to communicate with the infrastructure.
In the following sections we propose reasonable algorithms and instruments for plausibility and con-
sistency checks without relying on unrealistic requirements such as static node IDs or permanent RSU-
vehicle connections. Our solutions are based on fundamentals elaborated by Schmidt et al. [SLS+08]
in their module-based VEBAS scheme and by Gerlach [Ger10] in his observer-based scheme. Unfortu-
nately, the authors of VEBAS do not provide an evaluation at all (cf. [SLS+08]). The author of [Ger10]
limits the evaluation of the observer-based scheme to a fixed receiver station that processes messages
generated by a simulation environment. The practical applicability of these schemes is therefore not
proven. However, in this dissertation we combine most relevant approaches within practically rele-
vant frameworks that are deployed on test vehicles and evaluated under real conditions, partially over
long periods of time. Additionally, we propose a new plausibility check based on the principle of
having a maximum vehicle density as first discussed by Golle et al. [GGS04] and further mentioned
in [Ger10, LSK06].
3.2. Categorization of Misbehavior Detection Checks in VANETs
In this section we propose a strategy to categorize methods for misbehavior detection proposed by
authors of related work (cf. Section 3.1.2) and own methods developed within this dissertation. The
mobility data consistency and plausibility checks discussed in this section are aimed to be applied
in addition to cryptographic security measures as described in Section 2.2.1. These checks are used
to filter messages with obviously wrong position vectors and to collect evidence for a misbehavior
detection.
In general every node in the VANET autonomously perform the checks of the position vector after
reception and decoding of a V2X message. First, mobility data and sender IDs from different packet
headers are extracted by the responsible communication stack layers and handed over to the plausibility
tester. Finally, after performing the checks, an evaluation of the message and sender node trustworthi-
ness is performed which may be used by local applications and for local misbehavior detection.
An overview of the proposed classification is illustrated in Figure 3.1. A message-based plausibility
check of information is performed to filter malformed data that violate predefined range of values. If
the same piece of information is available multiple times in a message a consistency check should be
done in addition. Related methods are detailed in Section 3.2.2. The received mobility data of neighbor
nodes should also be checked against locally available trusted first hand information as explained in
Section 3.2.3 and 3.2.4. This data verification using local static knowledge and local sensor information
can be done either on message basis or on node basis. Finally, received data can be compared with
second hand information received from other VANET nodes. If received information is not consistent
with other received second hand information it might be challenging for the related mechanisms to
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interpret the results correctly, since both information sources are usually trusted equally. Mechanisms
handling second hand information are discussed in Section 3.2.5. A summarization of all mechanisms
is provided in form of a table in Section 3.2.6.
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Figure 3.1.: Checking data for misbehavior detection in VANETs
In Figure 3.1 it is shown that the three checks on the left hand side are message-based and the two
checks on the right hand side are node-based. The value range checks and the consistency checks are
message centric and consider V2X messages separately. The data verification with received second
hand information is in contrast node centric since previous messages have to be received that provide
information about prior node behavior.
3.2.1. Message-Based Data Plausibility Checks
A message-based plausibility check is using predefined rules and physical boundaries. These checks
are using a transmitted position vector (PV) that includes the position of the sender, its current speed
and heading at a specific point in time. In these basic checks the given values of a PV are compared
with the predefined domain of definition.
The heading value shall follow the domain of definition according to related standardization for
CAM and DENM as well as for network layer headers. A heading value larger than 360° for example
should be considered to be not plausible. Furthermore, the velocity values shall be checked as well
as the position of the sender. The position is usually encoded in the WGS841 format that includes a
latitude and longitude value [ETS10d, ETS10e]. For example, a velocity of a vehicle below -30 ms and
beyond 100 ms is suspicious in normal road traffic.
1Geodetic standard of world geodetic system (WGS) used in cartography, geodesy, and navigation, established in 1984 and
last revised in 2004.
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3.2.2. Message-Based Data Consistency Checks with Redundant Information
A message-based consistency check is possible if information is redundant, e. g. due to reception of
multiple messages over different communication channels or due to redundant information on different
layers of the OSI layer model. The general packet format of a V2X message as depicted in Figure 2.3
on page 15 shows that position information is available in different parts of a packet. Even though
this position information is not equal due to possibly different interpretations on different layers, a
comparison by means of consistency checks allows at least a detection of unexpected deviations. Large
deviations consequently may indicate a misbehavior of the sender station since a malware could have
modified the position data on one layer only. However, it is necessary to be aware about variations
between comparable information. For example, the position vector applied on one layer may be more
inaccurate as the vector applied on another layer because in one case the raw GNSS signal is used and
in the other case a dead reckoning optimized position is used. Another reason for variations could be a
slightly different position reference point.
In order to additionally detect Sybil attacks the consistency of identifiers contained in V2X packets
have to be checked as motivated and proposed by Bißmeyer et al. [BSP+13]. Therefore it is required
that at least the node ID of the network header and the station ID of the payload are linked to the
certificate coming as part of the security header. To create the linking the security subsystem of the ITS
station creates a hash value from the currently used pseudonym certificate and uses parts of the value as
certificate ID (cf. ETSI TS 103 097 [ETS13b]). This certificate ID is further used by the layers of the
communication stack to derive their header specific identifiers. On packet reception the identifiers from
the MAC header, network header, security header and payload are collected and finally compared on
the top most message processing layer. If the IDs are not consistent or cannot be linked to the certificate
or its certificate ID, the packet can be considered as malformed.
3.2.3. Message-Based Data Verification with Local First Hand Information
By using static local first hand knowledge two different checks of the message content are considered
that focus on the detection of replayed data. The application of local sensor information, however,
might be important for application-related checks such as temperature value verifications.
Check of maximum communication range (MCR): In a communication range check, the distance
between the position of a single-hop sender and receiver is calculated. If this distance exceeds the
maximum transmission range the location of the sender can be assumed to be not plausible. It is
assumed that radios are used that follow the maximum specified transmission power according to IEEE
802.11p [IEE10] and ETSI ES 202 663 [ETS10b]. The mechanism was first mentioned by Golle
et al. [GGS04] and corresponds to the Acceptance Range Threshold sensor described by Leinmüller
et al. [LSK06]. In general, this kind of check aims to detect location-based replay attacks that are
also known as tunnel or wormhole attack [HPJ06]. In this attack an attacker records an authenticated
message at a location l1, transmits it quickly to a location l2 and re-broadcasts it at l2.
Check of maximum transmission delay (MTD): In addition to a distance check, the maximum
transmission delay of single-hop messages shall be verified by receiving stations. According to ETSI
TS 102 637-2 [ETS10d] the maximum transmission delay of CAMs shall not be larger than 100 ms.
As a result, messages with an outdated timestamp or a future timestamp should be considered as not
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plausible. This kind of check is already part of emerging standards, i. e. IEEE 1609.2 [IEE13] and
ETSI TS 102 731 [ETS10c]. The MTD check aims to detect time-based replay attacks where an
attacker records a valid message at time k1 and replays it later at the same location at a time k2.
3.2.4. Node-Based Data Verification with Local First Hand Information
In addition to the message-based checks, a node-based verification is reasonable using two types of
local first hand information. Static local knowledge about the network and its communication systems
may be used to detect implausible behavior of adjacent nodes. Furthermore, local sensors may be used
to verify the PV of received messages.
3.2.4.1. Checks based on Static Local Knowledge
In this paragraph, four options are denoted that are based on static knowledge and standardized rules
to check location-related data. These checks were first mentioned by Leinmüller et al. [LSK06] and
Schmidt et al. [SLS+08]. However, their practical applicability has not been addressed. Within this
dissertation, different strategies are proposed how to integrate these checks into a misbehavior detection
framework.
Check of maximum beacon frequency (MBF): Since the wireless V2X channels are used coopera-
tively, the maximum transmission frequency of CAMs is limited. A plausibility check on the receiving
station is able to count the received messages from the single-hop neighbors and is consequently able
to detect violations according to ETSI TS 102 637 [ETS10d, ETS10e].
Check of suddenly appearing station (SAS): In normal traffic conditions it can be assumed that
new vehicles first appear at the boundary of the communication range. As a result, a first CAM from
a station with an unknown ID shall contain a PV that states a certain distance between the sender’s
station and the receiver station. However, ID changes and hidden stations that might be caused by large
buildings in urban traffic require a context depended check of suddenly appearing stations.
Check of plausible movement (PM): Based on a physical mobility model for vehicles a position
can be predicted using previously received position statements. When a new message is received, the
predicted position can be compared with the stated position whereupon large deviations are suspicious,
hence may result in misbehavior detection. Since CAMs are broadcasted with a maximum frequency
of 10 Hz [ETS10d], an accurate position vector of the next CAM can be assumed. By checking the
movement plausibility, position jumps and unexpected mobility behavior can be detected.
Check of map related position (MRP): A digital road map can be used to check the position of a
sending vehicle station assuming that every receiving VANET station is equipped with a digital map.
A digital road map may be required by traffic safety and efficiency applications anyway. However, a
vehicle that cannot be assigned to a valid road segment of the local map is possibly driving on a private
road or is parked beside a road. It has to be further considered that the local map may be outdated. In
any case, the exclusive check of a map related position is not robust enough for misbehavior detection.
Performing the MRP check in combination with other verification methods should be preferred.
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3.2.4.2. Checks Based on Local Sensors
Stations that are equipped with local environment sensors can use their measurements to confirm or
refute a stated location of a neighbor node. For example a local front radar transceiver is able to
track different vehicles that are driving ahead of the own station. In the same way, other local dis-
tance and proximity sensors such as cameras, lidar or infrared-based detectors can be used to check the
stated PV of neighbors. Since front radar systems are already widely used in vehicles for autonomous
cruise control, the plausibility checks discussed in this work focus on applying a radar transceiver as
local sensor. The concept of using local sensors to verify stated locations in VANETs has been first
comprehensively discussed by Yan et al. [YOW08] and was subsequently used within other related
concepts [Ger10, SLS+08]. Within this dissertation, we integrated a radar sensor into a misbehav-
ior detection framework and evaluated the practical applicability by using recorded traces and radar
measurements from test vehicles [JBSH11, QBa11].
Radar approved position (RAP): If a received position of a neighbor node can be mapped to a
radar object of the local sensor, then this vehicle position information can be assumed to be trustworthy.
However, RSUs are in general not confirmable with a radar sensor.
Radar conform position (RCP): In addition, the object detection of a local radar can be used to
refute a stated location. If a neighbor vehicle claims a position that is located between the own station
and an object that is detected by the radar, then this vehicle position is not trustworthy. Assuming
that the stations trust their own sensors and on-board networks, a detected false position claim can
be trusted. If however received second hand information is used to check the plausibility of received
position claims the verification might not be trustworthy as discussed in Section 3.2.5.
3.2.5. Node-Based Data Verification with Received Second Hand Information
A station that receives conflicting – but equally trusted – information from two different nodes cannot
directly determine which statement is true and which is false. However, by collecting additional infor-
mation about the same or a similar statement from different independent senders, the receiver may be
able to take a decision assuming that the majority of provided information is correct.
Neighborhood table exchange (NTE): As discussed in the related work neighbors may distribute
their local first hand information (e. g. radar tracked nodes) or reputation information about their neigh-
bor nodes. A receiver of this information is able to compare the received tables with other received
tables and with its local neighbor information. This mechanism has been first discussed by Leinmüller
et al. [LSK06] and is listed in this section for completeness. However, it is not further considered as
reasoned in Section 3.1.4.
Check of vehicle overlaps (VO): Since vehicles are periodically broadcasting CAMs with their
absolute position and their rough stations’ dimensions, a check of position overlaps can be performed
by comparing the PVs of near-by stations. The VO check has been newly developed by the author of
this dissertation [BSB10] and is further discussed in detail in Section 3.5.
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3.2.6. Summary of Misbehavior Detection Check Categorization
A summarization of relevant mechanisms for local misbehavior detection performed on VANET nodes
is presented in Table 3.1. This table shows the correlation of the methods applied in this dissertation
with the classification and information basis illustrated in Figure 3.1.
Table 3.1.: Summary of misbehavior detection check categorization
Abbre-
viation Name of method Classification Information Basis Comment
Plausibility checks of
value ranges
Message-based Specifications
Consistency checks Message-based Redundant information
MCR
Maximum
communication range
Message-based Local static knowledge
MTD
Maximum transmission
delay
Message-based Local static knowledge
MBF
Maximum beacon
frequency
Node-based Local static knowledge
SAS
Suddenly appearing
station
Node-based Local static knowledge
PM Plausible movement Node-based Local static knowledge
MRP Map related position Node-based Local static knowledge
RAP Radar approved position Node-based Local sensor information
RCP Radar conform position Node-based Local sensor information
NTE
Neighborhood table
exchange
Node-based
Received second hand
information
Not further
considered
VO Vehicle overlap test Node-based
Received second hand
information
Developed
by author of
dissertation
3.3. Evaluation Criteria for Misbehavior Detection in VANETs
The evaluations of our approaches in Sections 3.4, 3.5, and 3.6 are based on the aspects introduced in
this section: accuracy, scalability, extensibility, generalizability, complexity, bandwidth & connectiv-
ity, and privacy. In Section 3.7 we compare our proposals with related work based on these criteria
which are described in more detail in the following.
• Accuracy: We focus on the detection of misbehavior as defined in Section 1.2 by considering
the PV defined in Table 2.2 on page 18. The accuracy of the proposed frameworks is measured
based on the following criteria.
– Abnormal deviation of time, absolute location, heading, and velocity
– Abnormal vehicle movement, i. e. position jumps
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– Abnormal occupancy of space, i. e. position overlaps with other nodes and position conflicts
with the observed area of environment sensors such as radar
– Abnormal sudden appearance of VANET nodes
The number of correct detections of maliciously manipulated PV should be maximized (true-
negative) but the number of incorrect detections (false-positive) and the number of not detected
attacks (false-negative) should be minimized. Table 3.2 subsumes the applied evaluation metric.
Table 3.2.: Evaluation metric for data consistency and plausibility checking
Stated mobility information Outcome of plausibility Outcome of plausibility
is correct check is true check is false
(Plausibility confirmed) (Implausibility detected)
False, Correct,False
False-negative True-negative
Correct, False,True
True-positive False-positive
• Scalability: The scalability with respect to computational performance and memory consump-
tion is relevant since automotive computer systems might be more restricted as personal com-
puters. It should be ensured that respective hardware is able to handle the misbehavior detection
solution.
• Extensibility: The extensibility of a solution for misbehavior detection is important since new
attacks might come out in the future and should be considered.
• Generalizability: It should be considered whether the solution can be generalized to be applied
in other domains.
• Complexity: The complexity of misbehavior detection solutions should be as less as possible
in order to avoid vulnerabilities and faulty implementations. Less complex solutions might also
simplify their extensibility and generalization.
• Bandwidth & Connectivity: Since the wireless ITS-G5 [ETS10b] control channel must only be
used to transmit traffic safety related data, misbehavior detection mechanisms should be able to
work autonomously on the nodes.
• Privacy: The misbehavior detection system of a VANET should not weaken the drivers’ privacy.
For example, private information of individuals such as names or addresses must not be revealed
and vehicle traces should be protected in order to complicate the linking between movement
traces and information of individuals.
3.4. Module-Based Misbehavior Detection Framework using Kalman
Filters
The concepts and the design of the Kalman filter-based plausibility check presented in this disserta-
tion is the result of a group work of Hagen Stübing, Attila Jaeger and the author of this dissertation.
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Basics of the Kalman filter-based approach for vehicle movement plausibility checking are described
in the PhD Thesis of Hagen Stübing [Stü12]. Beyond the results achieved in the group work a com-
prehensive evaluation of the Kalman filter-based plausibility check concept is performed by the au-
thor of this dissertation. Within this dissertation we developed a concept to integrate and evaluate
the accuracy of the Kalman filter-based plausibility check within a large scale Field Operation Test
(FOT) [SES+13, BSS13]. The evaluation of the applicability of the plausibility checker is based on
long-term measurements that were performed by using a logging framework of the FOT. The automated
evaluation of the recorded log data was supported by Tobias Gundlach in his Bachelor thesis [GWB12]
which was supervised by the author of this dissertation. Within this dissertation we evaluated the appli-
cability of plausibility checks in a VANET for the first time with a noteworthy number of real vehicles
and roadside units.
Furthermore, a module-based misbehavior detection framework is developed by the author of this
dissertation that uses the Kalman filter-based plausibility check as one module. In addition, the de-
veloped framework integrates the checks categorized in Section 3.2 and subsumed in Table 3.1 as
separated modules. The results from different plausibility modules are aggregated in a fusion process
to determine the trustworthiness of V2X messages and neighbor nodes. We consider all categories
introduced in Section 3.2 with the module-based misbehavior detection framework. Daniel Quanz has
supported the work by implementing and evaluating the data fusion concept as part of his Bachelor
thesis [QBa11] which was supervised by the author of this dissertation.
In the following, a brief introduction of the Kalman filter theory is given, followed by a description
how the filter is adapted for the purpose of vehicle tracking. Subsequently, the module-based misbehav-
ior scheme is described in Section 3.4.3 that applies a Kalman filter among other instruments to check
the plausibility of stated movement data sent by single-hop neighbor nodes. Finally, an evaluation
of a related plausibility check is discussed in Section 3.4.4 that is based on long term measurements
gathered in a large FOT.
3.4.1. System State Prediction with Kalman Filters
A Kalman filter [Kal60] is a well-known tool for predicting the state of linear dynamic systems based
on a series of noisy measurement data. Especially for object tracking, a Kalman filter represents an
efficient solution [BP99]. The Kalman filter generates an optimal prediction if the measurement error
is Gaussian distributed. This is typically the case for position data delivered in wireless V2X commu-
nications even if some areas around the predicted position are more likely than others as discussed by
Bißmeyer et al. [BB11] and Gerlach [Ger10]. The limitations of the Kalman filter-based prediction
become obvious when unexpected deviations occur in the trajectory of a tracked object, e. g. caused by
sharp driving maneuvers in case of vehicle tracking. This aspect has been further considered in more
detail by Stübing et al. [SFH11]. Within this dissertation, that limitation of the Kalman filter is taken
into account by elaborating a particle filter-based misbehavior detection framework, cf. Section 3.6.
A Kalman filter is a recursively operating filter that is able to estimate a statistically optimal system
state based on previous states and noisy input data. In general, the filter is based on a prediction and
correction step for every time step k as depicted in Figure 3.2. The prediction xˆk of a system state is
calculated by multiplying the last predicted state xˆ+k−1 with the state transition matrix Fk as shown in
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Equation 3.1. The state transition matrix is the mathematical representation of the underlying system
model. The prediction accuracy can be further increased by incorporating a control value uk and using
a control matrix Bk.
xˆk = Fk · xˆ+k−1+Bk ·uk (3.1)
Additionally, a prediction error Pk is calculated that estimates the inaccuracy of the current prediction
xˆk. Pk is also known as covariance that considers the fact that states depend on previous states through
the linear matrix Fk. As shown in Equation 3.2 Pk is calculated based on the transition matrix Fk, the
calculated prediction error from the previous recursion round P+k−1, and a system fault matrix Qk which
represents inherent errors in the system model.
Pk = Fk ·P+k−1 ·FTk +Qk (3.2)
In the correction phase, the predicted state is then corrected in order to achieve a more accurate system
state by adding measured system state information. As shown in Equation 3.3 the predicted value xˆk is
multiplied with a transition matrix Hk before it is subtracted from the measured data y˜k.
∆yk = y˜k− yˆk
= y˜k−Hk · xˆk (3.3)
In order to decide how much ∆yk is needed to be considered in the corrected system state xˆ+k as estab-
lished in Equation 3.5, a Kalman gain Kk is calculated based on the prediction error and measurement
variances Rk as shown in Equation 3.4. Finally, the prediction error P+k is updated as shown in Equa-
tion 3.6 with the Kalman gain in order to support the prediction step of the next round (cf. Equation 3.2).
Kk = Pk ·HTk · (Hk ·Pk ·HTk +Rk)−1 (3.4)
xˆ+k = xˆk +Kk ·∆yk (3.5)
P+k = Pk−Kk ·Hk ·Pk (3.6)
The corrected system state and prediction error is then used in the succeeding prediction phase at time
step k+ 1. The schematic in Figure 3.2 illustrates the Kalman filter phases. Thereby, z−1 denotes the
time shift between step k−1 and k, respectively.
3.4.2. Tracking with Kalman Filters
In V2X communications, both CAMs and DENMs contain a position vector providing mobility in-
formation in the form of position, speed, heading, and time as listed in Table 2.2 on page 18. For
the purpose of vehicle tracking, the state vector of the Kalman filter xˆk at time k consists of the vehi-
cle’s position (pxk , pyk) as Cartesian UTM data and the velocity (vxk ,vyk) in the xy-plane as shown in
Equation 3.7.
xˆk =

pxk
pyk
vxk
vyk
 (3.7)
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Figure 3.2.: Schematic Kalman filter structure with a legend of used variables
In order to predict both position and velocity a vehicle mobility model is then applied, which is based
on the equation of linear motion as shown in Equation 3.8. Here, pxk and pyk denotes the position, vxk
and vyk the velocity, and axk and ayk the acceleration at time k.
pxk = pxk−1 + vxk−1 ·∆tk +axk−1 ·
∆t2k
2
pyk = pyk−1 + vyk−1 ·∆tk +ayk−1 ·
∆t2k
2
(3.8)
Based on variable message frequencies according to ETSI [ETS10d], the time difference ∆tk between
the current time k and the time of the previous step k−1 is assumed to be not constant. According to
Equation 3.8 and the form of the chosen system state shown in Equation 3.7, the state transition matrix
Fk results in a four by four matrix as depicted in Equation 3.9. Since acceleration is not transmitted in
CAMs and DENMs, its value is calculated from speed differences of the last received messages. Due
to the fact that the acceleration is assumed to be constant within each time step, ∆t2k /2 is added to the
respective speed entries with a factor ak before Fk is applied in the final prediction step.
Fk =

1 0 ∆tk 0
0 1 0 ∆tk
0 0 1 0
0 0 0 1
 (3.9)
The application of the control value uk (cf. Equation 3.1) is not taken into account as only received
location data is used as measurement input. If, however, local sensor data would be available for near-
by tracked vehicles, the sensor measurements could be incorporated as uk.
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In the subsequent correction step, the PV from the received message is taken as measurement input
y˜k. The contained values for position, velocity, and heading are converted into a system state as shown
in Equation 3.7. Therefore, the state yˆk and the measurement vector y˜k are of identical form and the
transition matrix Hk can be eliminated in the corresponding corrections steps (cf. Equation 3.3, 3.4,
and 3.6).
As mentioned by Jaeger, Stübing, and the author of this dissertation [JBSH11, SJB+10] the sys-
tem fault matrix Qk can be chosen dynamically according to the road type as the prediction accuracy
heavily depends on driving maneuvers. In [SFH11] Stübing et al. additionally propose a maneuver
recognition that modifies the Kalman gain Kk to correct the system state in a way that measurements
are considered more than predictions. In analogy, the measurement variances matrix Rk can be chosen
dynamically from a position confidence value contained in received V2X messages as proposed by
Gerlach in [Ger10]. Based on the adoptions and chosen matrices, the Kalman filter can now be used as
a vehicle tracker in a local mobility data verification mechanism that aims to detect misbehavior caused
by attackers and faulty nodes.
3.4.3. Module-based Misbehavior Detection
A misbehavior detection framework involving a Kalman filter is able to identify different mobility data
plausibility violations as mentioned in Section 3.2.4. By tracking adjacent nodes with the Kalman
filter deviations of speed, heading, and position are observed and a comparison between the stated
PV and its corresponding predicted PV is performed. As long as for every single-hop node within
the communication range V2X messages are received periodically, a separate Kalman filter instance is
maintained for the node in form of a vehicle tracker object.
Integration of PM and SAS Checks into Module-based Framework The different steps of tracking
with the Kalman filter are illustrated in the activity diagram in Figure 3.3. As soon as a V2X message is
received, the mobility data and node ID are extracted from the message and the list of locally managed
vehicle trackers is searched for this node ID. If a tracker is found for the ID in step (1), then the Kalman
filter prediction is performed as shown in Equation 3.1. By calculating ∆yk, cf. Equation 3.3, the
predicted state xˆk is compared with the received mobility data y˜k. If the deviation is above a defined
threshold, the received PV is not in accordance with the mobility model. As a consequence the PM
module returns the lowest possible result value (i. e. Result = 0.0) in step (2). Otherwise, if the deviation
is below the defined threshold then the highest possible result value (i. e. Result = 1.0) is returned.
Irrespective of the result, the correction phase of the Kalman filter is performed following step (2) in
order to get the corrected state xˆ+k (cf. Equation 3.5).
If no tracker was found, two possible reasons can be distinguished (step (1) in Figure 3.3): Either
an unknown vehicle is entering the receiver’s communication range or an already known vehicle has
performed an ID change. The ID change of a tracked vehicle is detected by iterating the tracker list to
identify the candidate which is most likely to fit the received mobility data. For the most reasonable
tracker a prediction and correction phase of the Kalman filter is entered and the deviation is determined.
If the vehicle movement fits the prediction of this tracker, then an ID change is detected (see step (3) in
Figure 3.3) and the maximum result value (i. e. Result = 1.0) is returned. Consequently, the associated
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Common Case New Vehicle Appearing Node ID Change 
Result: 0.0 
Tracker 
found? 
Compare predicted 
mobility data with 
received mobility data 
Yes 
yes 
1 
Deviation 
OK? No 
Execute Kalman filter 
prediction phase 
Yes 
Result: 1.0 
2 
Find feasible 
vehicle tracker 
No 
Deviation 
OK? 
3 
Update vehicle ID 
in tracker 
Yes 
Perform margin 
check 
Inside 
margin? 
4 
No 
Result: 0.5 
Mobility data  
and node ID 
No 
Search tracker which 
matches node ID 
Compare predicted 
with received 
mobility data 
Execute Kalman 
prediction phase 
Instantiate 
new tracker 
Yes 
Figure 3.3.: Tracking of adjacent nodes with the Kalman filter
vehicle tracker ID is updated and the next prediction is performed. The ID change detection is further
discussed in more detail in Section 4.2.
If a V2X message is received from an unknown node and an ID change of known nodes can be ruled
out, a sudden appearance check is performed before a new Kalman filter instance is created with the
sender’s pseudonymous node ID. In this case, a margin check is performed in step (4). The margin
check examines whether the new node first appears on the border of the current communication range
of the receiver. If the new node is located inside the margin then the result of the PM module is neutral
(i. e. Result = 0.5). Otherwise, the lowest result value (i. e. Result = 0.0) is returned.
Integration of Consistency and Threshold Checks into Module-based Framework For additional
checks such as MRP, RAP, RCP, and VO tests, mentioned in Section 3.2, additional algorithms have
to be applied. Some basic checks can be subsumed in a module that performs general consistency and
threshold checks as shown on the left-hand side of Figure 3.4. This consistency and threshold check
verifies first that only single-hop messages are considered. Multi-hop DENMs cannot be reliably tested
in a node-based misbehavior detection scheme since they are not received periodically. Subsequently,
the threshold check verifies the PV contents on a message-basis by checking the correctness of the
value range of the position, heading, and velocity. Additionally, a message-based consistency check
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is performed that compares the PV of the network header with the PV of the payload (e. g. CAM or
DENM) and optionally with the security header. Finally, the consistency and threshold check verifies
the sender’s maximum communication range, maximum transmission delay, and maximum beacon
frequency based on static local knowledge, i. e. standardization documents [ETS10d,ETS10e,ETS10b,
IEE10]. However, the maximum beacon frequency (MBF) is the only node-based check in this module.
Aside from the consistency and threshold checks, further different specific plausibility checks are
performed in separate modules, as depicted in Figure 3.4. One check detects vehicle position overlaps
as further detailed in Section 3.5 and another module is using local sensor information, for example a
radar transceiver, to analyze the plausibility of stated vehicle positions. In the latter check, roadside
stations are ignored as they do not create a radar echo that can be used. Finally, a test method is
executed that analyzed whether a vehicle position can be linked to a segment of a digital map.
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Figure 3.4.: Fusion of results from different data plausibility checks to rate the message-based plausibility
Fusion of Module Outputs In order to evaluate the trustworthiness of the message a fusion of inter-
mediate module results is realized with a tree [QBa11]. The tree consists of a root, internal vertices V
and leafs where every internal vertex has a set of child vertices VC. The leafs in Figure 3.4 represent the
plausibility modules which check the PV of received V2X messages. The different results are subse-
quently combined in the intermediate vertices and then finally consolidated in the root in order to get a
single plausibility rating of the analyzed V2X message. The fusion tree T is defined as T =(V,E,w,r,R)
at which V denotes the set of vertices, E denotes the set of edges, w denotes the weighting function, r
denotes the rating function and R denotes the set of rules that are applied by the vertices. The weight
function w : V ×V → N0 gives the weight of the edge that is spanned between two vertices and the
rating function r : V → [0,1] gives the result of a plausibility or consistency check that is performed by
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a single vertex. The set of rules contains triples of the form R := {x|x := (v,o,n),v ∈V,o ∈O,n ∈R+0 }
at which the set O := {=, 6=,<,>,≤,≥} denotes the possible operations, v denotes the vertex that the
rule is related to, and n is a value that is used to compare the rating r with.
The weights at the edges are used in the fusion process to prioritize results. For example, the rating
of a radar-based position verification is considered with high weighting due the usage of highly trusted
local first hand sensor information. However, in contrast, ratings of a map-based plausibility test are
considered in the fusion process with low weighting. Explicit values of the weights have not been
elaborated in this dissertation. The rules are built into the fusion process in order to allow for the
consideration of thresholds before the ratings are aggregated. If, for example, the consistency and
threshold check fails because a sender is outside the acceptable communication range then the message
should be rated as erroneous even if other modules rate the specific mobility information to be plausible.
The fusion process starts when the leaf vertices have processed the position vector of a V2X message
by providing their specific plausibility ratings. First the rule that is related to a child vertex vc ∈VC is
applied to the rating of vc. If no rule is assigned to the vertex then the rating value is used unmodified
in the fusion function as shown in Equation 3.10.
r(v) =
∑vc∈VC w(v,vc) · r(vc)
∑vc∈VC w(v,vc)
(3.10)
In order to simplify the misbehavior detection, the final merged result, gathered from the root vertex
r(vroot) is classified as Approved when 0.5 < r(vroot)≤ 1, Neutral when r(vroot) = 0.5, and Erroneous
when 0 ≥ r(vroot) < 0.5. A message is rated as Neutral only in special cases such as the initial track-
ing phase when no past movement information is available at the Kalman filter but all other modules
approve the message.
In case of an erroneous result, further action should be taken by the local misbehavior detection
system. At this point, only a message-based evaluation of the PV is performed. Additionally, an
evaluation of the nodes’ trustworthiness can be created by collecting the message-based ratings and
evaluate the short-term and midterm behavior of respective neighbor nodes.
In order to maximize the tracking time of neighbor nodes and therefore their evaluation time a local
detection of ID changes is proposed. This is necessary as an attacker could exploit the pseudonym
change mechanism (cf. Section 2.2.1 and [BSS+11]) by changing its IDs after performing an attack.
As a consequence the attacker might be rated neutral after an ID change by the misbehavior detection
system of neighbors. With the proposed ID change detection the local misbehavior detection system
is able to track vehicles irrespective of their used identifiers. However, the detection of ID changes
can only be performed by the Kalman filter if the specific node is accurately tracked based on fre-
quently received CAMs. If the tracked node applies countermeasures to complicate the detection of ID
changes, for example by applying random silent periods [HMYS05] or mix-contexts [GG07], then the
probability decreases for receivers to link messages with old and new IDs.
3.4.4. Evaluation of the Module-based Misbehavior Detection
The following evaluation of the module-based misbehavior detection framework is structured accord-
ing to the evaluation criteria defined in Section 3.3. After presenting details about the test setup, the
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evaluation criteria are discussed with respect to the module-based misbehavior detection framework.
This discussion is based on the defined criteria: accuracy, scalability, extensibility, generalizability,
complexity, bandwidth & connectivity, and privacy. By means of these criteria a comparison of related
solutions is presented in Section 3.7.
Evaluation Setup - Strategy An experimental evaluation of the module-based plausibility frame-
work has been selected to be most reasonable since the overall applicability of the framework should be
analyzed. The correct processing of the single module operations has previously been tested [SJB+10,
Stü12] using different parameters and input values. In order to evaluate the practical applicability of
the proposed framework data from real V2X communications has to be processed that may also contain
usual inaccuracies. Most simulation tools are not able to create at the same time realistic communica-
tion conditions including environment-related shadowing, realistic vehicles movements, and realistic
driver behavior. The experimental evaluation is consequently the best choice to evaluation the proposed
framework.
Evaluation Setup - Tools For the evaluation a Java OSGi [All13] implementation has been used that
was deployed on several test vehicles and RSUs of a FOT. The system architecture of the vehicles and
RSUs follows the description of the ITS architecture as discussed in Section 2.1. However, the function
of the communication stack is split in two parts as illustrated in Figure 3.5. Both, the access layer and
the network & transport layer come as a part of a communication & control unit (CCU).
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Figure 3.5.: Integration of the module-based misbehavior detection framework into the on-board V2X commu-
nication architecture of the FOT [SBH+10, JBSH11]
The application layer is operated by an application unit (AU) and functions of the facilities layer
can be found on both the CCU and AU. The security solution of the FOT implementation [BSM+09]
is also in line with the descriptions in Section 2.2 regarding all relevant aspects. The implementation
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of the module-based misbehavior detection framework is operated on the facilities layer of the AU
as depicted in Figure 3.5. The AU is realized with an automotive grade personal computer hardware
equipped with an Intel Atom D510 processor at 1.66 GHz and 2 GB of RAM. On a Windows-based
operating system the Java OSGi virtual machine is operated. On the facilities layer of the AU, the
plausibility checker is able to access the local mobility information of the own station and receives
all incoming messages before they are provided to the V2X applications. As illustrated in Figure 3.5,
V2X messages received by the CCU via ITS-G5A are processed by the different communication layer
implementations. The message object is extended on the network & transport layer with the PV of
the network header before it is provided to the AU facilities layer. Before the message object is stored
in the neighbor & location table the module-based misbehavior detection framework analyzes the PV
content of the V2X message. In order to check the PV the misbehavior detection implementation needs
access to up-to-date information about location and time of the station the implementation is running
on. This information is provided by the vehicular application programming interface (VAPI) that uses
GPS-based positioning improved by differential GPS (DGPS) and dead reckoning (DR).
Evaluation Setup - Measurements The author of this dissertation created for the FOT an exten-
sive evaluation concept with respect to security and plausibility in order to measure the required pa-
rameters related to misbehavior detection on 120 vehicles and 100 RSUs over a test period of 76
days [WBB+12]. This measurement was realized with the logging framework as shown in Figure 3.5.
Within the FOT, the AU logging application has collected on all vehicles and RSUs relevant log in-
formation generated by local system components. At the end of every day the logs were transmitted
to a central infrastructure entity. The misbehavior detection framework created log entries for V2X
messages that showed abnormal behavior of neighbor nodes or invalid values as listed in the following.
• THRESHOLD_CHECK__TIMESTAMP_CHECK_NOT_PASSED
• THRESHOLD_CHECK__RANGE_CHECK_NOT_PASSED
• THRESHOLD_CHECK__VELOCITY_CHECK_NOT_PASSED
• THRESHOLD_CHECK__MOBILITY_DEVIATION_CHECK_NOT_PASSED
• THRESHOLD_CHECK__HEADING_DEVIATION_CHECK_NOT_PASSED
• THRESHOLD_CHECK__C2X_MESSAGE_FREQUENCY_CHECK_NOT_PASSED
• NEW_STATION__MARGIN_CHECK_NOT_PASSED
As indicated by these evaluation parameters the misbehavior detection implementation deployed on the
test stations focuses on the main subset of plausibility checks: the consistency and threshold checks
(i. e. MCR, MTD, MBF) and the PM and SAS checks based on the Kalman filter-supported tracking of
adjacent nodes. After completion of the FOT the evaluation of the log entries has been performed with
an automated process. In order to minimize the size of the log entries exact values could not be logged
in the FOT. Instead we prepared value classes (e. g. 100, 200, ... , 1000) and rounded the exact value
to match a class. For example, a value of 156 is assigned to the class 200. The algorithms used in the
evaluation process, elaborated by the author of this dissertation, are further detailed in the evaluation
concept of the FOT project [WBB+12]. For the sake of simplicity, the following evaluation is focused
on measurements created by the vehicles and is ignoring the measurements created by RSUs. Since the
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module-based plausibility checks use only mobility data, the measurements created by RSUs are not
the primary focus of the evaluation.
Evaluation Setup - Environment In the course of the FOT urban roads, rural roads, and highways
of a test area around the city of Frankfurt am Main were used. The test vehicles has been steered by
twelve expert drivers and 450 test drivers who were specifically recruited for that purpose. During the
field operational test more than 150 kilometers of test drives has been traveled per day and per vehicle.
The test drivers performed specific experiments based on scripted road scenarios [Wei12]. This ensured
that most of the test time several vehicles were in common communication range.
Evaluation Setup - Reproducibility Based on the logs recored within the test drives XML encoded
trace files including V2X messages can be generated. Every XML file contains locally available infor-
mation of the respective station provided by the VAPI such as GPS location and time, speed, heading,
etc.. In addition, the sent and received V2X message objects can be included. These files can be re-
played with a trace player that is connected to CCU and AU devices in a laboratory environment. As a
consequence all test scenarios of the FOT are reproducible and repeatable.
Evaluation Setup - Configuration The configuration of the module-based misbehavior detection
framework used in the FOT is provided in Table 3.3. The values in the first three rows are fixed
due to physical limitations of the IEEE 802.11p radios and due to definitions in ETSI standards (i. e.
[ETS10d, ETS10e]).
Table 3.3.: Configuration of the module-based misbehavior detection framework
Plausibility check Value Description
Maximum
communication
range (MCR)
1 km
If the location of a single-hop message claims to be
within the MCR then the receiver considers the position
vector as plausible.
Maximum
transmission delay
(MTD)
500 ms
If the timestamp of the message generation is below the
MTD, compared with the receivers’ system time, the
provided message is considered to be fresh.
D
efi
ne
d
by
st
an
da
rd
s
Maximum beacon
frequency (MBF) 15 Hz
A sender that distributes V2X messages with a higher
frequency than MBF is considered to be suspicious.
Suddenly appearing
station (SAS) 200 m
Stations that claim to be in a distance below SAS are
considered to be not plausible.
Va
ri
ab
le
Plausible movement
(PM)
5 m
A claimed position that deviates more that 5 meters
from a predicted position is considered to be
implausible.
111 ms
A stated velocity value larger than 111 m/s is not
trustworthy.
10◦ A heading that differs more than 10
◦ from the predicted
heading is considered to be implausible.
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The MCR is for example limited by the maximum transmission power allowed for IEEE 802.11p
transceivers and the MTD and MBF are limited by specifications of the ETSI standards [ETS09,
ETS10d]. The remaining configuration values of the SAS and PM check are determined in dedicated
tests with a small number of test vehicles. Consequently, the variable configuration values may differ
in later deployments.
Accuracy In order to calibrate the Kalman filter-based tracking algorithm for the practical outdoor
tests, recorded traces from multiple test drives in cities, on country roads, and on highways has been
used. In these position prediction accuracy tests, CAM frequencies with a dynamic rate according to
ETSI [ETS10d] are compared with static frequencies between 1 Hz and 10 Hz. In particular, message
frequencies of 1 Hz, 2 Hz, 10 Hz, and the dynamic ETSI frequency are applied on the corresponding
CAM generation algorithm in a trace player to evaluate the Kalman filter accuracy. The test results
provided in Figure 3.6 show that the prediction accuracy of the advocated Kalman filter-based vehicle
tracker is optimal at the highest CAM frequency.
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Figure 3.6.: Evaluation of the impact of different CAM frequencies on the Kalman filter-based position predic-
tion accuracy
For the test shown in Figure 3.6 an exemplary trace is used that comprises highway sections allowing
speeds of more than 90 km/h, and inner-city road sections. Even with the variable CAM generation
interval, the prediction deviation is lower than 1 meter in the majority of all cases (i. e. 96% of received
PVs). In addition, the effect of different road classes on the prediction accuracy is evaluated. There-
fore, highway traces are compared with city traces, each with CAM intervals according to the CAM
generation rules based on ETSI specifications [ETS10d]. The position prediction accuracy depends on
the mobility and the behavior of the tracked object. We analyzed the hypothesis that the accuracy of
predictions is best having vehicles moving with high speed on highways that motivate less to change the
heading and velocity. On the contrary, vehicles moving with low speed in urban environments produce
higher prediction inaccuracies because they might change their heading and velocity spontaneously.
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Figure 3.7.: Evaluation of the Kalman filter-based position prediction accuracy. Measuring the impact of differ-
ent road types using CAM generation rules according to ETSI [ETS10d]
The measurements with the Kalman filter implementation confirm this hypothesis. In Figure 3.7
it is shown that a less predictable vehicle movement in urban scenarios has a negative effect on the
prediction accuracy. However, even in city traces the position inaccuracy is still negligibly low, but in
special situations, e. g., in a situation where a vehicle performs an emergency braking or suddenly starts
to overtake another vehicle, the prediction accuracy decreases.
In addition to Kalman filter-based measurements under laboratory conditions the module-based mis-
behavior detection framework has been deployed in a field operational outdoor tests over a time period
of 76 days. The goal is analyze the applicability of our approach under real conditions. The following
evaluation is based on log data created by the misbehavior detection implementation installed on the
test vehicles. Further, it has to be considered that within this FOT attacks were not performed. Con-
sequently, the number of anomalies caused by authenticated and authorized VANET nodes is analyzed
in the following. Even if the implementations of the FOT are partly based on immature prototypes the
results might provide valuable information for future productive implementations. This also applied
for anomaly and misbehavior detection.
In summary, the outdoor tests with real vehicles produced a false-positive rate of ≈ 9.25%. Conse-
quently, over 9% of the processed V2X messages are rated as erroneous in the tests. The pie diagram in
Figure 3.8 shows the distribution of the plausibility violations related to the different checks. A detailed
discussion of the false-positive rate is given in the following including an analysis and a classification
of the errors.
Figure 3.9 depicts the results of the MCR check. Only the detections above the threshold of 1 km,
cf. Table 3.3, are considered. The bar chart shows on the x-axis different ranges of distance between
the message sender and receiver. The y-axis shows the portion of MCR violations related to the total
number of processed messages. At the same time the y-axis shows the distribution of MCR violations.
The results show that some single-hop messages in the tests violate the predefined MCR but in relation
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Figure 3.8.: Distribution of plausibility violations in long-term tests with real vehicles
to the total number of processed messages these violations are marginal (i. e. subsumed ≈ 0.57h).
More than 40% of the anomalies are caused by messages that are sent beyond 2000 meters which is
twice as much as allowed according to MCR configuration, cf. Table 3.3. After an analysis of this
effect we identified that RSUs sent V2X messages with increased transmission power for test purposes.
Figure 3.10 shows the results of the MTD check. The construction of the chart is comparable with
Figure 3.9 with respect to the meaning of axis and bars. In the figure it is shown that the majority of
MTD faults are violating the threshold four times more than allowed. Moreover, the bars shows that this
check detects most implausible messages in the FOT. If all MTD faults added up≈ 8.2% of the received
V2X messages processed on vehicle stations provide a timestamp older than the configured MTD. The
pie chart in Figure 3.8 acknowledges that most false-positive detections (88.2%) are caused by the
MTD check. In most cases the timestamp is older than 2 seconds. This effect was primarily caused by
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Figure 3.10.: Violation of maximum transmission latency in long-term outdoor tests with real vehicles
unsynchronized nodes and overloaded systems unable to send outgoing messages in time. Furthermore,
some systems in the tests were not able to provide incoming messages to the plausibility checker on
the AU in time. It has to be considered that this MTD check is the first test that is performed by the
module-based misbehavior detection framework when a V2X message is received. If the generation
timestamp of the message is above the predefined threshold listed in Table 3.3 then the message is
considered to be erroneous. In this case no further check is performed and consequently no evaluation
with respect to the other parameters has been done. As a result, multiple implausibilities per message
are not considered.
Another threshold check is the MBF check that is not represented by a diagram. However, the FOT
evaluations have shown that 3.8% of the plausibility errors are caused by nodes that send more V2X
messages per second than allowed by the standards. In total, approximately 3.3h of the received V2X
messages violate the ETSI standard [ETS10d] with respect to the maximum beacon frequency.
The detection of suddenly appearing stations is evaluated in Figure 3.11. On the x-axis, the distance
between the new station and the receiver is grouped. The y-axis shows the number of SAS detections
within the corresponding range. It is shown that the number of suddenly appearing stations is higher
at the SAS threshold and decreases with a smaller distance to the receiver. This evaluation shows
that in real VANETs the sudden appearing of previously unknown nodes is not negligible even if only
≈ 0.3h of the received messages were related to this kind of anomaly. Most reasonable explanations
are shadowing effects caused by buildings, large trucks or geographical conditions such as hilltops. As
a consequence this kind of detection should probably not be used to exclude vehicles.
The evaluations shown in Figure 3.9, 3.10, and 3.11 are related to the threshold checks and do not
require a tracking of nodes. In contrast, Figure 3.12 depicts the evaluation of the Kalman filter-based
vehicle tracking.
The x-axis shows the different deviations between a stated position and the corresponding expected
position. In particular, this is the deviation between a stated position contained in a V2X message
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Figure 3.11.: Detection of suddenly appearing stations in long-term outdoor tests with real vehicles
and the Kalman-filter predicted position. The y-axis shows the portion of PM violations related to
the total number of processed messages and at the same time the distribution of violations in relation
to all PM errors. The figure shows that most violations (≈ 40%) appear in the range between 5 and
6 meters and that the number of detections decreases with higher distance values. By adding up all
values it can be shown that in total approximately 1.6h of all received V2X messages cause a PM
violation. Compared with the evaluations under laboratory conditions shown in Figures 3.6 and 3.7 the
FOT evaluation revealed that a few position jumps larger than 5 meters can be assumed in real VANET
implementations. As a consequence a local misbehavior detection system should be robust with respect
to single violations. However, if several detections are caused by a specific node then this node could
be considered as faulty and further actions such as local exclusion or misbehavior reporting should be
performed.
Since no attack has been performed in the long-term outdoor tests the author of this dissertation has
elaborated and performed dedicated experiments with attackers in place. This has been done to measure
the number correctly detected misbehavior (true-negative) and the number of undetected misbehavior
(false-negative). For this purpose an application-layer attacker is used to perform generic location-
related attacks in dedicated tests as presented in the adversary model in Section 2.3.3.2. Figure 3.13
shows the misbehavior that is detected by receiver R. Three types of points are used in this figure
to indicate the detection events with reference to the kind of consistency and plausibility check. The
misbehavior is caused by a ghost vehicle A1 over a test time of 70 seconds. The diagram shows the
misbehavior detections based on the same attack scenario as illustrated in Figure 2.10 on page 29. In
comparison to Figure 2.11 on page 30, in this diagram only the distance between the ghost vehicle A1
and the receiver R is shown by the filled curve.
The sudden appearance of the ghost vehicle is detected when the attack is started at time k0. Ac-
cording to Table 3.3 new vehicles that appear within a range of 200 meters around the receiver are
considered as suspicious. In the evaluated attack A1 appears in front of R with a distance of approx-
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Figure 3.12.: Detection of implausible movement in long-term tests outdoor with real vehicles
imately 30 meters which leads to a plausibility violation. The PM check identifies further position
jumps of the ghost vehicle every time A1 moves to a new position in front of the receiver, cf. time k2 in
Figure 2.12 on page 31 and time k2 in Figure 3.13. Position jumps larger than 5 meters are considered
to be suspicious, cf. Table 3.3. At the times 231, 235, and 262 position jumps are not detected as
the distance computed based on position information from two sequential CAMs has not exceeded the
threshold. Only abrupt jumps larger than 5 meters are considered as inconsistency as shown by the
distance curve in Figure 3.13. The third plausibility test detects position overlaps of A1 and R as further
detailed in Section 3.5. In total, receiver R detects in this exemplary attack scenario 24 plausibility vi-
olations caused by one ghost vehicle within a time frame of approximately 50 seconds. False-positive
detections have not been appeared in this dedicated attack scenario.
It has to be considered that the performed attack is based on the EEBL application. However, the
purpose of the attack and the ghost vehicle’s behavior is comparable with other location-based appli-
cation that aim for increasing traffic safety and efficiency. As a result, we can confirm the hypothesis
that the module-based misbehavior detection framework is able to detect abnormalities as introduced
in Section 1.2. Nevertheless, a more sophisticated attacker would try to present a fully plausible move-
ment of the ghost vehicle. These possibilities decrease with increasing traffic density as detailed in
Section 2.3.3.2.
Summarizing the results, both the evaluations of laboratory tests and outdoor tests with several
equipped test vehicles have shown that the module-based mobility data plausibility check applying
Kalman filters is an appropriate instrument to detect deviations of a defined mobility model. The detec-
tion requires, however, that the attacker produce abnormalities that can be detected. Further, it has been
shown that the combination of different specific plausibility verification modules is possible in order to
evaluate the plausibility of a PV on both message basis and node basis. Since a simple message-based
plausibility rating with the classification approved, neutral, and erroneous is provided, the V2X ap-
plications on the AU could decide not to process erroneous messages. Nevertheless, the results of the
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Figure 3.13.: Ghost vehicle caused misbehavior detection using a Kalman filter
outdoor tests show that approximately 9.25% of the received messages are rated as erroneous. From a
security perspective, it is reasonable to discard received messages that are not approved by message-
based plausibility checks. In particular, replayed messages and messages containing a PV with false
value ranges or with inconsistent PVs are detected by the MCR and MTD checks. The corresponding
erroneous V2X messages should be dropped and should not provided to the applications.
Implausible messages that are detected by the node-based checks (i. e. MBF, SAS, and PM), how-
ever, should not be dropped but handled by the application on the AU with low confidence. Based
on the ratings of the single messages a short and mid term evaluation of node trustworthiness can be
created. According to the evaluation involving the test vehicles, approximately 98% of the measured
implausibilities are caused by message-based checks and only 2% are caused by node-based plausi-
bility checks. Consequently, approximately 5h of the incoming single-hop V2X messages lead to a
node-based implausibility.
Since no evaluation results related to accuracy are published by authors of related work [SLS+08,
Ger10,oTRA12] a comparison based on figures cannot be done. For the comparison of our own propos-
als with related solutions we estimate the accuracy of related works based on argumentations provided
in the respective publications. A summary of this comparison is provided in Section 3.7.
Scalability The performance of the prototypical plausibility checker is measured under laboratory
conditions using different recorded vehicle traces. In these performance tests the previously described
AU hardware of the test vehicles has been used. Even though such high-performance hardware may not
be used in the later deployments it is assumed that more efficient implementations, for example code
written in C instead of Java, will probably show similar results on less powerful embedded hardware.
The evaluations show that the total execution of the plausibility check of an incoming V2X message
takes on average ≈ 2.7 ms but exceptional values of approximately 190 ms have been measured with
higher numbers of neighbor nodes. The exceptional values are potentially caused by the Java environ-
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ment that sporadically executes internal processes such as the garbage collector that consumes system
resources. Furthermore, the plausibility checker has to share its CPU and memory with other applica-
tions that are executed on the same system, e. g. V2X message generation and handling, local dynamic
map, navigation support. Moreover, it is measured that a minor part (≈ 20%) of the processing time is
consumed by consistency and threshold checks (i. e. MCR, MTD, MBF) and the major part (≈ 80%)
is consumed by the PM and SAS verifications. This evaluation shows that the module-based plausi-
bility check is basically able to verify up to 370 messages per second by predicting vehicle positions
accurately. However, this number strongly depends on the applied system and its performance and is
closely related to other applications that are executed on the system.
Since the concepts of related work [SLS+08, Ger10] have not been evaluated with implementations
a comparison with respect to scalability and performance is not possible. The performance of our
module-based misbehavior detection framework depends on the performance of the different modules.
The evaluated setup provides good results with respect to processing performance and latency. How-
ever, implementers should consider that operations required by different modules should be performed
only once in order to save resources. This might be the case, for example, for vehicle tracking.
Extensibility The proposed module-based misbehavior detection framework is extensible by adding
or exchanging single modules. Due to the approach for fusion of results provided by modules the func-
tionality of local misbehavior detection can be split in subordinated module implementations. The mod-
ularity of our approach is comparable with the VEBAS concept proposed by Schmidt et al. [SLS+08].
Generalizability Both frameworks, the proposed module-based framework and VEBAS, rely on
highly specialized modules to verify different aspects of location-related information. Consequently,
the generalization of the module-based misbehavior detection is limited. The consistency and threshold
check, for example, is designed to analyze the specific elements of V2X packet contents and the Kalman
filter is designed to track mobile network nodes. In the same way the verification of node positions with
local sensors such as radar or camera might be designed for specific inconsistency detections.
Complexity The module-based approach follows the simple paradigm divide and conquer which
is well known in computer science. Every module focuses on a specific aspect of the problem in
location-related misbehavior detection. This reduces on the one hand the complexity. On the other
hand, different modules may depend on the existence and operation of other modules which increases
the complexity. The Kalman filter-based vehicle tracking depends on correctly performed consistency
and threshold checks and the modules using local sensors rely on correct position predictions of the
Kalman filter. With an increasing number of modules the complexity of the framework increases.
Bandwidth & Connectivity In the proposed module-based framework no exchange of information
related to misbehavior detection is required. This saves valuable bandwidth of the ITS-G5 channels.
Moreover the proposed framework is working autonomously and is not depending on infrastructure en-
tities or specific misbehavior detection related information provided by VANET neighbors. The report-
ing of misbehavior to a central entity is optionally from perspective of the module-based misbehavior
detection framework.
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Privacy The module-based framework is able to work with pseudonymous IDs as targeted in stan-
dardization [IEE13, ETS12a, ETS13b] and deployment activities [WBF+13]. The module-based ap-
proach in contrast impacts the privacy since single-hop neighbor nodes are tracked by the Kalman
filter. This tracking allows the observation of ID changes of nodes as discussed in more detail in
Section 4.2. As long as the information about the linking of pseudonymous IDs is not distributed or
centrally collected the effort remains high to reveal personal information such as the home address of
drivers.
3.5. Position Overlap-Based Misbehavior Detection
As introduced in Section 3.2.5 second hand information provided by other nodes can be used to check
the location plausibility of adjacent nodes. In this section a new kind of node-based location data
consistency check is proposed that solely uses second hand information (i. e. CAMs) from single-
hop neighbor nodes to verify their location plausibility and consistency. This novel concept has been
elaborated by the author of this dissertation and bases on the idea that different physical vehicles cannot
occupy the same certain space at the same time. An implementation and evaluation of the concept was
supported by Christian Stresing within his Master thesis [SHB10] which was supervised by me.
The proposed check aims to detect implausibilities caused by non-existing ghost vehicles that are
created by an attacker as described in the adversary model in Section 2.3. These ghost vehicles fre-
quently exhibit inconsistencies when real vehicles move through the claimed position of the ghost. As a
result, this knowledge is used to make assumptions about possible misbehavior by modeling a position
verification strategy that compares the PVs of adjacent vehicles. While using a generic vehicle model
and taking typical GNSS position errors into account, physically impossible position overlaps can be
detected. This framework can be used by the local misbehavior detection system performed on receiver
stations.
3.5.1. Vehicle Overlap Model
Ideally, a received position vector represents the location of the center of a corresponding vehicle.
Obviously, two vehicles that virtually drive through each other are possibly not broadcasting the exact
same position data. PVs contain a single position that allows a centimeter exact resolution (cf. Table 2.2
on page 18). In general, the vehicles’ dimensions combined with a possible safety clearance is not
taken into account by the PVs. Therefore, the proposed overlap detection scheme models the vehicle
dimensions based on width w(NA) and length l(NA) information provided by a vehicle NA within its
CAMs. This model is based on an approach of Anurag et al. [DGB08] where it is used in a collision
warning system. Having the dimensions and the heading a vehicle the vertices of a rectangle can be
calculated. In particular, the left front (LF), the left rear (LR), the right front (RF), and the right rear
(RR) vertex can be identified as shown in Figure 3.14.
With the help of this vehicle model it is possible to calculate whether rectangles of different vehicles
overlap. In order to observe any overlap of two rectangles an hyperplane overlapping test is performed
that is well known as separating axis test in the literature [GT96, SIF97]. Two rectangles of vehicles
NA and NB overlap if any point P(xp,yp,zp) of one rectangle lies inside the area of the other rectangle.
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Figure 3.14.: Vehicles modeled as a rectangular shape with dimensions w and l
More specifically, the algorithm tests whether a vertex of the rectangle of one vehicle NA is on the right
side of all edges (traversing the rectangle’s edges clockwise) of the rectangle of vehicle NB. This rule
implies that this corner would be inside vehicle NB, and thus the vehicles overlap.
In every rectangle overlap test the algorithm starts with one edge of the rectangle of vehicle NB,
for example the leg between point LR(x1,y1,0) and LF(x4,y4,0) and computes its representing vector
~eLR,LF . Similarly, the vector ~fLR,P from LR(x1,y1,0) to the testing point P(xp,yp,0) is determined. The
testing point is one of the corners of the other vehicle NA. These two vectors span a parallelogram
whose surface can be calculated as euclidean norm of the resulting vector from the vector product of
the two vectors~eLR,LF and ~fLR,P as shown in Equation 3.11.
χ1 = |~eLR,LF ×~fLR,P|
χ1 = |(xp− x1)(y4− y1)− (yp− y1)(x4− x1)| (3.11)
The resulting value χ may be positive or negative, depending on the sign of the angle (either positive
or negative) between the two vectors. Consequently, the sign of the result indicates on which side of
the vector ~e the testing point P(xp,yp,0) is located. Subsequently, the algorithm continue clockwise
picking the next edge and test χ on the remaining edges.
If all test results, i. e. all χi with i∈ 1...4, have the same sign (in the example depicted in Figure 3.14:
positive), the tested point P(xp,yp,0) of NA is inside the rectangle of NB. If not, the calculation is
repeated with the next corner point of NA. Once all four corners have been tested and an overlap is
not detected then the algorithm tests whether the corner points from the other vehicle NB are inside
the rectangle of NA. This algorithm fails only if the two rectangles form a cross-like shape with all
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corner points outside the rectangle model of the other vehicle but their bodies crossing. In this case, the
overlap will be detected in the next test when at least one of the vehicles has moved slightly. Indeed,
this implies a valid movement behavior which can be ensured by the vehicle tracking discussed in
section 3.4 and 3.6.
Due to possible imprecisions of the distributed position data, the vehicle overlap detection model
needs to be extended. The previously discussed algorithm incorporates only two results: either an
overlap is detected or not. The extension assesses the certainty of overlaps by addressing the area close
to the vehicles. Even in a traffic jam, there is always a certain amount of space between neighboring
vehicles: the safety area. A vehicle that claims its position to be inside the safety area of another vehicle
is suspicious and should further be observed in more detail. However, due to the former mentioned
imprecisions in position data, vehicles that move close to another vehicle might unintentionally create
slight overlaps. This should not lead to immediate misbehavior detection, but should raise awareness.
As such, the area outside the physical vehicle dimensions shall be considered with a reduced weighting.
Therefore, differently sized rectangles are used to model the vehicles as illustrated in Figure 3.15.
Vehicle overlaps of inner rectangles result in detections with higher certainty than overlaps of outer
rectangles. The certainty of an overlap coverlap ∈ R with values in the range [0,1] can be calculated as
presented in Algorithm 3.1.
Algorithm 3.1 Algorithm to calculate the certainty of a vehicle overlaps
1: while i < imax and coverlap = 0 do
2: coverlap← overlaps(NA,NB,i)(i+1)γ
3: i← i+1
4: end while
The function overlaps() is a predicate that checks whether two specific rectangles of node NA and
NB overlap. More precisely, the predicate tests the particular rectangles at level i ∈ N0 with values
i = 0, ..., imax. Based on the parameter i several virtual rectangles with different dimensions are calcu-
lated for a vehicle as illustrated in Figure 3.15. The exponent γ in the second line is used to decrease
the weight of coverlap with increasing i as subsequently discussed in more detail. The predicate function
overlaps() in the numerator returns 1 if the rectangles overlap, or 0 otherwise. This function imple-
ments the algorithm that is described in the vehicle overlap model, but re-calculates the rectangle length
l and width w based on the loop iterator i.
It is assumed that the sizes of the vehicles’ physical safety area correlate to the speed of travel.
Additionally, the vehicles’ velocities influence the dimensions of the outer certainty rectangles. With
higher velocities, the safety area increases predominantly in the direction of travel which is modeled as
length lrect as shown in Equation 3.12.
lrect =
i
imax
· v(NA)
ds
+α · lNA (3.12)
The variable imax in equation 3.12 is the maximum number of iterations to be executed, i. e. the maxi-
mum number of rectangles in the vehicle model. The fraction v(NA)ds depends on the velocity of vehicle
NA and is added to the original length of the innermost rectangle of vehicle model of NA. The dimen-
sionless parameter ds calibrates the influence of the velocity on the length of the rectangles and the
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Figure 3.15.: Vehicle modeled using differently sized rectangles to observe overlaps
factor α reduces the original length of the vehicle for overlap detection. A reduction of the inner rect-
angle size may be interesting in order to increase the severity of inner rectangle overlaps. While lrect
depends on v(NA), the calculation of wrect ignores the vehicle’s velocity since it has marginal impact.
However, under consideration of lateral position inaccuracies, wrect is also enlarged with increasing i
as shown in Equation 3.13.
wrect =
i
imax
· (wl−α ·wNA)+α ·wNA (3.13)
The rectangle width wrect increases slightly, but shall not exceed the width of the lane the vehicle is
traveling on since otherwise overlaps would occur in the case that vehicles travel next to each other
on neighboring lanes. In the following evaluations, a typical lane width of wl = 2.5 m is assumed to
be the upper bound. The predicate overlaps() in Algorithm 3.1 uses equation 3.12 and 3.13 in order
to obtain appropriate values for lrect and wrect . With increasing i, and therefore increasing dimensions
of the rectangles, the overlap certainty decreases. The denominator in the equation of the second line
of Algorithm 3.1 determines the fraction of certainty of an overlap of the two rectangles that can be
adjusted with the exponential weight γ.
3.5.2. Node Evaluation based on Vehicle Overlaps
By applying the vehicle position overlap check, a ghost vehicle can be detected that claims a similar
position as another vehicle at a specific point in time. The overlap certainty indicates the probability of
the overlap. However, even in the case of high overlap certainty an attack is not necessarily the cause.
For example, two benign vehicles that are sending PV updates with a low frequency may cause a false-
positive vehicle overlap detection. As a result, a certain number of evidences should be collected by
the overlap detection module before a possible misbehavior is assumed.
In the above described evidence collection process, the overlap detection results gained from Algo-
rithm 3.1 are summed up in variable s ∈ R for every vehicle within the communication range. Every
time the algorithm is executed, new overlap detections s(k) are added to the value of previous detec-
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tions s(k−1) with k being the time, cf. Equation 3.14. In addition, an aging factor a ∈ [0,1] is used in
Equation 3.14 that enables previous overlap detections to fade. For instance, a neighbor vehicle that has
created in the past overlaps with other vehicles may has a considerable level of distrust. This distrust
should be decreased over time when no further overlaps are detected.
s(k) = coverlap+a · s(k−1) (3.14)
Obviously, variable s increases with respect to the certainty of overlap detections in each measurement.
In order to define an overall certainty of misbehavior, parameter smin ∈ N is introduced. This value
determines the level of evidence that is required to assume a misbehavior detection based on vehicle
overlaps. Equation 3.15 calculates the certainty of having detected overlap-based misbehavior.
cmisbehavior =
smin · s
2 · (smin− s)+ smin · s (3.15)
When the node-based collection of overlap evidence s reaches smin, then the misbehavior certainty
cmisbehavior reaches 1. Equation 3.16 shows the adaption of Equation 3.14 by constraining the results to
the range [0,smin].
s(k) = min(coverlap+a · s(k−1),smin) (3.16)
3.5.3. Evaluation of the Position Overlap-Based Misbehavior Detection
The following evaluation of the vehicle overlap detection mechanism is structured according to the
criteria defined in Section 3.3. In the first paragraph, the implementation, the evaluation instrument,
and the setup is presented. Subsequently, the evaluation results are discussed in respect to the defined
criteria: criteria accuracy, scalability, extensibility, generalizability, complexity, bandwidth & connec-
tivity, and privacy. We aim to examine the hypothesis whether the proposed mechanism can be applied
in VANETs to detect misbehavior.
Evaluation Setup In order to evaluate the functionality and applicability of the proposed mechanism
a simulation framework has been used. In contrast to the evaluation of the module-based misbehavior
detection framework all parameters of the communication channel, the vehicle movement, and the
driver behavior can be configured. Moreover, the required system configurations and components that
are required to analyze the functionality of the proposed mechanism are not available in prototypical
FOT implementations. The overlap detection mechanism requires in particular lane accurate positions.
This accuracy cannot permanently be achieved with FOT implementations that are available at this
time. Furthermore, a simulation study allows to calibrate the mechanism with different configurations
and the subsequent evaluation runs can be reproduced and repeated with the parameters given in this
section.
The V2X simulation runtime infrastructure (VSimRTI) simulator as previously introduced in Section
2.3.3.1 was applied. This framework has been developed by the Daimler Center for Automotive Infor-
mation Technology Innovations (DCAITI) to integrate several time-discrete simulators. VSimRTI is in
particular optimized for the testing of VANET applications. This simulation framework combines the
traffic simulator simulation urban mobility (SUMO) [KHRW02] that allows for the modeling of vehicle
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behavior in road scenarios and the network simulator JiST/SWANS [Bar06, Bar04] that is taking care
of the wireless communication between the vehicles and RSUs. The application interface simulator of
VSimRTI allows to implement applications that are running on each simulated station as depicted in
Figure 3.16.
V2X Simulation Runtime 
Infrastructure 
Application Container 
CAM Generator 
(Malware applied by attacker) 
CAM Generator 
(Applied by benign vehicles) 
Sensor 
Framework 
Vehicle Control Driver Interface 
V2X Communication 
Module 
Position Overlap 
Detection 
(Applied by observer) 
Figure 3.16.: Integration of applications into the VSimRTI simulation framework
VSimRTI comes with an implementation of a CAM generator that periodically distributes them
among relevant nodes in the network. These CAMs are periodically sent according to a predefined
frequencies between 1 Hz and 10 Hz. Every benign vehicle in the simulation is equipped with an
application that broadcasts CAMs. For evaluation purposes there is a single observer vehicle being
in communication range of the attacker that runs the application to detect the position overlap-based
anomalies.
The attacker malware that generates the ghost vehicle is designed to run on a RSU. At this station
the benign CAM generator is exchanged by the malicious CAM generator depicted on the left hand
side of Figure 3.16. That way, it is possible with VSimRTI to model a roadside attacker without af-
fecting traffic simulation due to a vehicle on the road. Based on recorded previous vehicle movements,
the malware replays these CAMs in order to create the illusion of correctly positioned or even plau-
sibly moving vehicles. The replayed CAMs are then received by approaching vehicles that check the
obtained position information.
Before the detection mechanism can be deployed, appropriate configurations for the vehicle overlap
model and its dimensions have to be determined. The following parameters have to be configured: imax,
γ, ds, α, and wl . Furthermore, reasonable values for the algorithm execution frequency must be found.
Finally, appropriate values for the overlap detection certainty related parameters such as smin and the
aging a need to be determined.
The usage of multiple rectangles that represent the vehicles’ dimensions and their safety areas (cf.
Figure 3.15), allows to allocate less weight to overlaps at outer distances than to overlaps in the core
of the vehicle overlap model. This functionality is verified with the attacker scenario depicted in Fig-
ure 3.17. A stationary ghost vehicle A1 is overlapped by a moving vehicle R. At time k0 the rectangles
of both nodes do not overlap. At a later time k1 the core of both rectangles overlap almost completely
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and at time k2 only the outer rectangle of the moving vehicle R is still overlapping with the rectangle
of A1.
R 
time 𝑘0 
A1 
time 𝑘1 
A1 
time 𝑘2 
A1 
R R 
Figure 3.17.: Attacker scenario considered for vehicle overlap detection
This attack scenario is used in the simulations to determine a reasonable value for imax. Depending
on the value of ds, which affects the length of the rectangles (see Equation 3.12), position overlaps of
the two vehicles are detected throughout the simulations. Figure 3.18 shows the simulation results of
the overlap scenario with different imax and constant ds = 1.25. Since only a small difference between
the overlap level imax = 6 and imax = 10 can be determined, it is reasonable to select the smaller value
for the remaining evaluations. For the detection of misbehavior the appropriate execution interval of the
overlap testing algorithm has to be elaborated. This interval should not be related to the frequency of
received CAMs because an attacker should not be able to manipulate the overlap detection by adjusting
its message broadcasting frequency. Nevertheless, the execution interval must be high enough in order
to allow a reliable overlap detection even with high vehicle mobilities.
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Figure 3.18.: Test results of the overlap detection algorithm used to calibrate imax of the misbehavior detection
module
Considering the anticipated application for misbehavior detection, it may happen that a stationary
ghost vehicle A1 is overlapped by another vehicle R that travels with maximum speed. In this situation,
the overlap time is reduced to a minimum. Figure 3.19 shows the course of an overlap of two vehicles
with a random GNSS error of 2 meters. In contrast to Figure 3.18, each curve has been recorded at
a different speed of vehicle R. At an execution frequency of 10 Hz, at least one overlap at the core
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Figure 3.19.: Test results of the overlap detection algorithm used to calibrate the execution interval of the mis-
behavior detection module
rectangle is observed, despite the simulated GNSS position inaccuracy. Since a single overlap at the
core provides a quite low level of evidence, the value of the overlap level at outer rectangles is set to γ=
0.5 in Algorithm 3.1. Based on further evaluations, detailed in [BSB10], an aging factor of a = 0.9 (cf.
Equations 3.16) is used as well as a threshold value smin = 4 that determines the number of sufficiently
collected evidences. Using these configuration settings combined with a maximum random GNSS
position inaccuracy of 6 meters, several evaluations of the overlap detection approach were performed
with the simulation framework VSimRTI as detailed in [BSB10]. All configuration parameters are
subsumed in Table 3.4.
Table 3.4.: Proposed configuration for position overlap-based misbehavior detection
Vehicle Model Evaluation of Vehicle Overlaps
Parameter Value Algorithm Equations Parameter Value Equations
γ 0.5 3.1 smin 4 3.15, 3.16
imax 6 3.1 3.12, 3.13 a 0.90 3.16
ds 1.25 3.12 Execution frequency 10 Hz
wl 2.50 3.13 of overlap detection
Accuracy In order to evaluate the accuracy of the proposed overlap detection, both the false-positive
and false-negative errors are measured, and both the true-positive and true-negative detections are
counted. The following three test scenarios have been evaluated with the simulation framework.
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(1) Attacker fakes road traffic congestion by creating several ghost vehicles In a first test setup,
a fake traffic congestion is created that consists of several ghost vehicles (e. g. A1, ... , A5, as
exemplarily depicted in Figure 2.7 on page 24) that are generated by the malware of the attacker.
Subsequently, benign vehicles overlap the positions of the ghost vehicles as they are driving
through the non-existing congestion area. As a result, it has been shown that all ghost vehicles
are correctly detected and no real vehicle is accused to be an attacker, despite random position
inaccuracies of 6 meters, cf. test scenario 1b in Table 3.5. In order to distinguish between
benign real vehicles and ghost vehicles, it is assumed that the observer of vehicle overlaps has
traveled together with the benign vehicles in single-hop communication range for a predefined
distance and time. Consequently, real vehicles have reached a higher trust and confidence level
than the ghost vehicles. This concept to distinguish between real vehicles and ghost vehicles has
obviously limitations as further discussed in test scenario 2.
(2) Attacker tries to deny existence of real road traffic congestion In this second test case it is
analyzed whether an observer is able to distinct between the benign neighbor node and the ghost
vehicle, both involved in an overlap, if no history about these nodes is available. This case may
happen if an attacker aims to deny the existence of a real congestion. In such a scenario, the
attacker creates a single ghost vehicle that drives virtually through a congestion area. In this
case, the benign real vehicles involved in the traffic congestion have an equally low trust and
confidence level than the ghost vehicle because the history of all nodes is equally long. Since no
vehicle has reached a sufficient high trust and confidence level the observer cannot recognize the
ghost vehicle as shown in Table 3.5. Consequently, we propose in Chapter 4 and Chapter 5 the
reporting of detections to a central authority to evaluate detections from different reporters that
have observed the same overlap. By combining other types of reported misbehavior a central
entity is assumed to be able to identify the attacker.
(3) Overlap detection with high lateral positional shifts In general the results of the local overlap
detection show that all vehicle overlaps are observed as expected. However, with increasing
random GNSS position inaccuracy the false-negative detection rate increases. A third simulation
setup is used to measure the false-positive rate without attackers in communication range that
create ghost vehicles. For this test, a multi-lane highway scenario is selected in which vehicles
overtake each other while traveling in the same direction with different velocities. With low
position inaccuracies, the simulation shows that no overlap detections occur, cf. test scenario
3a in Table 3.5. However, with high lateral positional shifts, a high false-positive rate can be
observed.
The results of the performed test scenarios are subsumed Table 3.5.
The evaluation has shown that the detection of position inconsistencies can be done reliable with
the proposed mechanism. However, we figured out that accurate position information is required to
minimize the number of false-positive detections. Different traffic safety applications (e. g. lane change
assistance, intersection management, etc. as specified in the basic set of applications of ETSI [ETS09])
also rely on accurate PVs. Therefore, it is likely that techniques such as dead reckoning, differential
GNSS, and relative positioning algorithms [BLB11] will be applied in future VANETs to allow a lane-
level accurate positioning [PB11]. In addition, a research project in the domain of automated driving
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Table 3.5.: Evaluation of the overlap detection algorithm
Random Detection of overlaps with Detection of
Test case GNSS error distinction between of real overlaps with-
vehicle and ghost vehicle out distinction
(1) Attacker fakes road 0 m 100 % 0 %
traffic congestion 6 m 100 % 0 %
(2) Attacker tries to deny exis- 0 m 0 % 100 %
tence of traffic congestion 6 m 0 % 80 %
(3) Overlap detection with high 0 m 0 % 0 %
lateral positional shifts 6 m 0 % 100 %
target the goal that vehicles can continuously determine their positions on the road to within 20-10
centimeters [MAG14].
Scalability The applied separating axis test [GT96, SIF97] applied for the position overlap detection
has in principle no high performance requirements with respect to computation and memory consump-
tion. The memory consumption is acceptable since only one vehicle model with several rectangles
has to be stored per neighbor node. This vehicle model can be updated in every execution step of the
algorithm.
Most relevant computations are related to simple vector operations and the processing of two dimen-
sional polygons. Nevertheless, the algorithm has to be executed per single-hop neighbor vehicle with
up to 10 Hz for several rectangles (cf. Table 3.4 for configuration of imax). Additionally, a straight-
forward implementation would verify the position of a neighbor vehicles with the position of all other
neighbor vehicles. In this case a complexity O(N2) is given with N being the number of single-hop
neighbor vehicles and assuming a maximum execution interval and a static number of rectangles imax.
This complexity would result in an unacceptable high number of executions per second. In order to re-
duce the complexity and therefore the number of executions we propose the application of a relevance
filter. Only neighbors that have nearby neighbors are verified. Since vehicles can have only a limited
number of flanking neighbors the complexity is reduced to O(N). Additionally, neighbor nodes that
are not in the relevant area of the verifying node could optionally be ignored. For example, vehicles
moving in the opposite direction behind the verifying node might be not relevant for local V2X appli-
cations. If this consistency check should, however, be used for misbehavior reporting it is reasonable
that all single-hop vehicles are verified.
Extensibility The proposed mechanism provides most benefit in dense road traffic scenarios. With
only a few vehicles on the road attackers could easily create ghost vehicles with plausible movement.
If the traffic density increases the attackers might forced to create unintended location-related conflicts
with other vehicles. For that reason, it is reasonable to deploy the overlap detection in a misbehavior
detection framework together with a PM and SAS check. Then an attacker cannot arbitrarily position
ghost vehicles on the road without provoking inconsistencies with other real vehicles, in particular in
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dense road traffic. An attacker that tries to avoid vehicle overlaps might be forced to create position
jumps of the ghost vehicle that can be detected by the PM and SAS checks.
Generalizability The proposed mechanism is designed for the application in transportation systems.
Therefore, its adaptation for other use cases is probably limited. In the domain of location-related
data consistency and plausibility checking this mechanism is generic and fundamental. Compared to
related mechanisms for misbehavior detection in VANETs it shows the following advantages. Our
mechanism is able to detect inconsistencies of single-hop vehicular neighbors that are not in line of
sight. This is not possible for example with mechanisms based on local sensors such as radar or
cameras. Furthermore, the overlap detection does not require additional knowledge such as digital road
maps or neighborhood tables. The proposed scheme also works independently from traffic situations
and movement patterns. Some related mechanisms are designed only for urban or highway traffic
[CWHZ09] and others must be trained and updated with specific knowledge [SFH11]. Moreover,
no support by roadside infrastructures is required and no specific information need to be exchanged
between VANET nodes.
Complexity The complexity of the proposed mechanism in terms of implementation and integration
is relatively low. As mentioned in the previous paragraph there are no dependencies on hardware such
as local sensors or infrastructure components. The overlap detection works autonomously on VANET
nodes and requires only permanently updated location-related information provided by neighbors via
CAMs.
We propose in this dissertation a simple vehicle model that is based only on rectangles that describes
the occupied area of a vehicle. In future work more complex vehicle models for trucks and buses should
be considered in addition in order to allow flexible vehicle structures. While driving through sharp
corners or while turning on intersections a long truck may not occupy a road area with a rectangular
shape. However, the applied algorithm for overlap checking of two vehicle models supports also more
complex polygon structures.
Bandwidth & Connectivity The proposed mechanism is based on received second hand information
contained in CAMs. No additional security-related information has to be exchanged in order to detect
possible inconsistencies. This is an advantage in contrast to related mechanisms that require for ex-
ample the periodic exchange of neighborhood tables between VANET nodes. Since only CAMs from
the adjacent nodes are processed an attacker can not influence the overlap detection mechanism to its
advantage without affecting the mobility of the ghost vehicle.
Privacy In order to create the vehicle model for neighboring nodes it is required to get their accurate
position and their rough dimensions. As a consequence it is not necessary to include very accurate
vehicle dimension information into CAMs that may allow a distinction between different vehicles. The
format of the CAM allows only to insert vehicle dimension matching to a predefined vehicle class. No
additional information is required to be inside the CAM format that may weaken the drivers’ privacy.
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As a conclusion of the evaluation, the proposed mechanism for vehicle overlap-based misbehavior
detection can be successfully applied in upcoming VANETs. Most relevant for an practical application
is the position accuracy of mobility information provided with CAMs.
3.6. Particle Filter-Based Misbehavior Detection Framework
The concept for mobility data plausibility checks presented in Sections 3.4 and 3.5 is based on dif-
ferent separate modules that perform PV-related tests in combination with local first hand information
or received second hand information. Other related approaches also separate tests into modules in or-
der to process different information sources as proposed e. g. in [Ger10, SLS+08, LSK06, YOW08].
These approaches, however, suffer from a complex aggregation of results (cf. Figure 3.4 on page51)
and sharing of information with different modules. Additionally the status of the neighbor nodes is
redundantly managed within different modules. In order to consider these issues, we present in this
section an alternative framework that combines different location information from a broad variety of
input sources using only one instance of a particle filter per single-hop neighbor node. This particle
filter is used to determine the trustworthiness of the node and allows a search for possible misbehavior
as shown in Figure 3.20.
Information Source 1 
(e.g. CAMs) 
Particle Filter 
… Information Source 2 
(e.g. Radar) 
Information Source 3 
(e.g. Road map) 
Evaluation of Node 
Trustworthiness 
Search for possible 
misbehavior 
… 
Figure 3.20.: Data source aggregation for plausibility checking with a particle filter
This framework has been elaborated by the author of this dissertation [BMBK12]. Some application
details of the particle filter-based misbehavior detection were further elaborated by Sebastian Mauthofer
in his Master thesis [MBH12] which was supervised by me. As part of this thesis he also implemented
and evaluated the concept under laboratory and real conditions using test vehicles.
In this section it is shown that a probabilistic particle filter [HMdPS05, TBF05] is an appropriate
instrument to implement data plausibility and consistency checks for VANETs. Usually Particle filters
are used to increase position accuracy of moving devices such as robots [TBF05] or persons equipped
with mobile devices [Ebi13]. As far we know this is the first time that a particle filter is applied
to verify location-related information in the context of vehicular ad hoc networks. In particular we
elaborated in this dissertation the possibilities to assign positive and negative particle weights in order
to represent plausible and implausible areas within an observed area. In the following subsections,
first the principles of a particle filter are described, followed by the utilization concept to check data
plausibility and detect misbehavior. Finally, an evaluation of the concept under laboratory conditions
is discussed, and tests with three real vehicles on a test track are described.
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3.6.1. The Particle Filter
Particle filters belong to the family of Bayesian filters. In general the algorithm of a particle filter
consists of predict/update cycles that are performed repeatedly to estimate the state of a dynamic sys-
tem [TBF05]. In a first step the filter performs a prediction of a prior system state, where a new believe
state is calculated. The second step is the so called measurement update. Here, the predicted believe
state is corrected by the use of sensor observations. The basic idea of particle filters is that any prob-
ability density function (PDF) can be approximated by a set of samples. With a sufficient amount of
samples, the density of samples in a given area represents the probability of that area. With particle
filters, each sample is represented by a particle, containing a whole set of state variables. This allows
for the sampling of arbitrary density functions and therefore of several complex models.
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Figure 3.21.: The particle filter algorithm using sequential importance resampling
For the application as mobility data plausibility check it is reasonable to choose a particle filter
algorithm that is using the common sequential importance resampling (SIR) approach [TBF05]. Each
particle x[m]k of the filter comes as a instantiation of the system state at a time k and represents a sample
of the posterior distribution. χk is the particle set at time k containing all particles x
[m]
k (with 1≤m≤M)
of that time step where M denotes the total number of particles. A reasonable value for parameter M is
evaluated later in this section by using a V2X communication test system. The algorithm depicted in
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Figure 3.21 takes a set of particles χk−1 together with the most recent control information uk to calculate
the required state shift of the particles by sampling the state transition distribution with p(xk|uk,xk−1).
In the weighting step following, the most recent sensor measurement zk is used as an input for
the weighting in which the conditional probability is calculated with p(zk|x[m]k ) for each particle. For
normalization purposes, a counter η is used which sums up all particle weights in the SIR loop. After
the weighting is done, the particle is added to a new temporary particle set χk. The most important step
of the particle filter algorithm is the resampling. The algorithm draws M particles with replacement
from the temporary particle set χk. The probability of drawing a particle corresponds to its normalized
particle weight w[m]k /η. Finally, the drawn particles are added to the output particle set χk. The resulting
particle set χk is used in the next iteration with k = k+1 when the SIR loop is executed again.
3.6.2. Data Fusion and Plausibility Checking with Particle Filters
In order to check the plausibility of mobility data sent by single-hop neighbor nodes the particle filter
algorithm performs a fusion of data from several location-related data sources. In this approach, a
separate particle filter is used for each tracked vehicle. Particle filters show a high efficiency with
respect to tracking purposes and allow the inclusion of both negative and positive weighting factors.
However, the VANET scenario differs from typical utilizations of particle filters where a hypothesis is
corrected by fully trusted sensor data. In contrast to other usage areas, e. g. the robotics domain, the
incoming PV of a tracked vehicle is an essential part of the data zk that is used to correct the sampling.
This received data however can be forged or flawed by an attacker. Consequently, the goal of the
tracking is not to identify the most likely position of the vehicle but to determine the plausibility of a
stated PV. We elaborated [BMBK12] that the following location data-based verification methods can be
applied with one particle filter per node without managing additional information in external modules.
• Tracking of adjacent nodes to verify their movement and detect position jumps of ghost vehicles
• Consideration of local first hand sensor information to confirm or disprove a stated neighbor node
position (e. g. information received from radar, lidar, cameras, directional antennas)
• Consideration of local first hand knowledge to confirm or disprove a stated neighbor node posi-
tion (e. g. information gathered from digital road maps, a sudden appearance area [SLS+08], a
maximum communication range [SJB+10])
• Consideration of received second hand information (e. g. overlap detection [BSB10])
• Functions for misbehavior detection support (e. g. consideration of moved distances [SLH09],
pseudonym change detection [WKMP10], tracking of own position)
Therefore, the particle filter-based concept comes as an alternative instrument to the module-based
concept described in Sections 3.4 and 3.5 for location data-based plausibility checking.
In order to apply the particle filter for mobility data plausibility checking, the sampling step is used
to predict the state transition from a previous state to the following state according to the given control
information. In this scheme, the state transition function is based on the positional shift between two
incoming messages. From the PV of a previous message, the vehicle speed and the heading is derived2.
2The node’s gear rate may also be available in V2X messages and could therefore be used to consider direction changes in
more detail. However, for the sake of simplicity this approach is not used in this proof of concept.
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This vector is multiplied with the time difference between the previous PV and the current PV. Since
the positional shift is assumed to be independent from the location of the tracked vehicle, all particles
are shifted identically. The actual fusion of the different location-related data sources is performed in
the weighting step. This step is dedicated to the correction of the predicted believe state calculated in
the sampling step. In order to do so, sensor data is provided to the particle filter to inform about the
current state of the environment.
In this misbehavior detection approach, two types of information are provided to the particle filter in
order to weight the particles.
The first type of information is the stated position of the tracked neighbor vehicle which is gathered
from received V2X messages. Figure 3.22(a) and Figure 3.22(b) depict the same situation from differ-
ent perspectives. In this scenario a single-hop neighbor node claims to be located in front of the own
vehicle. The top view in Figure 3.22(a) shows the own vehicle in the center. The horizontal view from
the own vehicle towards the tracked vehicle that is driving ahead is shown in Figure 3.22(b).
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Figure 3.22.: Fusion of multiple weight factors with a primary Gaussian distribution
The four stacked diagrams show how separate information sources are combined to a single weighted
area. As shown in the topmost layer of Figure 3.22(b) a Gaussian distribution of particle weights is
created based on the stated position of the tracked vehicle. Although this information is not reliable, as
it might be forged, it represents the claimed state of the tracked vehicle. This position is actually the
key information which has to be matched with the predicted current position to identify deviations from
the movement pattern. If the stated position does not match at all, there is a high probability that the
received message is flawed. In order to weight the particles, the information about the stated position
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needs to be mapped onto a PDF as shown in Figure 3.21 and Equation 3.17.
w[m]k = p(zk|x[m]k ) (3.17)
With an increasing distance from the original position, the uncertainty of the stated position is increas-
ing but still a roughly circular shape is generated. The center of the area created by the PDF corresponds
to the highest probability. The reduction of probability is approximated by a Gaussian distribution in
the evaluated implementation.
The second type of information is local first hand information that is assumed to provide additional
reliable knowledge about the environment. This knowledge involves data obtained from local sensors
such as radar, environmental databases such as street maps, and general laws of physics, such as com-
munication distances assuming a maximum transmission power. This knowledge is used to reduce the
particle weight at implausible locations and raise the particle weight at locations with a high likelihood.
In Figure 3.22(a) and Figure 3.22(b), the influence of road side areas and a radar area are shown exem-
plarily in form of hatched polygons. According to the plausibility model vehicles driving next to the
road should be detected as well as vehicles that are located within the radar beam area that is spanned
between the own vehicle and another vehicle traveling ahead. Consequently, the weight of particles is
reduced that are located inside the road side areas and inside the radar beam area. As a result, particles
of a ghost vehicle claiming a position inside the radar beam area are assigned a low weight.
In principle, every information can be used as a weighting factor as long as it can be described
as a single polygon or a combination of multiple polygons that represent the knowledge about the
environment. In the module-based framework discussed in Section 3.4, each sensor information is
processed in a separate plausibility check module. In contrast, the particle filter-based scheme allows to
add knowledge and sensor results in a single step. The factor assigned to each polygon area represents
the importance of the information.
The process of weighting particles is performed in two steps. First, the bivariate normal distribution
of the stated position is used to weight the particles as shown by p(zk|x[m]k ) of Equation 3.18. In the
second step, the total of all area factors as expressed by the second factor of Equation 3.18 is applied
to increase or decrease the particle weights.
w[m]k = p(zk|x[m]k ) ·
1
f [m]1 + f
[m]
2 + ...+ f
[m]
n
(3.18)
If Equation 3.18 is applied the stated position information is dominant in the weighting process. This
is required since the next prediction step at time k+1 relies on the information included in the message
at time k. However, the area factors might have a high influence on the plausibility rating but not
necessarily on the correction of a predicted believe state.
The actual core of the concept is to use the normalization factor of the particle filter as a measurement
of the plausibility of the stated position and therefore of the content of the received message. The
normalization factor, further denoted as Ω, contains the summarized weights of all particles. It is
assumed that a high particle weight - which results either from the proximity to the center of the
bivariate normal distribution or from a positive area factor - represents a high probability of being in a
plausible state. Accordingly, a low particle weight results from high uncertainty that could be caused
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by conflicting information. Therefore, a high normalization factor (= high probability of being in a
plausible state) is caused by a large number of high-rated particles, and a low factor (= low probability
of being in a plausible state) by many low-rated particles - with a smooth transition between the two
extremes.
3.6.3. Misbehavior Detection with Particle Filters
As shown in Figure 3.22 different checks can be simply integrated as weighted polygon areas in order
to detect misbehavior based on the MCR, SAS, PM, MRP, and RCP check. The particle filter further
allows to check whether an object at a given location is matching with the particle cloud of one of
the tracked vehicles. This mechanism can be used to test if any of the tracked vehicles is detected by
the radar or if a tracked vehicle has performed an ID change. In order to perform this kind of check
normally distributed particles at the interested location are added to the particle cloud. For these checks
the sampling and resampling steps can be skipped since only the particle weights and the respective
normalization factorΩ are needed. The rest of the procedure, e. g. mapping of the normalization factor,
is done as usual (cf. Figure 3.21).
Moreover, the particle cloud can also be used to check whether the stated positions of neighboring
vehicles overlap as detailed in Section 3.5. For this task, the particle filters are applied in the following
way: All particles of the respective filters are mapped onto a two-dimensional grid. In this concept,
the size of a grid cell has approximately the size of the involved vehicles, and the cells are partly
overlapping each other. Every cell, identified by its x and y coordinate, maintains a separate counter
variable ϑx,y that is used to detect possible overlaps. For each particle of the filters in question, the
closest cells of the grid are searched and the counters ϑx,y of the affected cells are incremented. After
all particles are assigned, the cells with high values of ϑx,y represent vehicle locations. For cells its
counter ϑ exceeded the maximum number of particles assigned to a single particle filter indicate an
overlap of two or more vehicles.
Finally, an additional particle filter instance can be used to track the own vehicle’s position. It is not
relevant if imprecise map data, winding roads, or an inaccurate own GNSS information are the cause,
the own vehicle should always be able to serve as a reference with respect to plausibility. If the own
station is not able to achieve high position accuracy, the whole plausibility check should be paused until
the accuracy is sufficiently high.
3.6.4. Evaluation of Plausibility Checking with Particle Filters
The goal of this evaluation is to analyze whether a particle filter can be applied to detect the location-
related misbehavior defined in Section 1.2. The paragraphs of this section are structured according to
the evaluation criteria defined in Section 3.3. Further, we analyze whether the particle filter provides
better properties with respect to extensibility, generalizability, and complexity than a module-based
misbehavior detection framework. By means of these criteria a comparison of proposed and related
solutions is finally presented in Section 3.7.
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Evaluation Setup Similar to the evaluation of the module-based approach, discussed in Section 3.4.4,
practical experiments have been performed to analyze the overall applicability of the particle filter
framework. After the functionality of the particle filter implementation has been tested recorded vehi-
cles traces have been used in a laboratory setup to calibrate and evaluate the framework. We utilized the
same evaluation setup as used for the module-based framework as illustrated in Figure 3.5 on page 53
and described in Section 3.4.4 to enable a comparison of both approaches. Within the performed ex-
periments only the Java OSGi implementation of the module-based misbehavior detection framework
has been substituted by a Java OSGi implementation of the particle filter-based framework. However,
a long-term evaluation within a large scale FOT has not been performed due to missing opportunities.
Instead, dedicated tests has been conducted with several test vehicles. In these real world experiments
XML encoded vehicle traces were recorded per vehicle that include all on-board information of the
station and all V2X messages that were exchanged in the test runs. These files have been replayed
with a trace player that is connected to a CCU and AU device in a laboratory environment to analyze
the particle filter-based approach with different configurations. Based on these recored traces and the
configuration parameters presented in this section our evaluations can be reproduced and repeated.
In the real world experiments three test vehicles were used on a testing area to perform various
test drives including different maneuvers. In all tests one particle filter instance was used for every
neighbor vehicle. Each filter contained 1000 particles and used a filter area size of 800× 800 meters.
The configuration parameters of the particle filter are subsumed in Table 3.6. In contrast to the module-
based framework only location-related information can be checked by the particle filter. As a result,
the MTD and MBF checks are not performed by the particle filter.
Table 3.6.: Configuration of the particle filter-based plausibility check
Plausibility check Value Description
Maximum
communication
range (MCR)
0.8 km
If the location of a single-hop message claims to be within
the MCR then the receiver considers the position vector as
plausible.
Suddenly appearing
station (SAS)
200 m
Stations that claim to be in a distance below this value are
considered to be not plausible.
15
Number of messages to be received until the sudden
appearance area is deactivated.
50
Weighting factor related to messages that violate the sudden
appearance area, cf. Equation 3.18.
Plausible movement
(PM) 4
Value for the sigma of the Gaussian kernel applied as PDF
which corresponds approximately to a radius of 3 to 6 meters.
Radar conform
position (RCP)
100 m
Maximum detection distance supported by the front radar
transceiver.
50
Weighting factor related to messages that violate the radar
appearance area, cf. Equation 3.18.
Accuracy For the evaluation of the particle filter-based framework an implementation is tested that
comprises the MCR, SAS, PM, and RCP checks. In order to measure both, the false-negative and the
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false-positive rates (cf. Table 3.2 on page 45) several manually generated vehicle traces has been used
as well as real vehicles traces. The results of the measurements performed in an environment free of
attackers show that benign single-hop neighbor nodes are rated trustworthy. Figure 3.23 exemplarily
show that no false detections are created by the plausibility checker in normal road traffic conditions
even if some messages do not provide absolute accurate mobility data. In contrast to the evaluation of
the module-based framework no long-term evaluations of the false-positive rates could be performed.
However, several different test drives have been performed and different recorded traces have been used
with the trace player setup to ensure that no false detections are created by the particle filter.
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Figure 3.23.: Evaluation of particle filter-based MDS under real conditions using trace without attackers
In order to verify that attacks are correctly detected (cf. true-negative rate according to Table 3.2)
with the particle filter-based framework different dedicated tests with respect to the MCR, SAS, PM,
and RCP check has been performed with several test vehicles. The results are comparable with the
results of the module-based framework with respect to detection rate and detection accuracy. In the fol-
lowing the misbehavior detection related to the radar conform position (RCP) verification is discussed
in more detail since this kind of check has not been analyzed with the module-based framework.
The results depicted in Figure 3.25 show a ghost vehicle attack as introduced in Section 2.3.3 and
extended in Figure 3.24 under optimal laboratory conditions. In this scenario a tracked ghost vehicle A1
drives along with a vehicle R that runs the plausibility checker. At the beginning of the test A1 moves
with a constant speed identical to the speed of R, and keeps a constant distance. At time k1, the tracked
ghost vehicle enters the radar area that is spanned between vehicle R and another real vehicle T that is
detected by the radar of R. Since it is very unlikely that a real vehicle is located in the radar-monitored
area, this area has a weighting factor of 50 configured, which will result in a particle weight reduction
of 150 according to Equation 3.18.
As shown in Figure 3.25 the rating of vehicle A1 increases rapidly after the initialization phase
and stays at a high level until the ghost vehicle enters the radar area at time k1. As expected, the
rating of messages suddenly drops to a low value clearly below a defined threshold of 0.5. While the
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Figure 3.24.: Ghost vehicle A1 violates the radar area spanned between R and T
ghost vehicle is within the radar-monitored area, the node-based trust value decreases also below this
threshold. Shortly after the ghost vehicle has left the radar observed area at time k2, the message-based
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Figure 3.25.: Evaluation of particle filter-based MDS under laboratory conditions using trace with RCP violation
rating reaches a high value again. Figure 3.25 shows that the malicious behavior of ghost vehicle A1
is clearly detected indicated by the decrease of the node-based rating caused by violation of the radar-
monitored area. However, the detection of node-based anomalies should not lead to a permanent local
exclusion of the affected node since unexpected situations such as an accident could also be the cause
of an detected anomaly. The rating of the node should rather be used to created misbehavior reports
that are evaluated by a central entity.
Additional tests performed under real conditions are based on traces recorded on a dedicated test
area where several simple maneuvers, e. g. sudden braking and evasion of obstacles, were performed.
The test results shown in Figure 3.26 address the impact of the radar object detection analogous to the
tests under laboratory conditions. The tracked ghost vehicle A1 starts a sudden overtaking maneuver
and goes into the gap between the vehicle R and a heading vehicle T at time k1. Afterwards, at time
k2 the ghost vehicle leaves the radar area but stays in communication range and performs some further
driving maneuvers.
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Figure 3.26.: Evaluation of particle filter-based MDS under real conditions using trace with RCP violation
Figure 3.26 shows the decrease of the message- and node-based rating below the threshold at time
k1, which indicates non-plausible behavior of the tracked vehicle A1. Similar to the test results under
laboratory conditions, the node-based trust rating of the A1 increases as soon as the ghost vehicle
leaves the radar area at time k2. The alternating message trust values in Figure 3.26 are related to
the applied Gaussian distribution function. This function is used to check whether a stated position
of a tracked vehicle is valid as illustrated in the topmost layer of Figure 3.22(b) on page 78. An
analysis of recorded messages from real vehicles has shown that many stated positions are not perfectly
matching with this Gaussian bell curve, which results in low message ratings. It is therefore reasonable
to adapt the probability distribution function in future prototypical implementations in order to ignore
minor position inaccuracies in received V2X messages. However, in spite of alternating message trust
values caused by inaccurate position data and insufficiently considered abrupt driving behavior, the
expectations are fulfilled since the misbehavior of the ghost vehicle is clearly detected.
The evaluations show that in general both, the module-based and the particle filter-based framework
are comparable with respect to misbehavior detection accuracy. The results of tests with real vehicles
show that the particle filter algorithm is able to handle movement data that represent typical driving
behavior, without producing false detections. At the same time, ghost vehicle attacks are detected as
long as they show abnormal behavior according to the aspects defined in Section 1.2. A concluding
comparison with other approaches is provided in Section 3.7.
Scalability The performance and therefore the scalability of the particle filter-based framework is
directly related to the number of particles contained in the filters. On the other hand, the accuracy also
directly depends on the number of particles. An increase of particles leads to a higher accuracy but,
otherwise, needs more processing power. We evaluated the optimal number of particles that can be
applied per filter to obtain optimal results. Figure 3.27 presents different graphs of a node-based rating
that are related to different numbers of particles, starting from 10 particles up to 1000 particles per
84
3.6. Particle Filter-Based Misbehavior Detection Framework
filter. For these performance evaluations, the recorded real vehicle traces are reused, cf. rating curve of
A1 shown in Figure 3.26.
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Figure 3.27.: Accuracy of particle filer measurements with different numbers of particles
All particle filters that are related to the graphs depicted in Figure 3.27 with marginal deviations
from the reference vehicle trust graph can be assumed to handle appropriate particle numbers. In
theory, a particle filter processing more particles produces more precise results. Consequently, the
graph representing the particle filter with the highest amount of particles is used as reference that
can be computed reliably on the test system. In the test setup the best results can be achieved with
particle numbers between 500 and 1000. Filters with more than 2000 particles cannot be processed fast
enough due to limited processing power on the tested automotive systems. In Figure 3.28 the deviations
between the reference filter with 1000 particles and the filters with less particles are shown. For filter
providing less than 300 particles, the results are still usable but cannot be deemed satisfyingly accurate
(i. e. showing a mean deviation ≥ 4%).
Figure 3.29 shows the performance measurements of the particle filter with varying numbers of
particles similar to the accuracy evaluation shown in Figure 3.27. Since the complexity of particle filters
is O(M), an increase of the number of particles M causes a linear increase of computational effort. This
might be a problem in resource restricted environments. For practical application we propose to utilize
between 100 and 500 particles per filter. When only 100 particles are used per particle filter, it is
possible to handle up to 200 incoming messages per second, but using around 500 particles per filter,
approximately 40 messages can only be processed. Consequently, the particle filter algorithm may be
adapted to incoming message rates and only relevant neighbors may be tracked.
In comparison with a other probabilistic filters (e. g. the Kalman filter see Section 3.4) the particle
filter can process in a single weighting step information from different information sources. The com-
putational overhead caused by the number of different information sources is negligible with respect
to the total order O(M) of the particle filter-based plausibility check. As a result, the particle filter is
a good choice if several different information sources have to be considered in order to detect mis-
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Figure 3.29.: Runtimes of the particle filer algorithm in dependence of particles numbers
behavior in V2X communications. For the sake of complexity and effort, the tested proof of concept
implementation has not used enough information sources to outperform the module-based framework
that is implemented with a Kalman filter.
Extensibility A particle filter is able to integrate different location-related information in order to in-
crease the quality of the probabilistic state modeling and estimation. The information of the sources are
considered by the particle filter using Equation 3.18 in order to influence the weights of the single par-
ticles. The extensibility of the particle filter is however limited to sources that provide location-related
information. In particular, it is necessary that replayed messages are dropped before the location data
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of an associated V2X message is processed by the particle filter. Additionally, the beacon frequency
of observed neighbors cannot be verified with the particle filter concept. Therefore it is necessary to
perform some basic checks before the location-related checks are performed by the particle filter.
Generalizability The generalizability of the particle filter concept with respect to misbehavior detec-
tion is high. In general, particle filters support non-linear state propagation functions and non-Gaussian
noise. There is no limitation to the probability density function that is applied in a particle filter. In
addition several different PDFs can be applied at the same time for different information sources. This
property makes the particle filter to an adequate instrument for location data plausibility and consis-
tency checking.
There are proposals to apply particle filters in the domain of mobile ad hoc networks to track persons
that are equipped with wireless transceivers [Ebi13]. Moreover, the particle filter-based framework
could be extended by other kinds of information, for example light, moisture, temperature or pressure,
to support misbehavior and fault detection in wireless sensor networks.
Complexity In order to analyze the complexity related to the integration of information sources that
may have mutual dependencies with other aspects of local-related information we performed several
experiments with a radar sensor. In Figure 3.4 on page 51 the dependency of a RCP test on a prob-
abilistic vehicle tracker is shown. The position of the tracked vehicle must be synchronized with the
radar sensor in order to rate the location plausibility. When applying a particle filter it is not necessary
to specify each single dependency between different aspects of location-related plausibility since the
weight of the particles is automatically influenced by all existing information sources. For example, if
a neighbor vehicle claims to be located within an area that conflicts with measurements of a local radar
then the affected particles are assigned with low weights and consequently are drawn in the resampling
state with low probability, cf. Section 3.6.2. Additional information sources with mutual dependencies
are for example digital maps, differential antennas, or second hand location information used to detect
vehicle overlaps. In the module-based framework the sequence of checks might be relevant. Since the
particle filter framework include all information into one weighting process some dependency questions
become obsolete.
Our experiments and related evaluations have shown that the integration of information sources with
mutual dependencies is simple. This simplicity is in particular important to avoid vulnerabilities and
faulty implementations.
Bandwidth & Connectivity In the same way as specified for the module-based approach the particle
filter-based framework is designed to work autonomously on the nodes of the VANET. The exchange of
information related to misbehavior detection via ITS-G5 with neighbors is not considered. A misbehav-
ior report generation that is using the particle filter might need, however, capabilities to communicate
sometimes with the infrastructure.
Privacy Personal or identifying information related to the driver of a vehicle is not processed by
the particle filter-based approach. Similar to the module-based framework the application of pseudo-
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nymous IDs is anticipated. However, the tracking of the nodes allows the detection of ID changes and
therefore the linking of different IDs. In order to protect the privacy of drivers this linking information
must not be shared with other VANET neighbors or external entities.
3.7. Comparison of Local Misbehavior Detection Approaches
In this section we summarize the comparison of the module-based framework with the particle filter-
based framework, cf. Sections 3.4 and 3.6, respectively. Moreover, we compare our approaches
with VEBAS, proposed by Schmidt et al. [SLS+08], the observer-based scheme proposed by Gerlach
[Ger10] and a purely centralized approach. The later schemes are aiming to process random V2X
messages that are reported by nodes of the VANET whereas the nodes do not evaluate the suspects
beforehand. This comparison is based on the criteria defined in Section 3.3 and uses the four simple
rating values: - - (very poor), - (poor), + (good), and ++ (excellent). The double minus and the double
plus indicates a very negative or very positive rating, respectively. The single minus indicates that some
requirements are unfulfilled or unsatisfactorily considered. The single plus indicates that most require-
ments are considered. Table 3.7 lists the ratings associated to the different approaches and subsumes
the most relevant positive and negative aspects.
The accuracy of the module-based and particle filter-based frameworks is comparable with both,
VEBAS and the observer-based approach. In all four cases the detection mechanisms can be configured
and extended in order to provide a high detection rate and a low false-positive detection rate as long as
benign vehicles provide accurate position information. However, Gerlach propose to apply RSSI that
is prone to false and inaccurate detections [Ger10, Section 5.5.2]. The accuracy of a pure centralized
approach is not sufficient if only reports containing inconsistent V2X messages are provided to a central
misbehavior detection authority. Since VANET nodes can gather a large set of information about
neighbors based on V2X messages and context information the local misbehavior detection can work
more accurate. Furthermore, some misbehavior can only be detected if local first hand information can
be accessed that is exclusively known by VANET nodes, cf. MBF, SAS, RCP.
With respect to scalability and performance the module-based framework shows better results than
the particle filter-based approach. By comparing the performance of vehicle tracking in both ap-
proaches, at the first glance the Kalman filter seems to be more efficient than the particle filter. With
increasing number of information sources and location-related plausibility checks the particle filter
becomes more interesting since the particle processing step is executed only once regardless of the
number of data sources and checks. Even if no performance numbers are available for the related
works [SLS+08,Ger10], it can be assumed that VEBAS and the observer-based approach show similar
performance values as the module-based approach. A purley centralized approach, however, has to pro-
cess large data amounts which might cause problems with an increasing number of reporting VANET
nodes.
The extensibility of a central mechanisms can be assumed to be better than solutions that are dis-
tributed on network nodes because a remote update might not be supported by most vehicles. However,
in general all proposed schemes can be extended by additional mechanisms in order to detect location-
related misbehavior that is unknown today.
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Table 3.7.: Comparison of local misbehavior detection approaches
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Module-
based
framework
High detection accuracy
with specialized mod-
ules; Extensible with
specialized modules; No
exchange of additional
data between VANET
nodes; No permanent
connection to central in-
frastructure required
Specialized modules
responsible for specific
tasks; Dependability of
modules increase com-
plexity of module-based
framework.
++ + + -- - + +
Particle
filter-
based
framework
High detection accuracy
due to flexible PDF;
Generalizable to be ap-
plied in other domains;
Reduced complexity due
to direct integration of
information from differ-
ent sources into parti-
cle cloud; No exchange
of additional data be-
tween VANET nodes;
No permanent connec-
tion to central infrastruc-
ture required
High computational per-
formance requirements;
Only location-related
consistency or plau-
sibility tests can be
integrated that can be
realized with particles
++ - + ++ + + +
VEBAS
[SLS+08]
High detection accuracy
assumed since compara-
ble with module-based
approach; Extensi-
ble with specialized
modules
No evaluation results
published; Additional
data exchange between
VANET nodes
++ + + -- - - -
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Observer-
based
approach
by Gerlach
[Ger10]
Extensible with special-
ized modules; Concept
of Bayesian Networks
can be used in other do-
mains
Multiple processing of
same data; Received
signal strength observer
prone to false-positive
detections; Additional
data exchange between
VANET nodes
+ + + + - - -
Purely
centralized
approach
Generation of long-term
node reputation
Decreasing accuracy of
misbehavior detection
with less information
gathered; Handling of
large amounts of data
at central infrastructure;
High requirements
regarding connectivity
between VANET nodes
and central infrastruc-
ture
- - - ++ + - - - -
Considering the generalizability, the particle filter can be easily adopted to other kinds of misbehav-
ior detection in VANETs and also to other domains of computer networks. Since the observer-based
solution is based on Bayesian networks the generalizability can also be assumed to be high.
The complexity of most approaches is rather high since dependencies and interoperability between
different components have to be considered in the module-based approach, the observer-based ap-
proach, VEBAS and the centralized approach. The particle filter solves this problem in an elegant way.
Since the location-plausibility of neighbor nodes is represented by a cloud of particles local first hand
information and received second hand information can be integrated into this particle cloud. As a result,
the rating of the neighbors’ location is automatically influenced by the integrated information.
With respect to communication bandwidth and connectivity the module-based approach and the par-
ticle filter-based approach are rated positive since no additional data associated to misbehavior detec-
tion is transmitted via the ITS-G5 communication link. The authors of VEBAS and the observer-based
approach propose to exchange information between VANET neighbors that is related to misbehavior
detection. Due to the same reason the pure centralized approach is rated negative. If no filtering of
possible misbehavior is performed on the local nodes then possibly high amounts of data has to be
transmitted between the network nodes and the central entity. This may require in addition a constant
communication link between the network nodes and the infrastructure.
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In order to protect the privacy of drivers the module-based framework and the particle-filter based
framework are rated positively because information that may simplify the vehicle tracking is not ex-
changed between neighboring nodes. VEBAS and the observer-based approach are rated negatively
because they consider the exchange of neighborhood tables. However, local misbehavior detection
mechanisms applied on VANET nodes can protect the driver’s privacy better than purely centralized
frameworks.
3.8. Limitations of Local Misbehavior Detection and Further Challenges
The local detection of anomalies is naturally limited with respect to the detection of misbehavior and
attacks. According to our research results there is no difference between valid and expected anomalies
such as a traffic accident and maliciously created anomalies introduced in Section 1.2. For example,
two vehicles that collide on the road distribute mobility data via CAMs that may violate the boundary
of regular negative acceleration and may cause vehicle overlap detections. In this case, the involved
nodes must not be considered as attackers and must not be excluded from V2X communications.
A local misbehavior detection running of VANET nodes is consequently not able to distinguish
in any case between valid expected anomalies and anomalies caused by maliciously generated ghost
vehicles. A pure local misbehavior detection solution can therefore only detect the abnormal situation
and related events but cannot reliably decide if the anomaly is caused due to an attack. This aspect is
further analyzed in more detail in Chapter 4.
Additionally, the following aspects have to be considered that complicate data consistency and plau-
sibility checking in general.
• Synchronization: Information from different sources in a multisensor environment might be
received at different times, intervals and arbitrary orders. The fusion of information that are re-
ceived with some delays is first named by Bar-Shalom [BS02] as out-of-sequence measurements
(OOSM). The problem of multisensor target tracking systems receiving out-of-sequence mea-
surements is discussed in detail by Zhang and Bar-Shalom [ZBS12a]. They argue that the fusion
of OOSM is not trivial and with respect to the particle filter they showed that optimal solutions
have high performance effort [ZBS12b]. Sensor measurements provided by local sensors such
as the GNSS position or a radar object detection need to be synchronized with the PV that is
extracted from received V2X messages. With the tracking functionalities of the Kalman filter or
the particle filter it is possible to calculate an accurate PV of the past and predict a PV of the near
future. Synchronized mobility data are also required by the vehicle overlap detection.
• Inaccuracy: Broadcasted mobility data contain usually inaccuracies since the GNSS suffer from
measurement inaccuracies of about 3 to 5 meters even if mechanisms for error reduction are
applied, e. g. map-based positioning, dead reckoning and differential GNSS.
Additionally, some constants in the CAMs such as the dimensions of a vehicle are inaccurate as
only values can be used that are related to predefined classes. This is required to make vehicles
to a great extend undistinguishable from other vehicles in the VANET and therefore to protect
the privacy of the drivers.
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• Scalability: Both theoretical situation analysis and simulations have shown that incoming packet
rates of approximately 1000 packets per second can be expected [SBK+11] when wireless V2X
channels are used that base on ITS-G5 [ETS10b] using IEEE 802.11p [IEE10]. If more than
approximately 1000 packets are sent over one channel the number of packet collisions increases
dramatically. However, for traffic safety and efficiency applications only a subset of neighbors
may be relevant, e. g. only vehicles driving ahead in a similar direction. As a possible solution, a
relevance filter can be applied that decides which neighbors have to be checked and observed.
In order to minimize the performance requirements for misbehavior detection, a predefined ex-
ecution interval of plausibility checks is reasonable. Alternatively, the execution might be done
upon receipt of a new V2X message.
• Bandwidth and connectivity limitations: Since the wireless ITS-G5 control channel must only
be used to transmit traffic safety related data, plausibility checks and misbehavior detection
mechanisms should be able to work autonomously on the nodes. Additionally, constant or even
sporadic connections to back-end services of the infrastructure cannot be assumed.
• Privacy: In order to protect drivers’ privacy, identifiers of vehicles are changed frequently and
unexpectedly. An attacker could misuse this feature to hide its malicious behavior when the
identifier of the attacker vehicle is changed directly after an attack. Even if vehicle trackers
are applied to detect the ID change of neighboring nodes, cf. Section 4.2 and related works of
Wiedersheim et al. [WKMP10], an attacker could stop broadcasting messages before changing
to another ID. This behavior would prevent others to be able to link different IDs owned by the
attacker.
In the evaluations of the proposed module-based framework (Section 3.4) and the particle filter-based
framework (Section 3.6) as well as the newly proposed vehicle overlap check (Sections 3.5) all these
VANET-specific requirements are considered.
3.9. Summary and Conclusion
Within this chapter we depicted that location-based misbehavior can be reliably and autonomously
detected by single-hop neighbor node applying consistency and plausibility checks of received mobility
data. We proposed a categorization of plausibility checks that separates message-based checks from
node-based checks (cf. Section 3.2).
Based on this categorization we developed a module-based misbehavior detection framework that
applies these checks in separate modules. The message-based verification of correct value ranges, mo-
bility data consistency, maximum communication range, and maximum transmission delay can be used
to filter messages with erroneous content. The evaluations of the corresponding plausibility checks
based on long-term outdoor tests have shown that the majority of false-positive detections are caused
by single-hop messages that exceeded the maximum communication range or the maximum transmis-
sion delay. However, the node-based checks should not result in the discarding of affected messages
since implausibilities could be caused by possible dangerous road traffic situations that may lead to
the transmission of abnormal mobility information. The respective messages could be very important
for the traffic safety applications to show appropriate reaction, e. g. through warning the driver. The
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evaluations of the node-based plausibility checks based on outdoor tests show that suddenly appearing
stations, vehicle overlaps and implausible movements of attacker nodes are detected.
Further, we developed a new kind of node-based location data consistency check that is based on
received second hand information (cf. Section Section 3.5 ). Based on accurate position information
the consistency check is able to reliably detect anomalies created by attackers. Compared to related
mechanisms no additional information exchange with neighbor nodes is required.
Finally, we propose a particle filter-based framework in Section 3.6 that aims at integrating different
information sources to perform both plausibility checks and misbehavior detection. In this approach
one single particle filter instance is maintained per neighbor node in order to combine all relevant
local first hand information and received second hand information. In contrast to the module-based
schemes, sharing of the same information among different modules is avoided as well as the multi-
ple management of a neighbor node’s state in different modules. Moreover, a complex aggregation
of module results is avoided. The detection of misbehavior and consequently an evaluation of node
trustworthiness is possible by accessing the particle filter. Finally, the evaluation of the particle filter-
based misbehavior detection scheme has been performed in dedicated tests under laboratory and real
conditions. The results show that attacks are reliably recognized and that false-positive detections are
avoided.
Own proposals and related concepts are compared in Section 3.7 based on seven evaluation criteria
that are introduced and reasoned in Section 3.3. This comparison estimates that our module-based ap-
proach is comparable with the VEBAS concept proposed by Schmidt et al. [SLS+08] and the observer-
based concept proposed by Gerlach [Ger10] with respect to most criteria. In contrast, our particle
filter-based framework shows better properties with respect to generalizability and complexity than re-
lated proposals. However, the scalability of the particle filter is rated worse due to higher computation
effort. Most comparisons are based on estimations since detailed evaluations of related work is missing.
Compared to purely centralized mechanisms our proposals outperform them in mostly all categories.
As discussed in Section 3.8 the local autonomous detection of misbehavior on VANET nodes allow
only a short-term identification of attackers with possibly low confidence. Details related to the location
identification of attackers are further analyzed in Chapter 4. In order to identify attackers with high
confidence and to allow a permanent exclusion of these affected nodes we propose in Chapter 5 the
central evaluation of reported misbehavior.
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4. Local Short-term Identification of Potential
Attackers
In addition to the detection of abnormal activities caused by attackers or faulty nodes the responsible
nodes have to be identified in order to allow reactions on misbehavior events. As discussed in Part II
of this dissertation misbehavior detection frameworks operated on VANET nodes detect the malicious
activities of attackers. In this part mechanisms for both short-term and long-term identification of
responsible attackers are proposed. Based on these mechanisms malicious and faulty nodes can be
excluded from the active participation in VANET communications.
In Section 4.1 related work is analyzed that aims for local identification and exclusion of attack-
ers in the context of wireless V2X communications. Subsequently, in Section 4.2 privacy enhancing
technologies (PETs) are discussed and how they may complicate local attacker identification. The im-
pact of the PETs on misbehavior detection and evaluation is analyzed in an example scenario using
several test vehicles over a long period of time. Based on the results of the mobility data plausibility
checks discussed in Chapter 3, the message and node trustworthiness can be assessed as presented in
Section 4.3. Finally, Section 4.4 analyzes afterwards the applicability of local misbehavior evaluation
mechanisms with respect to the local exclusion of attackers and faulty nodes.
4.1. Related Work
Both local identification of attackers and local reaction on attacks are discussed in different publica-
tions. Gosh et al. [GVKG09] identified that a local eviction of malicious and faulty nodes is desirable to
minimize the time to detect, report, and exclude responsible nodes. However, more important than the
time of exclusion is the accuracy of the doubtless identification of responsible nodes in order to mini-
mize the false-positive and false-negative rates. In Section 4.1.1 related work is discussed that aim for
the local identification of attackers by solely exchanging information between local VANET neighbors.
In most cases a trust value is calculated for the neighbors in order to distinguish benign and misbe-
having nodes. Related work regarding the evaluation of trustworthiness is discussed in Section 4.1.2.
Finally, in Section 4.1.3 related work is discussed that aim for the local exclusion of attackers.
4.1.1. Local Identification of Attackers
Basically, the identification of attacks can be done event-based or node-centric. The authors of [DLJZ10,
GVKG09, ODS07] focus on the identification of false traffic events such as fake post crash notifica-
tions [GVKG09] or fake local danger warnings [ODS07]. In these proposals, the consistency of re-
ported event information is considered instead of the behavior of involved nodes. However, for this
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event-centric attack identification, specific knowledge of the affected application is needed. Conse-
quently, the node-centric identification of attacks is more universal since detection results reported by
different applications can be aggregated. Related approaches for the node-centric attacker identification
are discussed in the following.
Leinmüller et al. [LHSW04] and Crescenzo et al. [CLPZ10] propose a local evaluation architecture
that is based on data plausibility checks to determine which neighbor is possibly attacking the net-
work by maliciously sending false data. In order to identify the generator of Sybil nodes, the authors
of [GGS04] and [XYG06] analyze the radio characteristics for a position verification. In these pro-
posals, information about locally detected attackers is not shared with other neighbors. In contrast,
Schmidt et al. [SLS+08] propose a framework that distributes local detections to neighbors and conse-
quently considers recommendations from others. Similarly, the publications of Park et al. [PATZ09],
Chen et al. [CWHZ09], and Zhou et al. [ZCNC07] rely on information sent by trusted RSUs in order
to identify Sybil nodes.
4.1.2. Local Evaluation of Node Trustworthiness
Based on the observation of the neighbor nodes’ behavior, the receivers of single-hop V2X messages
are able to evaluate autonomously the trustworthiness of others. However, basic trustworthiness of
VANET nodes is derived from the cryptographic verification of message signatures and certificates
that are issued by a trusted PKI. Most related proposals distinguish between entity (node-based) trust
and data (message-based) trust. Zhang [Zha11] provides a survey that analyzes relevant approaches
for trust management in VANETs. According to this survey most trust management approaches use
entity trust (also referred to as reputation) as a basis for trustworthy wireless VANET communications.
In Sections 4.1.2.1 and 4.1.2.2 basics of state-of-the-art trust models are discussed as well as related
implementations.
4.1.2.1. Trust Models
We focus on models that are related to the context of automated trust generation by machines. Trust
models that are based on recommendations, rankings or ratings of human users in online environments
such as commercial platforms or social networks are not considered. Furthermore, we focus on the
application of direct evidence generated locally. Second hand recommendations provided by VANET
neighbors are not considered. As discussed in Section 3.2.5 the exchange of second hand information
does not provide much benefit but burdens the bandwidth-limited ad hoc communication channels.
Probabilistic Models Most relevant probabilistic trust models are Bayesian or reputation models as
proposed by Jøsang et al. [JI02] and Buchegger at al. [BB04]. In the following the basis of Bayesian
trust models is introduced [TBF05]. The Bayesian fundamentals are also used in general in Sections 3.4
and 3.6 to calculate the location plausibility using the Kalman filter and the particle filter, respectively.
The Bayes’ theorem, cf. Equation 4.1, can be used to calculate the probability of a belief based on a
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measurement Y . The outcome can be used as probabilistic trust value with the range [0,1].
P(X |Y ) = P(Y |X)P(X)
P(Y )
=
P(Y |X)P(X)
∑X ′ P(Y |X ′)P(X ′)
(4.1)
If X should be inferred from a measurement Y then the probability P(X) is referred to as prior proba-
bility distribution. The probability P(X |Y ) is called the posterior probability distribution. As shown in
Equation 4.1 the posterior P(X |Y ) can be computed using the "inverse" condition probability P(Y |X)
together with the prior probability P(X).
Beta Distribution The beta distribution is a probabilistic distribution of a random variable 0≤ p≤ 1
over [0,1]. Jøsang et al. [JI02] propose its application in reputation systems. The posteriori probabilities
of binary events can be represented as beta distributions using the probability density function Γ with
two parameters α> 0 and β> 0.
f (p|α,β) = Γ(α+β)
Γ(α)Γ(β)
pα−1(1− p)β−1 (4.2)
In addition, the following restrictions have to be considered in Equation 4.2: p 6= 0 if α< 1 and p 6= 1
if β < 1. The outcomes of a misbehavior detection mechanism that is further denoted as rating can
be represented as r denoting the observed number of positive evidences and s being the number of
negative evidences. If no prior knowledge is available the beta distribution function is initialized with
f (p|1,1) according to Buchegger at al. [BB04]. As soon as ratings in form of r and s are available they
are integrated in the beta distribution function as α := α+ r and β := β+ s.
The probability expectation value of the beta distribution is given by Equation 4.3 according to [JI02]
and the standard deviation is given by Equation 4.4.
E(p) =
α
α+β
(4.3)
σ=
√
αβ
(α+β+1)(α+β)2
(4.4)
The advantage of this expectation function is that rating information are continuously included into
the model. It is in particular not necessary to store the rating information per processed event per
node. Only the aggregated values α and β have to be managed per node. However, this function
needs to be extended by a weighting mechanism to consider the recentness of rating information. If
this would not be done new ratings become less important over time the more ratings are aggregated.
The required mechanism is denoted as aging in related literature [BB04, Ebi13, Rie09]. Buchegger at
al. [BB04] propose to integrate a static weight u as a discount factor for past experiences. They propose
a modified Bayesian update approach as shown in Equation 4.5.
α := uα+ r
β := uβ+(1− r) (4.5)
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In order to select the appropriate aging value Buchegger et al. propose to use an integer m that is used
to define u as shown in Equation 4.6.
u = 1− 1
m
(4.6)
The magnitude m defines the number of new ratings that are required to assume stationary behavior. In
addition, the aging factor ensures that the values of α and β will store finite numbers with respect to
the rating values r.
Subjective Logic The subjective logic, proposed by Jøsang [Jøs01], allows to combine elements of
the Bayesian probability theory (evidence) with elements of the belief theory. This approach is based
on an opinion space o that consists of three parameters b(x) ∈ [0,1], d(x) ∈ [0,1], and u(x) ∈ [0,1]
representing the belief, disbelief, and uncertainty. The three coordinates of an opinion are depended
by the function b(x) + d(x) + u(x) = 1 so that one element is redundant. In Figure 4.1 a graphical
illustration shows the interrelation of these three parameters as an equal-sided triangle. As an example,
the opinion ωx = (0.4,0.1,0.5) is illustrated.
Uncertainty 
Disbelief Belief 
1 
1 0 0.5 
0 0 
Probability axis 
0 
0.5 0.5 
0.5 
ω𝒙 
Figure 4.1.: Simplified illustration of the subject logic opinion triangle proposed by Jøsang [Jøs01]
The subjective logic can be used as basis for probability density functions such as the beta distri-
bution. Jøsang [Jøs01] provides also mapping functions between the evidence space used in the beta
distribution and the opinion space used in the subjective logic. As a consequence values can be trans-
fered between both models. The opinion space is related to the uncertainty that an observer has about
the evidence. In order to complete the model, Jøsang [Jøs01] proposes also methods to aggregate
opinions and to integrate discounting functions.
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4.1.2.2. Related Implementations of Systems for Node Evaluation
In order to apply node reputation for misbehavior detection probabilistic systems are useful that apply a
two-value pair to distinguish trust and certainty [EB09,Ger07a,Rie07]. According to Gerlach [Ger07a]
the reputation of nodes can be classified reflecting untrusted nodes, marginally trusted nodes, and com-
pletely trusted nodes. By calculating the entropy of the trust, a certainty value is allocated to the
respective trust value. High entropy represents a high level of uncertainty and hence low trust in the
node. Low entropy, on the other hand, results in high trust.
Mármol et al. present in [MP12] a trust and reputation infrastructure-based proposal (TRIP) which
computes a reputation score based on both recommendations and self-estimated reputations. In TRIP
every node locally computes a reputation value for all neighbors and maintains a comprehensive repu-
tation table over a long period of time. The reputations are further shared with local neighbors and with
a central infrastructure.
Both the vehicle ad hoc network reputation system (VARS) [DFM05] and the vehicular security
through reputation and plausibility check (VSRP) [DOJ+10] scheme use neighbor reputation values
that are built on local observations. VARS proposes the piggybacking of reputation opinions to allow
for confidence decisions at neighboring nodes upon the reception of event messages. The VSRP scheme
on the contrary allow for actively requesting reputation information when messages from unknown
nodes are received.
4.1.3. Local Exclusion of Attackers
According to Liu et al. [LCH10] related approaches for attacker exclusion in VANETs can be clas-
sified into two categories: local and global eviction. In this chapter only mechanisms for local at-
tacker eviction are discussed. The global attacker exclusion is considered in chapter 5. The authors
of [MRC+08,RPA+07,RMFH08,YOW08] argue that the local eviction of attackers is possible without
a central control system. In this context, the following general approaches are considered [RMFH08]:
abstain, voting, and self-sacrifice.
If a node ignores the node eviction information sent by neighbors (abstain), it fully relies on its own
local misbehavior detections to identify attackers and to ignore messages sent by these nodes. Yan
et al. [YOW08] propose the local isolation of malicious nodes by allocating all neighbors to groups
named: trust, question, and distrust. In their scheme, communication is generally granted with nodes
of the groups trust and question whereby fully trusted nodes are preferred communication partners.
The communication with nodes of the group distrust is not allowed.
By applying a voting protocol, a node informs its neighbors about potential attackers that should not
be considered as trustworthy. The LEAVE (local eviction of attackers by voting evaluators) protocol
proposed by Raya et al. [RPA+07] is used to periodically broadcast identities of nodes that have been
locally tagged as misbehaving. Assuming both a majority of honest reporters and reliable local misbe-
havior detection, nodes identified as attackers are temporarily ignored by nodes that use LEAVE. Cao
et al. [CKL+08] further propose a collection of event-based votes that inform about the trustworthiness
of events. If a consensus is reached, then the related event is assumed to be true.
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The protocol named Stinger is based on the mechanism of self-sacrifice that considers in particular
the discrediting attack in contrast to the voting schemes [MRC+08]. Applying this protocol, a node S
that accuses another node R to be an attacker in turn has to sacrifice its own reputation. Consequently,
the certificate and the corresponding identities of node S and node R are both temporarily evicted from
the VANET. This self-sacrifice mechanism should prevent that attackers are able to discredit benign
nodes.
4.1.4. Evaluation of Related Work
We focus in this dissertation on trust models as introduced in Section 4.1.2.1 that consider machine
associated trust values that are generated by machines. Probabilistic Bayesian models base on well
defined mathematics and are applied in several domains. Both, the beta distribution and the subjective
logic base on these probabilistic model and provide possibilities to express the uncertainty of trust
values. As a consequence, these approaches are relevant for the local node trust evaluation in VANETs.
We focus in this dissertation on the beta distribution since it works with a two value pair. However, if
required a translation between the beta distribution model and the subjective model is possible.
Regardless of the approaches for local node exclusion discussed in Section 4.1.3, the authors of
[LCH10] argue that a local eviction of attackers requires a reliable detection of misbehavior by honest
nodes, which may not be possible in most situations. In particular, the simultaneous use of two or more
certificates is identified as a potential weakness in both the voting and the self-sacrifice mechanism.
Another critical aspect, as identified in [LCH10], is the circumstance that some honest nodes may not
be able to vote as they are not equipped with appropriate detection devices such as a radar transceiver
or do not perform the required plausibility checks. However, if available, such devices or mechanisms
may have a limited range of influence. The temporary local exclusion of attackers as presented in
related work is not a satisfying solution for safety-related VANET applications.
In conclusion, the node-centric observation of the behavior of neighbor nodes is most useful in or-
der to discover potential attackers. This approach is more generic compared to event centric attack
identification, and does not rely on application-specific knowledge. The evaluation of neighbor node
trustworthiness based on data plausibility checks can be generally considered reasonable. However,
all related publications presented in Section 4.1.2 require permanent never changing unique node iden-
tifiers. This assumption is not in line with those mechanisms applied to protect drivers’ privacy as
discussed in the VANET model in Section 2.2.
4.2. Change of Identifiers for Privacy Protection
The periodical change of the vehicles’ identifier is obligatory in order to protect drivers’ privacy. The
following analysis of ID changes and related ID change observations, performed by the author of this
dissertation [SES+13,BSS13], is based on measurements recorded in an outdoor test involving 120 ve-
hicles over 76 days. As far we know this is the first time that aspects of ID changes in VANETs are mea-
sured over a long period of time using real traffic data. Wiedersheim et al. [WKMP10] have analyzed
previously the detection of ID changes of single-hop neighbors by utilizing a simulation framework.
They simulated 25 - 200 nodes in an urban environment of 1000×1000 meters over a period of 1000
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seconds. In this dissertation we aim to validate their simulation results by real world measurements.
This is an important aspect for local misbehavior detection and local short-term identification of poten-
tial attackers. In our tests we applied the Kalman filter described in Section 3.4.2 to track single-hop
neighbor nodes. Details about the test and evaluation setup can be found in Section 3.4.4.
We analyzed in our long-term experiments three aspects.
• Are the ID changes performed as expected?
• Have temporary blocks of ID changes a negative effect on ID changes?
• Is it possible to observe the ID change of neighboring nodes?
Related to the evaluation criteria the following events were logged by all vehicles of the FOT. The
first three event types are used to log relevant information of the vehicle’s status when an ID change
is performed. The last type is used to log ID changes of a single-hop neighbors that are detected by a
local vehicle tracker.
• PSEUDONYM_ID_CHANGE__ODOMETER
• PSEUDONYM_ID_CHANGE__BLOCK_ACTIVATED
• PSEUDONYM_ID_CHANGE__BLOCK_DEACTIVATED
• VEHICLE_TRACKER__PSEUDONYM_ID_CHANGE_OBSERVED
Every log entry contains a timestamp that allows the synchronization of logs from different vehicles.
In addition, several other information are logged by the Vehicular Application Programming Interface
(VAPI) that allow a detailed evaluation of ID changes, ID change blocks, and ID change observations.
In the long-term experiment a predefined ID change interval of 30 minutes was configured. In
Figure 4.2 the measurements from all 120 vehicles are subsumed with respect to performed ID changes.
The logarithmic x-axis provides the driven distance between two ID changes. The y-axis is used to show
the time between two changes. Apart from some premature change events, when the trip is interrupted,
the ID is changed every 1800 seconds as shown by the first graph in Figure 4.2. If a trip is interrupted
 0
 300
 600
 900
 1200
 1500
 1800
 2100
 2400
 1  2  3  4  5  6  7  8  9
10
-20
20
-30
30
-40
40
-50
50
-60
Tim
e b
etw
ee
n t
wo
 ID
 ch
an
ge
s [
se
c]
Driven distance between two ID changes [km]
ID change within one trip
Trip time with one ID
Figure 4.2.: Performed vehicle ID changes measured in long-term outdoor tests
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earlier, e. g. by shutting down the vehicle including its OBU, a new pseudonymous ID is applied at the
beginning of the next trip. As expected, the second graph shows that the duration of short trips (i. e. ≤
1800 sec) increases with the driven distance.
A temporary blocking of ID changes is used by different V2X applications to prevent ID changes in
critical traffic situations for a limited period of time. For example the application that is responsible
for intersection collision warnings blocks the ID change if the own station is within the vicinity of
an intersection. This mechanism was developed by the author of this dissertation within the simTD
project [MBS+09]. Subsequently this mechanism was included into the ETSI standard TS 102 723-
8 [ETS13a].
We analyzed with the FOT if a temporary block of ID changes has negative effects on the regularly
performed ID change. Figure 4.3 shows the related evaluation results. In particular, the driven distance
and duration with activated ID change block has been measured at all vehicles in the long-term outdoor
test. On the x-axis the line graph depicts the driven distance in meters. The left y-axis shows the
duration of active blocks in seconds. The filled curve depicts with the x-axis and the right y-axis that
most blocks occur within a distance of up to 600 meters. Distances with activated blocks larger than
1 km were not measured in the FOT. Only few ID change blocks remain active for more than 600 meters
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Figure 4.3.: Block of vehicle ID changes measured in long-term outdoor tests
and 90 seconds. The graph shows that on average the duration of an ID change block does not exceed
the time of 150 seconds and the vehicles are not driving more than a few hundred meters with an active
block. As a result, regular periodic ID changes that are performed probably every few minutes in future
productive devices are only minimally affected by temporary ID change blocks.
As discussed in Section 3.2 the local plausibility checks depend on the tracking of single-hop neigh-
bors. In order to track neighbor vehicles despite their periodic ID changes, probabilistic mechanisms
for position estimation (e. g. Kalman filter or particle filter) can be used to observe ID changes of nodes
in direct communication range. To protect drivers’ privacy, the tracking information and ID change
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detections must not be shared with other V2X communication neighbors or central infrastructures. As
long as the ID change information is used by different stations autonomously, the privacy of the driver
is preserved because the involved nodes are not able to create long-term movement profiles. Conse-
quently, an attacker would need to follow a specific node within its single-hop communication radius
over a relatively long period of time in order to collect data for useful movement statistics. Only with
long-term statistics, an attacker would be able to create a link between the movement of a vehicle and
its possible driver’s identity by analyzing specific location information. In particular the start location
of the vehicle’s first trip in the morning could reveal the home address of the driver and the destination
could reveal the address of his or her workplace [GP09].
Figures 4.4 and 4.5 show the accuracy of a Kalman filter-based ID change detection performed on
120 vehicles as evaluated in long-term outdoor tests. In this evaluation the number of correctly ob-
served ID changes and the number of false-positive detections is measured. Based on the findings of
Wiedersheim et al. [WKMP10] the hypothesis is analyzed that almost all ID changes can be detected by
neighboring nodes as long as precise and frequent position information is received per V2X neighbor.
The fraction of correctly observed ID changes is illustrated in Figure 4.4. The x-axis shows the number
of neighbor nodes that were in communication range when an ID change occurred. The number of
measured ID changes having more than 50 single-hop neighbors was negligible low in the FOT. The
y-axis shows the percentage of correctly observed ID changes of all single-hop neighbors. The graph
shows that the detection rate decreases with an increasing number of neighbors. While with one adja-
cent node, the observation rate is at 100%, the detection rate decreases to approximately 50% with 12
neighbors.
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Figure 4.4.: Correct detection of ID changes in long-term outdoor tests
Figure 4.5 shows on the other hand the evaluation of false-positive detections. The red graph shows
that on average 23.5% of the detections are false. However, it is additionally shown by the gray filled
curve that most ID change detections were made with a low number of neighbors in the reception
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range. Consequently, the results of the long-term evaluation show that nodes in the single-hop commu-
nication range can be tracked beyond their usage of single node IDs. The findings of Wiedersheim et
al. [WKMP10] based on simulations are confirmed in general by our real world experiments. However,
inaccurate position information in real systems and frequently appearing and disappearing vehicles
complicate the detection and create some false-positive detections.
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Figure 4.5.: False detection of ID changes in long-term outdoor tests
The analysis of related work in Section 4.1 shows that most related publications do not consider
regular ID changes in the VANET at all. However, this assumption is not followed in this dissertation
even if vehicle trackers are able to observe the majority of ID changes that are performed by single-hop
neighbors. At latest when the neighbor leaves the communication range, its ID change cannot be ob-
served and if the same neighbor enters the communication range again its new ID cannot be associated
to previous IDs. A single central entity that is able to link all pseudonymous identifiers, as needed by
the TRIP scheme [MP12], conflicts with the protection of drivers’ privacy as well. Consequently, we
assume that the stations can autonomously and arbitrarily change their identifiers without following
global or local instructions. Even attackers could misuse this mechanism in order to hide malicious
activities without coming into conflict with general ID change rules. That means that receivers of V2X
messages can create short-term reputation profiles only.
4.3. Trust Model for Local Evaluation of Node Trustworthiness
The concept of trust is not easy to define since there is not a single definition based on universal con-
sensus. However, Gambetta [Gam88] defines trust as "trust (or, symmetrically, distrust) is a particular
level of the subjective probability with which an agent assesses that another agent or group of agents
will perform a particular action, both before he can monitor such action (or independently of his capac-
ity ever to be able to monitor it) and in a context in which it affects his own action". In the proposed
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trust model the local evaluation of node trustworthiness is based on ratings related to V2X messages
sent by this node. We propose to apply Bayesian logic to determine the relationship between message
ratings and node trust. The rating of received messages is then again based on the outcome of the
module-based data plausibility checker discussed in Section 3.4, and the particle filter-based plausibil-
ity checker discussed in Section 3.6.
In order to locally evaluate the trustworthiness of single-hop neighbors a trust model with three
parameters message rating, node trust, and node trust confidence is applied.
• The message rating is based on the results of data consistency and plausibility checks as pro-
posed in Chapter 3. The rating ro,n,k of a message sent by node n at time k is created by the
receiving observer node o. Every locally processed V2X message is rated which is sent by a
single-hop neighbor node. More details about the generation and processing of message ratings
are described in Section 4.3.1.
Based on results of data consistency and plausibility checks as detailed in Chapter 3 we propose a
local evaluation of node-centric trustworthiness [BMBK12]. For this task a pair of two values (i. e.
node trust and node trust confidence) is used.
• The node trust is a probabilistic value that bases on message ratings. It expresses the trust-
worthiness of a trustor, in our case the receiver of V2X messages, into the trustee, which is
in our context the sender of V2X messages. The mechanisms related to the establishment and
management of node trust are discussed in more detail in Section 4.3.2.
• The node trust confidence represents the certainty a trustor has about the correctness of the
node’s trust value. In our concept, the node trust confidence depends on three parameters: the
message rating, the node trust, and context information. In Section 4.3.3 the generation and
management of node trust confidence is described in more detail.
Figure 4.6 depicts the relationship between trust and confidence. The labels high distrust, low dis-
trust, neutral, low trustworthiness, high trustworthiness in this figure are only used to explain the
relationship between node trust on the x-axis and node trust confidence on the y-axis. We do not apply
functions to classify the unit intervals as done in the fuzzy logic [Zad75]. This might be necessary if
the node trust assessment should be used locally by V2X applications to adapt their behavior accord-
ingly. Since we aim to centrally evaluate detected node-related misbehavior for a long-term exclusion
of attackers in this dissertation this local classification is not further considered.
Node Trust 
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 Low trust- 
 worthiness 
 High trust- 
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Figure 4.6.: Relationship between trust and confidence
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A node can be fully trusted if both the values for trust and confidence show their respective maxi-
mum. A low confidence value means that the related node trust value should not be considered much.
The local evaluation of node trustworthiness considers the message rating ro,n,k related to sender node n
at time k separately from the node trust to,n,k as further detailed in Sections 4.3.1, 4.3.2, and 4.3.3. Node
trust values to,n,k ∈ R and associated node trust confidence values co,n,k ∈ R have values in the range
[0,1]. A value of 1 represents the best possible rating, values around 0.5 indicates missing knowledge or
uncertainty and 0 is the worst possible rating. The transition between the minimum and the maximum
is smooth.
We focus on the computational trust model to discuss the processing of both, evidence derived from
local misbehavior detection mechanisms and context-dependent parameters. The representation of
results of this trust model is designed for software agents instead of humans. As discussed in the
following sections the relationship between evidence (message rating) and node trust is based on the
Bayesian approach introduced in Section 4.1.2.
4.3.1. Message Rating
The rating ro,n,k of a message sent by node n at time k and processed by a receiver o is based on
consistency and plausibility checks of location-related data. A high value is achieved if the results of
the checks substantiate the correctness of the message content regarding the following measures:
• compliance to specifications,
• consistency of duplicate data,
• verifications with both first hand information and second hand information.
In particular, the maximum is assigned to ro,n,k if the node’s movement is in accordance with the
predefined mobility model and own sensor measurements as well as with rules that do not indicate a
violation. Deviations result in a gradual decrease of the message rating value. Low message rating
can be the result of unforeseen movement patterns and/or violations of plausibility checks. Although
low values might indicate a potential attack, it is also possible that they are caused by natural reasons
such as inaccurate GNSS signals, not synchronized stations, or sudden driving maneuvers. In general,
the outcome of the module-based data plausibility checker discussed in Section 3.4, and the particle
filter-based plausibility checker discussed in Section 3.6, determines the message rating.
In the module-based plausibility framework, the values for message rating are calculated by the
fusion of ratings provided by different modules as illustrated in Figure 3.4 on page 51. The description
in Section 3.4 states that the final rating of the root vertex r(vroot) can be used to set the message rating.
In the particle filter-based framework, a normalization factorΩ is used to determine ro,n,k. This factor
Ω contains the summarized weights of all particles of a tracked neighbor node. In order to calculate
the value for ro,n,k, a factor Ω′ with Ω′ <Ω is normalized to the range of values for the message rating
ro,n,k. It is reasonable to select a particle weight Ω′ that is smaller than the maximum weight of all
particles since some particles are randomly spread and a perfect matching of received location data
with the PDF applied in the particle filter is unlikely. In order to do so, the upper limit of Ω′ needs
to be defined using the parameters for random particle spreading and the PDF. In the simplest way, a
linear mapping function is used, where Ω′/2 is mapped to a value of ro,n,k = 0.5. If, for example, the
maximum measured total particle weight isΩ= 100, the maximum message rating ro,n,k = 1 is mapped
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to a value of about Ω′ = 80 and therefore the ro,n,k = 0.5 is mapped to a value of Ω′/2 = 40. In the
same way, measured Ω′ values like 20 and 60 would result in ratings of 0.25 and 0.75, respectively.
As argued in the conclusion of the local misbehavior detection in Section 3.9 the message-based
checks should be used to filter messages with erroneous content. On the contrary, the node-based
checks should not result in a discard of affected messages. Consequently, a local classification of
message rating values according to Table 4.1 is proposed that bases on research of Jaeger, Stübing, and
the author of this dissertation [JBSH11,SJB+10]. The message rating is created by applying the results
of the message and node-based checks. The three validation classes can easily be interpreted and used
by local V2X applications. Messages considered to be erroneous should be ignored or dropped by
upper layers, and approved messages shall be used without constraints.
Table 4.1.: Simple validation classes used by local message-related plausibility checks
Validation Class Interpretation Message Rating
Erroneous The security system recommends to
ignore the message
0 ≤ ro,n,k < 0.5
Neutral
Due to missing information the
consistency and plausibility checks
cannot evaluate the message
ro,n,k = 0.5
Approved Mobility data of the message are
checked and approved
0.5 < ro,n,k ≤ 1
However, V2X messages that are classified as neutral shall be used with caution because in this case
the security subsystem is not able to take a reliable decision with respect to message-based checks. For
example, if the plausibility framework does not get a periodical update of the own position and time,
the plausibility of received PVs cannot be determined, which may result in neutral message rating
evaluations with a ro,n,k = 0.5. The node trust is not considered in this classification and shall not
be used as a basis for decisions on message droppings. The node-based evaluation is discussed in
Section 4.3.2.
4.3.2. Node Trust
The node trust to,n,k is based on evidence derived from message ratings. to,n,k is an indicator for general
trustworthiness of trustor node o in a trustee neighbor node n at time k, i. e. whether a node is faked
or its real existence can be approved. Here the probabilistic model based on the Bayesian approach is
chosen in combination with the beta distribution as introduced in Section 4.1.2. In addition we extend
the beta distribution model with a static aging factor u as proposed by Buchegger et al. [BB04]. The
value of the message rating ro,n,k is applied as shown in Equation 4.7 which is based on Equation 4.5.
αo,n,k := u αk−1+ ro,n,k
βo,n,k := u βk−1+(1− ro,n,k)
(4.7)
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The node trust value is calculated with the formula introduced in Equation 4.3 on page 99 whereby
the expectation value represents node trust to,n,k. Equation 4.8 shows the formula used to calculate the
node trust.
to,n,k =
αo,n,k
αo,n,k +βo,n,k
(4.8)
The initial values for αo,n,k0 and βo,n,k0 are 0.5 which results in an initial node trust value of to,n,k0 =
0.5. This indicates that no prior knowledge is available about a neighbor node such as a tracked vehicle.
The aging factor u ∈ (0,1) determines the ratio of how much a new message rating value affects the
node trust. Depending on the chosen value for the aging (e. g. u = 1− 1m ), a magnitude of m plausible
messages have to be processed until stationary maximum node trust can be assumed. In the same way
m implausible messages have to be sequentially received until the minimum trust value is reached. As
a consequence, a single message with a bad trust rating will only effect the node trust marginally, but
multiple successive bad ratings will result in a rapid decrease of to,n,k.
4.3.3. Node Trust Confidence
The purpose of the node trust confidence co,n,k is to provide the certainty of the trustor o (receiver of
V2X messages) regarding the node trust value to,n,k at time k that is related to a single-hop neighbor
node n. If the confidence value is low, either not enough information has been collected about a target
node, or to,n,k shows inconsistent trust information. The node trust confidence value represents the con-
fidence of the security subsystem with respect to the rating of the node trust value to,n,k. Alternatively,
co,n,k can be described as the quality of the node trust value. In our model we apply a two-step approach
to create the node trust confidence.
a) First, the standard deviation of the beta distribution is calculated, cf. Equation 4.9.
b) Subsequently, the standard deviation is multiplied by factors that consider the time and distance
the sender and receiver of V2X messages have been in common single-hop communication range.
With increasing time and distance the factor applied on the node trust confidence value increases.
Equation 4.9 is used to calculate the preliminary c′o,n,k based on the standard deviation of the beta
distribution that is used to calculate the node trust to,n,k according to [ZMHT05, ZMHT06]. Zouri-
daki [ZMHT05] extended the standard deviation by a parameter ζ to ensure that resulting confidence
values are in the range [0,1].
c′o,n,k = 1−
√
ζαβ
(α+β+1)(α+β)2
(4.9)
Since low values of c′o,n,k indicate inconsistency in the node’s behavior, the confidence is also used
to indicate potential attacks, in addition to confirm the plausibility of the node trust to,n,k. For example,
a low value can be caused by a ghost vehicle that is suddenly entering a radar-monitored area that
has to be free of vehicles (cf. location-based attack described in Section 2.3.3). The influence of the
preliminary c′o,n,k is shown in Figure 4.7. In this figure, the evaluation of a tracked neighbor node
is illustrated. It is shown that the node trust confidence value indicates differences between message
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rating and node trust. At the beginning of the tracking of a new node, c′o,n,k is increasing together
with the node trust value. As soon as ro,n,k1 = to,n,k1 at time k1, the confidence approximates also to its
maximum and acknowledges the consent with a high value co,n,k1 ≈ 1. However, when the message
rating suddenly drops at time k2, for example due to an attack, the confidence drops below the threshold
as well. A low confidence value indicates a large difference between the message rating and the node
trust. If the message rating remains at a low value then the node trust follows. Consequently, the trust
confidence value increases with converging values of r and t at times k3 and k4.
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Figure 4.7.: Node trustworthiness under attacks based on message rating, node trust, and confidence
In a second step the preliminary node trust confidence c′o,n,k is extended by context information.
Schmidt et al. [SLH09] describe an approach to consider the observed movement distance of neighbor
nodes in order to detect potential stationary roadside attackers. For this verification at least twice the
transmission radius of a common radio device is used to define the value for the minimum distance
moved (MDM) attribute. If the observed travel distance of an adjacent nodes is larger than the MDM
distance, then a stationary sender at the roadside can be excluded. Based on this concept, the node
trust confidence co,n,k grows linear with the distance and duration two nodes are in common single-
hop communication range. The connection time and the observed driven distance of neighbors is
used to calculate the final value for node trust confidence as shown in Equation 4.10. We propose to
apply a simple multiplication of the preliminary node trust confidence c′o,n,k value to linear decrease
the confidence until the required values for travel distance and contact time are reached. As soon
as the values are reached the node trust confidence c′o,n,k is multiplied by 1 and therefore not further
manipulated.
co,n,k = c′o,n,k ·min
(
1 ,
1
γ ·duration(n)+ 1δ ·distance(n)
2
)
(4.10)
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In order to use this context information the security subsystem must be able to provide information
how long both stations have been in common communication range and which distance the nodes have
been driven in this time. The contact time between the local station and the neighbor n is given by
the function duration(n) and the moved distance with distance(n). The variables γ and δ determine
the required values for minimum contact time and minimum traveled distance to multiply c′o,n,k with a
maximum factor.
In Figure 4.8 the effect of increasing confidence is shown when a new node is discovered at time k0
and subsequently reaches the minimum required distance and duration at time k1. In this dissertation a
maximum communication range of δ= 1000 meters and an average vehicle speed of 25 m/s is consid-
ered. The minimum required duration is consequently reached at k1 = 40s = γ as shown in Figure 4.8.
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Figure 4.8.: Node trustworthiness with linear increasing confidence
4.4. Local vs. Central Misbehavior Evaluation
In order to locally identify and exclude an attacker from V2X communications two requirements have
to be fulfilled. First, the autonomous detection of misbehavior has to be done by the node and second,
attacker nodes must be identified by their pseudonymous ID as long as they are in communication range
of the detector. The following analysis is based on Bißmeyer et al. [BNPB12] and aims to evaluate pos-
sibilities and limitations of local attacker identification. It is assumed that pseudonymous identifiers
are changed regularly so that the used IDs cannot be linked or resolved by the nodes of the VANET.
After the introduction of general notations in Section 4.4.1, two attack scenarios are discussed in Sec-
tion 4.4.2 involving local attacker identification. Both scenarios are based on Bißmeyer et al. [BSB10].
Subsequently, the general possibilities of a central attacker identification is analyzed in Section 4.4.3.
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4.4.1. Notations
The VANET is modeled as a graph G = (V,E) where V is the set of vertices (nodes) and E denotes the
set of edges (communication links between the nodes).
• K: The ordered set K of timestamp elements is related to vehicle trips and contains elements
{k0, ...,kn} with n ∈ N and k0 < ki < kn,∀ 1 < i < n.
• Nv(k): The set Nv(k) contains neighbor nodes that are located within the single-hop communica-
tion range of node v ∈V at time k ∈ K, where v /∈ Nv(k).
• N∗v (k) = {v}∪Nv(k): The set N∗v (k) contains node v and all neighbors of node v at time k ∈ K.
• Pv(k): The set Pv(k) contains the pseudonymous unique identifiers of node v ∈V that are derived
from valid pseudonym certificates1 owned by this node at time k ∈ K.
• Iov′(k): The set Iov′(k) contains misbehavior events (inconsistencies) detected by observer node
o ∈V at time k ∈ K concerning node v ∈V that appears with the pseudonym v′ ∈ Pv(k).
4.4.2. Attack Scenario with Local Attacker Identification
A set V ′ ⊆V of nodes is passing an area where a ghost node a ∈V is simulated within the time frame
K = {k0, ...,kn} as depicted in Figure 4.9. In this example, an attacker creates a stationary ghost vehicle
that claims to be broken down on a road. The attacker is able to change the pseudonymous ID of
the ghost node arbitrarily as mentioned in Section 4.2. Therefore, node a appears with the identifiers
a′,a′′,a′′′...∈ Pa. A local misbehavior detection system running on the observer nodes o∈Na(k) is able
to detect inconsistencies Ioa′(k) that are caused by a ghost vehicle a′ when a vehicle is overlapping the
stated position. In general, if the attacker a ∈ No(k) is in communication range of observer o ∈ V and
the attacker uses different pseudonyms a′,a′′, ... at different times k for the ghost vehicle then different
detections cannot be assigned by observer.
Location-Based Attacker Fakes a Non-Existing Hazard on the Road Due to the local ID change
detection, discussed in Section 4.2, nodes o2 and o3, illustrated in Figure 4.9, can assign the overlap
detections at time k0 and time k1 to a causer set P∗a = {a′,a′′}. If the attacker changes the ID of the
ghost node while node o2 is not in its communication range, an overlap detection at a later time kn
cannot be assigned to the set of previous causers P∗a . The latter event is depicted in the outer right
part of Figure 4.9. In this simple scenario, the stationary position of the ghost vehicle might allow for
the linking of the different vehicle overlaps caused by the same ghost vehicle. However, in a more
complex and dynamic scenario the detection rate of ID linkings might be lower compared to the test
results presented in Section 4.2.
The maximum number of linkable local detections made by the different observers o is discussed in
the following. The inconsistencies that are autonomously detected by the nodes o ∈ Na(k) over time
k0...kn, are combined in a subset Ioa′ . For the sake of simplicity we focus in this discussion on the
detection of vehicle position overlaps. Related to every ghost node a′ only one overlap can be observed
at time k by another node. However, a detection is only possible if both nodes, the observer o and the
1Functions to derive an ID from a certificate are further detailed in related IEEE and ETSI standards [IEE13, ETS13b].
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Figure 4.9.: Location-based attacker fakes a non-existing hazard on the road
affected node a, are in common communication range at time k. Node a∈V owning the pseudonymous
identifier a′ ∈ Pa(k) must be in range of the observer a ∈ No(k) and, vice versa, the observer must be
in range of the affected node: o ∈ Na(k). Consequently, the maximum number of elements in the set of
detections is 0≤ |Ioa′ | ≤ |K|.
The exemplary situation depicted in Figure 4.9 shows that node o1 is only in communication range
of attacker a at time k0, and therefore o1 is able to detect only its own overlap with a′. Node o2 and o3,
however, are element of Na(k) at time k0 and k1, and therefore able to detect autonomously overlaps
of o1 with a′ at time k0 and o2 with a′′ at time k1. At a point in time when Na(k) = ∅ the attacker
changes the ID of the ghost vehicle from a′′ to a′′′. As a result, node o2, which is element of Na(k) with
k ∈ {k0,k1,kn} can only create a set |Io2,a′ | ≤ 2 with a′ ∈ P∗a ⊆ Pa(k).
If observers share their local detections as proposed in related publications [DOJ+10,DFM05,MP12]
the detection and temporary exclusion of attacker a might be possible. However, the local exchange of
misbehavior detections enables new vulnerabilities, e. g. the discrediting of benign real nodes.
Location-Based Attacker is Denying the Existence of a Real Vehicle Figure 4.10 shows an attack
scenario where a real vehicle’s position is overlapped by several ghost vehicles created by attacker a.
The real vehicle r is blocking the road but as long as its hazard lights are activated, a DENM is period-
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Figure 4.10.: Location-based attacker is denying the existence of a real vehicle
ically distributed by the responsible V2X application of r that aims at warning approaching nodes, e. g.
o2 at time k1. A stationary attacker, however, is creating several ghost vehicles a′,a′′,a′′′ that virtually
overlap the position of node r. Such an attack is assumed to be possible since an attacker can change
its pseudonymous ID frequently in order to create different vehicles that approach the scene.
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It is assumed that node r appears with the same pseudonymous identifier r′ ∈ Pr(k) in the critical
time k ∈ {k0,k1,k2}. With the vehicle overlap detection mechanism the benign observers o1,o2 ∈
Na(k)∩Nr(k) detect the overlaps of the ghost vehicles a′,a′′,a′′′ with the real vehicle r autonomously.
The corresponding numbers of observed overlaps with K = {k0,k1,k2}, are as summarized in Table 4.2.
In Table 4.2 it is shown that node r produces three events in this exemplary attack scenario. However,
each ghost vehicle creates only one event from the view point of node o1 and o2. The reliable local
identification of the attacker is therefore not possible. By only considering the number of overlaps
per node, the observers o1 and o2 may deem node r to be the attacker. Consequently, node o2 would
possibly ignore the hazard warnings that are sent by r, which in turn could cause a dangerous situation
since vehicle o2 has to brake suddenly assuming vehicle r is not in direct line of sight. Even when
practicing the local exchange of misbehavior detections or node reputations, the identification of the
attacker is not reliably possible for node o2 because the statement of r would probably contradict with
the statements of o1,a′,a′′,a′′′,a′′′′. The latter set of nodes would declare that node r is overlapped
three times, and that nodes a′,a′′,a′′′ are overlapped only once. As a result, the reputation of node r
would possibly be three times lower than the reputation of the remaining nodes in the scenario. Another
aspect that has not been considered in both attacker scenarios is the implausible behavior of vehicles
that might be shown in critical situations having involved tossing or crashing vehicles. The temporary
exclusion of suspicious nodes may hinder the V2X applications to warn the driver about dangerous
situations since safety-related messages would be dropped.
Table 4.2.: Observed overlaps of o1 and o2 in the ghost vehicle attack
PPPPPPPPNode
Node
o1 o2 r a′ a′′ a′′′ a′′′′ ∑
r 0 0 - 1 1 1 0 3
a′ 0 0 1 - 0 0 0 1
a′′ 0 0 1 0 - 0 0 1
a′′′ 0 0 1 0 0 - 0 1
Equation 4.11 shows the collection of misbehavior detections exchanged between VANET neigh-
bors. In this equation a collector node c ∈V receives misbehavior detections from its neighbors o ∈ Nc.
The set of collected misbehavior detections Ioa′(k) accusing one specific node a′ may comprise only
detections from those neighbors o ∈ Na(k) that were situated in the communication range of the at-
tacker a at time k. Furthermore, at either the same time j = k or a later time j > k, the observer node o
must be a single-hop neighbor of the collector node c, cf. o ∈ Nc( j) in Equation 4.11.
Ia′ =
⋃
o∈Nc( j)
Ioa′ ,∀o ∈ Na(k),∃a′ ∈ Pa(k)∧ k, j ∈ K∧ j ≥ k (4.11)
As a consequence, the local attacker identification is not sufficient if nodes are using pseudonymous
identifiers that can be changed arbitrarily. In the following section, the local attacker identification is
compared with a central attacker identification.
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4.4.3. Attack Scenario with Central Attacker Identification
In contrast to a local evaluation of misbehavior detections, a central solution is able to use additional
possibilities but at the same time also has to deal with limitations. The goal of the central evaluation is
the reliable detection of attackers in order to exclude them from V2X communications. For this task, a
central misbehavior evaluation authority (MEA) is introduced.
The MEA is able to collect misbehavior detections Ioa′(k) from different observer nodes o ∈ Na(k)
that have been in the communication range of attacker a ∈ V at time k. It is further assumed that
the attacker is using different pseudonymous identifiers a′ ∈ Pa(k) for the location-based attacks. In
contrast to the local collection of detections as specified in Equation 4.11 the MEA has two further
possibilities that may increase the accuracy of attacker identifications.
• The central entity is not limited to single-hop V2X communications based on ITS-G5 [ETS10b]
in order to collect misbehavior detections from observers. Considering the ITS architecture in-
troduced in Section 2.1 the observer is able to transmit its local detections to the central infras-
tructure via field-vehicle communications with (RSUs) or wide area wireless mobile communi-
cations. Further it is assumed that the nodes are able to temporarily store misbehavior detections
and transmit them at a later point in time when a RSU is in communication range.
• In contrast to local nodes, the MEA is able to get linking information of pseudonymous identifiers
that are related to detected misbehavior. The MEA, however, must not be able to misuse this
pseudonym linking function to breach the privacy concept of V2X communications. Having for
example two detections Ioa′(k) and Ioa′′(k), the MEA is able to check whether {a′,a′′} ⊆ Pa(k).
Due to these additional possibilities the central collection of misbehavior detections as shown in Equa-
tion 4.12 is less restricted compared to the local collection of related events as shown in Equation 4.11.
Ia′ =
⋃
o∈V,a′∈Pa(k)
Ioa′ ,∀o ∈ Na(k)∧ k ∈ K (4.12)
Only if the following three conditions are fulfilled the union set
⋃
o∈V Ioa′ is equal to the union set⋃
o∈Nc( j) Ioa′ with j,k ∈ K and j ≥ k. First, all observed misbehavior detections are transmitted to the
central MEA. Second, the local collector node c has connection to all VANET nodes V = Nc( j) and
third, the attacker has only one pseudonymous ID Pa(k) = {a′}. In this constructed scenario, the set of
locally collected misbehavior detections comprises the same elements as the set of centrally collected
misbehavior detections as shown by Equation 4.13.
 ⋃
o∈Nc( j)
Ioa′ =
⋃
o∈V
Ioa′
 ,∀o ∈ Na(k)∧ k, j ∈ K∧ j ≥ k (4.13)
Assuming attacker a is able to use more than one pseudonymous identifier a′,a′′,a′′′, ... ∈ Pa(k) and
node a changes the IDs of its ghost nodes while a local observer o ∈ V is not in its communication
range o /∈Na(k), then the observer o is not able to identify that different misbehavior events are induced
by the same attacker. If additionally the set of nodes in the VANET comprises more elements than the
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neighbor set of node c at time j ∈ K (i. e. |V |  |⋃ j∈K Nc( j)|) the relation in Equation 4.14 holds. ⋃
o∈Nc( j)
Ioa′ ,∃a′ ∈ Pa(k) 
⋃
o∈V,a′∈Pa(k)
Ioa′
 ,∀o ∈ Na(k)∧ k, j ∈ K∧ j ≥ k (4.14)
Even if only a subset of local detections are transmitted to the central MEA, it is assumed that the
statement of Equation 4.14 is true. In this dissertation it is assumed that in the majority of all cases the
set of VANET nodes that are able to report to the central MEA comprises considerably more elements
than the set of neighbors of a local collector.
Under the assumptions that, first, the MEA receives sufficient misbehavior reports and second, that
the MEA is able to conditionally check the likability of different pseudonymous IDs contained in the
reports, the following two attacker identifications are possible. The detailed description of the related
concrete concept is given in Chapter 5.
• In the attack scenario with a faked non-existing hazard (cf. Figure 4.9), the central MEA is
able to identify that the IDs a′,a′′,a′′′ are elements of Pa and that different independent nodes
o1,o2,o4 ∈ V overlapped the stated position of the ghost vehicle. This knowledge allows the
MEA to identify node a to be the attacker.
• In the second attack scenario (cf. Figure 4.10), the MEA is likewise able to identify that a′, a′′,
a′′′, and a′′′′ are elements of Pa and that no other node o ∈ Nr has overlapped the position of
node r (assuming sufficient high position accuracy). Therefore, the central MEA can conclude
that node r is real and that the claimed overlaps are faked.
In summary, it can be stated that a central misbehavior evaluation authority is able to identify attackers
and faulty nodes more reliably than local VANET nodes.
4.5. Summary
As analyzed in this chapter the local detection of misbehavior, based on mobility data plausibility
checks, can be used to identify the causing node (i. e. an attacker or a faulty station). The majority of
related publications has proposed to do this attacker identification locally on the nodes without support
of a central entity. Even the exclusion of attackers is proposed to be done locally by sharing information
about both detected misbehavior and neighbor reputations. However, most of the related proposals do
not consider the application of changing pseudonymous identities. Therefore, most related work is
not in line with the privacy design of international standardization (i. e. ETSI [ETS12a, ETS12b] and
IEEE [IEE13]) as well as latest V2X field operational tests [BSM+09, Fun13, Sch13].
With the evaluation of the outdoor tests it has been shown that pseudonymous IDs can be changed
regularly without negatively effecting traffic safety and efficiency applications. The results show further
that a detection of an ID change is possible by neighbors in the single-hop communication range.
Based on these findings, an evaluation of the neighbor node’s trustworthiness is proposed that can be
maintained locally as long as both nodes are in common communication range.
The trustworthiness of a node consists of two measures namely trust and confidence. The node trust
value is based on results of local consistency and plausibility checks related to mobility data. The node
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trust confidence value could be considered as the weight of the related trust value. If a low message
rating value is caused by message-based plausibility checks, the affected single V2X message can be
dropped locally on the node. In contrast, an exclusion of neighbors as consequence of a low node
trust value should not be performed. As analyzed in this chapter local nodes are not able to reliably
identify the attacker who is causing several inconsistencies. Due to the use of different pseudonymous
IDs, the attacker can hide its malicious behavior while local observers are not able to decide which IDs
belong to the respective attacker. Consequently, a central misbehavior evaluation authority is required
to identify the causer of detected misbehavior. In the Chapter 5 we propose a framework to centrally
identify attackers in order to permanently exclude them from active VANET participation.
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The reliable identification of attackers and faulty stations in V2X communications is challenging for
local misbehavior detection systems deployed on the network nodes, as discussed in Chapter 4. More-
over, local nodes cannot exclude attackers from the VANET for long periods of time, and the short-term
eviction of misbehaving nodes is prone to false-positive detections. There are three main reasons why
a central mechanism for long-term exclusion of attackers is indispensable.
a) VANET nodes cannot necessarily distinguish between valid and expected anomalies such as a
traffic accident and maliciously created anomalies such as an attack. This issue is discussed in
more detail in Section 3.8.
b) As analyzed in Section 4.2, nodes cannot locally recognize an attacker over a long period of time
if the attacker performs an ID change after every attack with a silence period in between.
c) In some cases network nodes can only detect a misbehavior event where multiple nodes are
involved but the identification of the responsible node is not possible autonomously. In Sec-
tion 4.4.2 related cases are described in more detail.
As a result, we propose in this dissertation the application of a central misbehavior evaluation au-
thority that identifies attackers and faulty nodes and that excludes them from the VANET to ensure
the network’s long-term reliability. Based on reported misbehavior detections, a central misbehavior
evaluation authority (MEA) aims to identify the causer of location-based attacks and observed implau-
sibilities. The MEA can execute this task more reliably than local network nodes since the MEA is able
to collect information from independent observers. However, the central evaluation authority also has
to consider attacks such as discrediting and has to consider specific requirements such as scalability
and flexibility in order to efficiently identify attackers in the VANET.
In Section 5.1, related work is analyzed that considers both the central identification and exclusion
of attackers or faulty nodes. General requirements for a central misbehavior evaluation are discussed
in Section 5.2. Subsequently, in Section 5.3 a proposal for misbehavior reporting is described. In
Section 5.4 a concept is presented that allows to conditionally link pseudonymous IDs in cooperation
with the PKI. Based on these mechanisms, a central MEA is able to assess reported suspicious nodes
to identify attackers. The mechanisms for central node evaluation with attacker identification, and final
attacker exclusion are detailed in Sections 5.5 and 5.6, respectively.
5.1. Related Work
The central exclusion of VANET attackers is not well considered in related publications due to the
general decentralized character of VANETs. However, the analysis in Chapter 4 shows that a reliable
identification and permanent exclusion of attackers is not possible for local network nodes. In Sec-
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tion 5.1.1, proposals are presented that consider the reporting of misbehavior to central infrastructures,
followed by work in the context of central pseudonym resolution in Section 5.1.2. In Section 5.1.3
work in the field of fault diagnosis and attacker identification is presented and in Section 5.1.4 work
about the exclusion of VANET nodes.
5.1.1. Misbehavior Reporting to Central Infrastructures
The reporting of misbehavior to a central infrastructure is designated by ETSI in their technical spec-
ification of the security services and architecture [ETS10c, ETS12a]. According to this specification
a report may contain only the pseudonymous identifier of suspects and information that is not further
specified in this related work. The receiving entity within the infrastructure subsequently has to respond
with an acknowledgment or a cause in case of report rejection. In a similar way, in the draft version
of the security credential management system design of the American VSC3 consortium [oTRA12] a
structure for misbehavior reporting is proposed. According to the VSC3, every report contains addi-
tionally to the reporter’s temporary identifier, the location and time of a suspicious event as well as
categorized information about the detected misbehavior. Moreover, a list of multiple recorded V2X
messages can be attached.
5.1.2. Pseudonym Resolution
In order to identify attackers based on reported misbehavior, a central MEA may need linking infor-
mation for pseudonym credentials, which is provided by a credential provider such as a PKI. Different
approaches are published that consider the resolution of pseudonymous identifiers. These protocols
allow to request information whether different pseudonymous identifiers belong to the same node or
alternatively the respective long-term identifier of the owner of a pseudonymous ID.
The secure revocable anonymous authenticated communication protocol (SRAAC) [FAEV06] uses
magic-ink signatures with shared secret schemes in order to provide blindly signed pseudonym certifi-
cates. Using this protocol, the pseudonymous node identifier can only be resolved if a defined number
of CAs cooperate to first map a pseudonym certificate to a resolution tag and, subsequently, to the
node’s identity. In [SKMW10], the authors propose a similar protocol that also blindly signs pseu-
donym certificates. However, in contrast to SRAAC, the resolution information (called V-token) is
stored inside the certificate instead of the CA’s database. Both protocols, SRAAC [FAEV06] and V-
Token [SKMW10], require extensive message exchange in the pseudonym acquisition phase caused by
the blind signature scheme.
The security credential management system of the American VSC3 consortium [oTRA12,WWKH13]
also applies a method for pseudonym resolution. Their proposed framework is based on the imprint
of linked identifiers in pseudonym certificates. The linking information is managed by at least two
linkage authorities that both have to cooperate in order to get long-term information or pseudonym
linking information. Similar to this solution, both Pietrowicz et al. [PZS10] and the European Car-
to-Car Communication Consortium [BSS+11] propose a simplified split of duties within the PKI to
protect the drivers’ privacy. This strategy prevents a single instantiation from storing resolution in-
formation for pseudonymous data. However, the conditional resolution of pseudonymous identifiers
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is not considered by the authors of latter mentioned publications [BSS+11, PZS10]. Similarly, ETSI
specifies a PKI architecture with different entities [ETS10c], but a protocol for pseudonym resolution
is not included.
5.1.3. Fault Diagnosis and Attacker Identification
The detection of Byzantine attack behavior is a common problem in different wireless networks such as
MANETs [EB09,SPC11] or WSNs [SONP12]. The general Byzantine problem has been first described
by Lamport et al. [LSP82] in the year 1982. The principles of the Byzantine problem are later applied
in computer networks, primarily in the field of fault tolerance [CL99] and fault detection [SA14].
Fault detection is recognizing that a problem has occurred, even if the root cause is not known. In
addition fault diagnosis and fault isolation is applied to pinpoint one or more root causes of a problem.
This diagnosis may therefore be used for attacker identification in VANETs. A central misbehavior
evaluation authority has to equally trust in general the senders of authorized reports but it is not required
that all the non-Byzantine nodes come to a common agreement regarding the content of their reports.
This trust association reflects essentially the problem of the Byzantine generals [LSP82].
Fault Management The process of attacker identification is in general similar to fault management.
As a consequence related mechanisms are discussed in this section. The term fault management de-
scribes the overall process and infrastructure associated with detecting, diagnosing, and fixing faults as
well as returning to normal operations. In context of misbehavior detection in VANETs the local nodes
are responsible for detecting the anomalies. The central infrastructure is responsible in the VANET
context for the diagnosis and mitigation actions. However, mechanisms related to fixing of problems
and returning to normal operation are not discussed in this dissertation because these are tasks that
are handled individually by vehicle and RSU manufacturers for specific use cases. In fault diagnosis
different models are used to identify the "root cause". According to Stanley et al. [SA14] a root cause
is an underlying problem leading to other problems and observable symptoms. In the context of fault
detection and fault diagnosis different models are defined.
• Abnormal vs. normal operation: Models of normal operation observe the behavior of system
components in order to detect deviations from the model. This allows a sensitive detection of
problems but the observation of normal operation might also be prone to false positive detections
if the detectors are not configured appropriately.
According to Stanley et al. [SA14] models of abnormal behavior are generally qualitative and
need to capture more extreme changes in behavior. However, the transition between abnormal
and normal operation modes could be ambiguous.
• Static vs. dynamic models: In dynamic models the behavior of system components is modeled
over time. These models consider the order of events as well as time delays included. The
synchronization of inputs can help to process data with static models that are much easier to
handle in most cases.
• Quantitative vs. qualitative models: Quantitative models process numerical data in algebraic
equations and differential equations. On the contrary, qualitative models do not include infor-
mation on the magnitude of misbehavior detection. In qualitative model often terminologies are
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used such as "large deviation in time" instead of numerical expressions. There are techniques,
e. g. based on fuzzy logic, that translate between quantitative and qualitative models.
• Compiled vs. first principle models: The term "first principle" is used by Stanley et al. [SA14]
to express the detection of faults based on fundamental models using physical laws or device
implementations. Compiled models, however, are based primarily on the processing of empirical
data involving "training" with measured data. The compile models are considered sometimes as
blackbox because they process the same knowledge as first principle models but are generally
not explicit, and hence cannot be easily inspected for accuracy and completeness.
• Probabilistic vs. deterministic models: Deterministic models do not consider the uncertainty
of faults or misbehavior events. However, in real systems it is mostly reasonable to include a
representation of uncertainty in order to consider inaccuracy and imperfection of system compo-
nents, sensors, detection models, and diagnosis models. In related work different probabilistic
approaches are described that base on the evidence theory of Dempster-Schafer, Bayesian Mod-
els or neural networks.
Fault Diagnosis Based on Causal Models An important piece of information in fault management
is the relation between cause and effect. Causal models are a way to process this information. A causal
model can be used to predict on the one hand events based on sensor measurements and to infer on
the other hand a faulty sensor that is based on measured events. Figure 5.1 shows an example for the
diagnosis using causal models. In this example it is assumed that C1 can be a possible cause of the
(symptom) event E1 and E2 and C2 can be a possible cause of E2. That is, if E2 is true than at least
one, C1 or C2 must be true. In addition only C1 can be a cause of the event E1.
C1 
C2 
E1 
E2 
E1 observed true 
C1 
C2 
E1 
E2 
E2 observed true 
C1 
C2 
E1 
E2 
E1 observed false 
C1 
C2 
E1 
E2 
E2 observed false 
Color coding: 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Unknown 
Observed true 
Predicted or inferred true 
Observed false 
Predicted or inferred false 
Unknown but suspected 
as possible true 
Figure 5.1.: Example of fault diagnosis using causal models according to Stanley et al. [SA14]
In the first case on the left hand side of Figure 5.1 the event E1 is observed to be true. Due to the
OR connections between the cause and the event elements C1 is inferred to be also true. Knowing that
C1 is true, it can be further predict that E2 is also true. A conclusion about C2 is not possible unless
a single-fault assumption is taken for the causal model. In the second diagnosis example of Figure 5.1
event E2 is observed true. In this case no concrete conclusion can be made about C1 and C2. However,
since one of them must be false, both are added to a group of suspects. In the third example E1 is
observed false. Consequently, C1 can be inferred false but no further prediction about E2 can be made
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due to the OR connections between the cause and the event. In the fourth example, E2 is observed
false. Due to the OR connection to C1 and C2, both causes must be false. Therefore, if C1 is assumed
to be false then E1 can be predicted to be false.
Fault Diagnosis Based on Probabilistic Models In addition to simple causal models more complex
probabilistic models are used in the fault management to consider uncertainty [SA14,LWR03]. The un-
certainty can be caused by imperfect observations, imperfect models, or missing observations. Dealing
with uncertainty is essential for real world systems but could lead to undetected events (false-negative)
and false events (false-positive). Defining the appropriate threshold is one of the most challenging tasks.
A Bayesian network is a tool that can be applied to process cause-effect information if uncertainty is
included. These systems start with prior estimates of failure probabilities for the root causes and deter-
mine the probability of each possible root cause, given the observed symptoms. In a Bayesian network
every fault and symptom is modeled as a random variable with a probability distribution. When an
observed symptom Y is input to the network, probabilities of every fault X are computed according to
the Bayes rule shown in equation 5.1. The term P(X |Y ) denotes the posterior probability of fault X that
can be computed when the likelihood P(Y |X) and prior probability P(X) is known.
P(X |Y ) = P(Y |X) ·P(X)
P(Y )
(5.1)
In most related proposals in the context of VANET security, trust or reputation profiles are con-
structed that contain information about accused nodes based on measurements provided by local ob-
server modules. Gerlach [Ger10] applies an Bayesian network to process observations locally on the
node. The result of this local processing is a temporary database with trust information that can be
used to identify misbehaving nodes. The beta distribution which is also based on Bayesian rules and
introduced in Section 4.1.2.1, is commonly used to probabilistically calculate whether a node can be
considered as benign or malicious [BB04, EB09, Ger10, SPC11]. However, this approach works best
with periodic information updates that attest benign behavior (called positive evidence) or prove mali-
cious behavior (called negative evidence). These periodic updates may be locally available but usually
not at a central entity.
Mármol et al. [MP12] propose TRIP, a trust and reputation infrastructure-based framework that cen-
trally collects reported reputation information for all nodes of the VANET. It has to be considered that
the central infrastructure requires both positive and negative reputations in order to prevent the discred-
iting of benign network nodes. The central reputation database can be accessed on demand by vehicles
via RSU connections to obtain reputation information from the infrastructure in order to support the
local calculation of neighbor reputation. However, a specific proposal for the central processing of
reported reputation is not given by Mármol et al. [MP12] since they focus on the local calculation of
reputations.
5.1.4. Attacker Exclusion
A revocation of VANET nodes is described in related work that is based on the detection of irregular
behavior. If a node should be excluded from the network then information about the nodes’ creden-
tial has to be quickly distributed to every node in the network, for example as certificate revocation
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list (CRL). According to Laberteaux et al. [LHH08] and Raya et al. [RMFH08] the exclusive distribu-
tion of CRLs by RSUs is in particular not suitable during the initial deployment phase when a dense
network of infrastructure access points is probably not available. An alternative is the exclusion of
vehicles by rejecting the request of new pseudonyms as first mentioned in technical project reports of
NOW [Ger07b] and SEVECOM [Kun08]. This approach has been adopted and further substantiated
by the C2C-CC in their PKI concept [BSS+11]. In both solutions the revocation or deactivation of
vehicles has to be triggered by the identification of misbehavior.
5.1.5. Evaluation of Related Work
A collection of disadvantages and open problems in the context of global revocation in VANETs is
provided by Lui et al. [LCH10]. Under the assumption that local misbehavior detection is not free of
false positives and false negatives, the central attacker identification must also consider false accusa-
tions of benign nodes and undetected attackers. Consequently, an appropriate reporting of attackers
is required but currently not specified or proposed (cf. Section 5.1.1). Mármol et al. [MP12] propose
with their TRIP protocol the report of misbehavior to create a central database containing long-term
node reputations. However, they did not consider the periodical change of pseudonymous identifiers in
V2X communications. In this dissertation the detection and exclusion of attackers is addressed under
consideration of drivers’ privacy. However, approaches for privacy preserving pseudonym resolution
are discussed in related work but these approaches burden the ad hoc communication by increasing
packet sizes and complex infrastructure communication links. The author of this dissertation proposes
an alternative lightweight protocol for conditional pseudonym resolution.
Even if the pseudonym resolution can be regarded as being solved, the proposal of Mármol et
al. [MP12] does not consider the scalability of the central framework sufficiently. Their solution re-
quires the periodic report of both positive and negative observations. Especially, the amount of reported
positive data regarding node behavior dramatically increases with an increasing number of network
nodes. Our proposed solution aims for central misbehavior evaluation and attacker identification con-
sidering scalability, changing pseudonyms and the report of false accusations. As far we know there is
no related work that fulfill all these requirements.
5.2. Requirements for Central Misbehavior Evaluation
Based on the analysis in Section 4.4.3 requirements are listed in the following that have to be considered
for the evaluation of detected misbehavior in order to identify the causer (i. e. attacker or faulty station).
• Time between misbehavior detection and attacker identification: Since most vehicles are
probably not provided with wide area wireless mobile communications to arbitrarily establish a
connection to the central infrastructure, the observed misbehavior has to be stored in the station’s
security subsystem until the data can be transmitted via RSUs. Moreover, the storage on the
nodes may be limited so that the data of old detections might be overwritten by data of new de-
tections and consequently some detections cannot be reported. When the central MEA receives a
specific misbehavior detection event it should wait until other observers or involved nodes report
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their related detections. Consequently, the central MEA has to be provided with information
regarding how many reports can be expected for a known misbehavior event.
The goal of local misbehavior evaluation also differs from the goal of the central MEA. A local
observer of misbehavior o has to rapidly decide which node is probably the attacker in order
to ignore further messages from this suspect. A long-term collection of detections regarding a
specific suspect is not reasonable and also may not be possible since the attacker can change
the ID of the affected node as soon as o is out of the attacker’s communication range. On the
contrary, the central MEA aims for a long-term exclusion of attackers. As a result, the central
MEA can collect sufficient evidence from independent reporters until a substantiated attacker
identification can be performed.
• Accuracy: A reliable identification of an attacker is not possible by VANET nodes under the
assumption that ghost vehicles are created by using different pseudonymous identifiers of the
same node. Although the nodes can detect the misbehavior itself, reliable identification of the
attacker is not possible because the different IDs of the attacker cannot be linked by a local
misbehavior evaluation. A central entity, however, has the possibility to check whether different
pseudonymous IDs belong to the same node. The main goal of the MEA is to generally reduce
the number of false detections, be it false-positives or false-negatives.
• Discrediting: The false accusation of benign nodes has to be considered by the central misbe-
havior evaluation with high priority. If for example a node b is accused to misbehave by a node
o, then it is necessary that this accusation is confirmed by other independent neighbors of b.
Further, it is required to obtain the information from independent nodes that the observer o is a
physically existing station and not a faked sender of reports created by an attacker. Colluding
attackers a1,a2, ...,an ∈V are another threat that has to be considered by the central MEA.
• Availability and Scalability: Compared to the local misbehavior evaluation, a central MEA
has to process the detections from all nodes of the VANET. As a result, the central evaluation
has to be either scalable or dividable in order to consider a growing number of nodes in the
network. The more nodes are on the road, the more misbehavior events are probably detected
and transmitted.
• Privacy: Although the central MEA requires the ability to check whether different pseudo-
nymous IDs belong to the same physical station, the privacy of all unconcerned nodes should not
be affected. Especially the privacy of drivers must be preserved due to the partial resolution of
pseudonymous IDs. The MEA requires only the information whether IDs a′ and a′′, contained in
detected misbehaviors, e. g. Ioa′(k) and Ioa′′(k), belong to the same owner. For the misbehavior
evaluation it is not necessary to check the link of IDs from different misbehavior events that has
been observed at different times and locations.
5.3. Misbehavior Reporting
Autonomously observed anomalies caused by attacks or critical traffic situations such as accidents are
reported to a central MEA. Node-based plausibility checks are the basis for misbehavior detection
reports that possibly accuse different nodes. The report structure has to be designed in a way that
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accusations with low confidence are possible. For example, a plausibility check that is based on re-
ceived second hand information (e. g. vehicle overlap checks) is not necessarily able to decide which
of the involved nodes is causing the implausibility. Additionally, discrediting of benign nodes has to be
considered in the misbehavior reporting strategy in order to satisfy the requirements of central misbe-
havior evaluation as listed in Section 5.2. In order to consider these requirements, a specific approach
for misbehavior reporting is proposed by the author of this dissertation [BNPB12]. The novelty of this
proposal is that some environment information of the attack scene can be stored in the report and signed
evidence can corroborate the reported misbehavior detection. Misbehavior reporting is also a topic of
international harmonization and standardization involving the ETSI (cf. TS 102 941 [ETS12b]), VSC3
CAMP [oTRA12], and IEEE [IEE13] in which the author of this dissertation is involved.
In the following, first the required elements of the report structure are discussed in Section 5.3.1.
Subsequently, a description of related security aspects is provided in Section 5.3.2.
5.3.1. Structure of Misbehavior Reports
A misbehavior report (MR) is used to send information regarding potential misbehavior from dis-
tributed network nodes to a central MEA. In order to avoid that nodes are constantly sending MRs it is
required that the detection mechanisms on the nodes are able to handle most false-positive detections
locally. Only relevant detections should be sent to the MEA.
Generally, a report contains the type of detected misbehavior such as vehicle overlap, implausible
movement or suddenly appearing station. In addition, the pseudonymous ID of the reporter node, a list
of suspected nodes, and a list of neighbors surrounding the reporter can be included. The neighbors
may be able to witness or refute an event as autonomous observers. Figure 5.2 shows the proposed MR
structure.
Pseudonymous 
identifier of 
reporter 𝑟 
List of suspected nodes 
MR 
type 
List of neighbors 
Pseudonymous ID3 
… 
Node trust 𝑡𝑟,𝑛,𝑘 and confidence 𝑐𝑟,𝑛,𝑘  
Duration(𝑟, 𝑛) Distance(𝑟, 𝑛) 
 First received signed message 
Signature created by reporter 𝑟 
ID1 
Trust  
statement1 
Signed 
evidence 
ID2 
Trust  
statement2 
Signed 
evidence 
Signature of message sender 
Position vector: latitude, longitude, timestamp  
Message type Pseudonymous ID of sender 
Pseudonymous ID4 
… 
Pseudonymous ID5 
Figure 5.2.: Structure of misbehavior report (MR)
Every report contains an evidence of the observed event. For example, in the case of an observed
relevant position overlap two signed CAMs are added proving the overlap of vehicle polygons as de-
tailed in Section 3.5. The list of suspected nodes, e. g. the two overlapping nodes, and a list of relevant
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one-hop neighbors are reported to the MEA by providing the respective pseudonymous IDs being used
by the nodes at event time. Additionally, suspected nodes are evaluated by a trust statement.
This statement contains one pair of trust-confidence information per suspected node. The trust-
confidence values are calculated by the local misbehavior detection system of the reporter. The node
trust is the first element of a trust statement and models the subjective probability that a neighbor
behaves as expected from the reporter’s point of view. The trust that reporter r ∈V specifies regarding
node n ∈V at time k is denoted as tr,n,k ∈R (cf. Section 4.3.2). The trust value in the MR is defined for
the range [0,1], where 0 denotes maximal distrust and 1 denotes maximal trustworthiness. The second
element of a trust statement is the node trust confidence. It models the confidence regarding the node
trust as specified in Section 4.3.3. The confidence value that node r assigns to the trust value of node n
at time k is denoted as cr,n,k ∈ R and comes within a value range of [0,1].
Moreover, every trust statement of a suspected node is extended by a contact duration and the dis-
tance that a reporter and a suspect have been in common communication range. In order to confirm
these distance and duration values a signed message such as a CAM has to be appended to the trust
statement. Later on, the MEA can compare the position of this message with the position of the mes-
sages that evidence the observed event in order to verify the plausibility of given distance and duration
values.
After the complete report is signed and encrypted by applying connectionless security mechanisms
such as the elliptic curve integrated encryption scheme (ECIES) [IEE04] the report is sent to the central
MEA. Consequently, the sender’s and receiver’s authentication is ensued as well as the integrity and
confidentiality of the MR. If connection to the infrastructure is temporarily not available, the reporter
can store the MR and postpone its transmission. The local MR storage on the stations should be suffi-
ciently persistent and specific requirements regarding security or tamper protection should be specified
in a real deployment. If a misbehavior is detected in a dense traffic scenario involving a large number
of VANET nodes, the size of a MR can be limited by adding only relevant neighbors that can probably
witness the observed misbehavior. Only selected one-hop neighbors should be added, prioritized by
the distance between the respective neighbor and the location of the misbehavior. The probability that
nearby neighbors have also detected the inconsistency autonomously is higher than for distant neigh-
bors. This list of neighbors is relevant for the central MEA in order to decide whether a misbehavior
event has really happened or an attacker is just using received messages from benign nodes to discredit
them. In order to calculate the probability of a misbehavior event, the entropy can be reduced with
more information regarding a same event from independent sources.
Due to the signed evidence that proves the misbehavior (e. g. a vehicle overlap), an attacker cannot
create arbitrary events accusing benign nodes. Cooperative attacks with several malicious reporters are
consequently spatially and temporarily limited.
5.3.2. Certification of Misbehavior Reports
When the central MEA receives a MR, the contained signatures are first verified by using the public
keys of the related pseudonym certificates. If the certificates with the required public keys are contained
in the MR, the verification can immediately be done. Alternatively, it is assumed that the MEA is
permitted to request missing certificates from the PKI. In a second step, the evidence of the reported
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misbehavior is checked by verifying the signature of contained V2X messages (cf. Figure 5.2). If for
example an overlap scenario is reported, the misbehavior can be verified by comparing the position
vectors of the appended messages with the algorithm proposed in Section 3.5.
Subsequently, all information of the appended neighbor list is verified by comparing the position
vector of the first received signed message with the given duration and distance values. If the MEA
detects a noteworthy difference the report is discarded and not used in the further evaluation process.
Additionally, the confidence cr,n,k of the trust statement is compared with the plausibility checked
duration and distance. As a reminder, these duration and distance values indicate how long the two
nodes has been located in common communication range. Assuming a linear increase of confidence
with increasing duration and distance, Equation 5.2 is used to calculate a reference confidence value that
should be consistent with the given confidence of the trust statement. This reference confidence value
is calculated by the central MEA in accordance to the local calculation of confidence as described in
Section 4.3.3. In contrast to Equation 4.10 that is used by the local nodes the central MEA can calculate
only an estimated value for the distance based on the provided first received signed messages. The
functions duration(r,n) and distance(r,n) in Equation 5.2 provide the contact time and the estimated
commonly driven distance of node n and node r. The variables γ and δ determine the required values for
minimum contact time and minimum traveled distance to get a maximum node trust confidence value.
In order to be conform to the configuration of the local station’s security subsystem (cf. Section 4.3.3),
the following values are applied: γ= 40 seconds and δ= 1000 meters.
cr,n,k = min
(
1 ,
1
γ ·duration(r,n)+ 1δ ·distance(r,n)
2
)
(5.2)
If the confidence in the trust statement of node n, reported by node r, is considerably larger than the
calculated reference value of cr,n,k, the misbehavior report should be discarded.
Duplicated reports from the same node are discarded as well even if different pseudonymous IDs
are used. In order to check the independence of reporters, the MEA requires linking information of
pseudonymous IDs. A protocol to request this information is described in Section 5.4 that considers
relevant privacy protection requirements. After the verification of all signatures contained in the MR,
a reduced report structure can be used for subsequent internal operations. This reduces the storage
capacity required at the MEA.
The verified MRs are stored in order to collect enough reports from independent nodes that are
involved or have observed an inconsistency related to the same event such as a specific overlap of
vehicle positions. Having collected enough reports for an evaluation, a session object is created for
every misbehavior scenario. The session maintains a list of suspected nodes and a list of reported
neighbors that have witnessed the misbehavior events. Based on a policy, the number of required
witnesses can be defined before starting further evaluation as detailed in Section 5.5.
5.4. Conditional Pseudonym Resolution for Misbehavior Detection
Protecting the location privacy of drivers is a major requirement in VANETs as defined in Section 2.2.
As a solution, frequently changing pseudonymous IDs are applied in V2X packets to complicate the
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long-term tracking of VANET nodes. In general, it should not be possible to link a pseudonymous
identifier to its long-term identifier, neither by the nodes of the VANET nor by a single entity of the
security infrastructure such as a CA of the PKI. However, in specific situations, conditional pseudo-
nym resolution is required, for example in the case for central attacker identification. In this case,
a MEA only needs to know whether messages with different pseudonymous IDs belong to the same
physical station. In order to fulfill the requirements regarding pseudonym resolution, the conditional
pseudonym resolution algorithm (CoPRA) is developed by the author of this dissertation [BPB13]. An
implementation of CoPRA was integrated into a PKI implementation that follows the specifications of
C2C-CC [BSS+11] and ETSI [ETS10c] in order to evaluate its applicability and performance. As far
we know, CoPRA is the only protocol that has shown to be compatible with the European V2X PKI
solution.
Using this protocol, pseudonym resolution information can be requested based on defined condi-
tions, i. e. permissions and policies. Depending on the desired resolution information type, several
independent authorities are involved in the process in order to avoid misuse. In addition, CoPRA does
not decrease the performance and the security data overhead in wireless ad hoc communications as the
size of certificates and therefore the message size remains untouched. The evaluation in Section 5.4.4
shows further that complexity and workload for pseudonym certificate issuance is not increased. Since
the communication links between the vehicles and the PKI might be temporary and instable, the pro-
cess of requesting pseudonym certificates should be realized connectionless oriented rather than based
on complex sessions.
5.4.1. Privacy Preserving Pseudonym Resolution Protocol
The following protocol for pseudonym resolution aims to be applicable in different PKI environments
to provide privacy preserving acquisition of pseudonym certificates and to enable conditional resolution
of pseudonyms in specific situations. The protocol is divided into two processes: During acquisition of
pseudonym certificates, resolution information is created and distributed as shown in Figure 5.3. Sub-
sequently, authorized authorities are allowed to request pseudonym resolution information as depicted
in Figure 5.5 and detailed in the related text. In this resolution process it is differentiated between
identity resolution and resolution of pseudonym linkability.
In case of identity resolution, an authority A requests the vehicle identity id (e. g. the vehicle’s
long-term certificate identifier idLTC, its license plate number, or the vehicle’s identification number)
that is related to a given pseudonym certificate PC. This identity resolution should be possible only in
well defined cases, for example, if a law enforcement agency needs to know the identity of a vehicle
after a hit-and-run accident. For this purpose, CoPRA can be used with a defined number of privacy
protection authorities PPA1, ...,PPAn or juridical institutions J1, ...,Jn that have to be involved in the
process to request idLTCv and idv with v ∈ V . For simplicity, only one instance of a PPA is considered
in the following protocol.
In case of linking resolution, an authority A requires only the information whether pseudonymous
IDs idPCv′ and idPCv′′ with v
′,v′′ ∈ PIv(k) belong to the same station v ∈ V at arbitrary time k. We
propose for this linkability resolution a Pseudonymous Long-Term identifier PLT that can be used by
a misbehavior evaluation authority to identify stations that fake misbehavior events and misbehavior
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reports. This kind of resolution may have lower privacy protection requirements since the long-term
identifier idV is not disclosed and PLT can change regularly. Nevertheless, privacy protection authori-
ties PPA1, ...,PPAn can also be integrated in the pseudonym linkability resolution process.
5.4.1.1. Pseudonym Certificate Acquisition
Basic protocols for requesting PCs from the PKI are described in the PKI design of the C2C-CC
[BSS+11]. However, this published basic PKI design has not considered mechanisms for pseudo-
nym resolution for misbehavior detection and active revocation. The authors of the C2C-CC PKI de-
sign [BSS+11] propose a split of powers between the enrollment authority (LTCA) and the pseudonym
certificate provider (PCA) due to privacy protection requirements within the PKI. The ETSI [ETS12b]
and IEEE [IEE13] protocols are extended in CoPRA to enable conditional and temporal restricted
pseudonym resolution. An overview of the protocol is provided in Figure 5.3 and is further detailed in
Figure 5.4. The numbers in both figures are related to each other. With this protocol the enrollment
of vehicles as well as the acquisition of pseudonym certificates is realized. CoPRA applies the well-
known idea of separation of duties [oTRA12, ETS10c] in order to ensure unlinkability of pseudonym
certificates and, therefore, protect the identity of vehicles and the privacy of drivers.
Vehicle LTCA PCA 
Send pseudonym 
certificate request 
Send long-term certificate request 
Send long-term certificate 
Send authorization 
request 
Send authorization 
response 
Send pseudonym 
certificate 
6 
8 
1 
2 
4 
9 
3 
5 
7 
11 … 
Figure 5.3.: Sequence of successful certificate acquisition
Enrollment phase Every vehicle of the VANET v ∈ V has to be equipped with valid certificates in
order to securely communicate with other ITS stations. Therefore, vehicle v ∈ V has to be enrolled
at a LTCA in order to get a valid long-term certificate LTCv. Details of the enrollment should be left
unspecified in this protocol as vehicle manufacturers may have specific solutions to register their ITS
station in a secure manner.
130
5.4. Conditional Pseudonym Resolution for Misbehavior Detection
(1) Nevertheless, in the first step the enrollment process should consider authentication, authoriza-
tion, integrity, and non-repudiation of the requesting ITS station (i. e. vehicle or RSU) in order
to prevent enrollment of malicious stations.
(2) If this is ensured the LTCA generates and issues in the second step a new long-term certificate
LTCv based on the given public key PKLTCv . A signature over a whole content with the private
key SKLTCA is indicated with σLTCA(◦). The resulting certificate is sent to v and can be used
subsequently to request pseudonym certificates.
Enrollment phase:
Vehicle→ LTCA : (idv,PKLTCv) (1)
Vehicle← LTCA : LTCv = (PKLTCv , idLTCA,σLTCA(◦)) (2)
Pseudonym acquisition phase:
Vehicle : req = (PKPCv ,EPKLTCA(idLTCv)) (3)
Vehicle→ PCA : (req,σLTCv(req)) (4)
PCA : RIdPCv = (δ(PKPCv) || rand) (5)
PCA→ LTCA : (σLTCv(req),δ(req),RIdPCv ,EPKLTCA(idLTCv),σPCA(◦)) (6)
LTCA : store(RIdPCv , idLTCv , idPCA) (7)
PCA← LTCA : (δ(req),expPCv ,σLTCA(◦)) (8)
PCA : PCv = (PKPCv , idPCA,σPCA(◦)) (9)
PCA : store(idPCv ,RIdPCv , idLTCA) (10)
Vehicle← PCA : PCv (11)
Figure 5.4.: Protocol showing successful issuing of long-term and pseudonym certificates
Pseudonym acquisition phase The protocol for pseudonym certificate acquisition has to consider
the split of duties between enrollment authority (LTCA) and short-term pseudonym certificate provider
(PCA).
(3) In the third step vehicle v creates a pseudonym certificate request that contains the public key
of a securely generated asymmetric key pair (PKPCv ,SKPCv) and the long-term ID idLTCv that
is encrypted with the public key PKLTCA of the LTCA using an Integrated Encryption Scheme
(IES). The private key SKPCv is stored securely in the ITS station and must never leave it. In
order to proof the knowledge of SKPCv and that the key pair is generated within a security device
additional signatures are required according to the basic system standards profile of the C2C-
CC [WBF+13]. For the sake of complexity these additional signatures are not considered in this
protocol description.
(4) This request is signed with the long-term certificate proving identity idLTCv and, subsequently,
sent to a PCA.
131
5. Central Long-term Identification of Attackers
(5) The PCA generates a resolution identifier RIdPCv related to the requested pseudonym PCv by
composing the hashed digest δ(PKPCv) of the given public key PKPCv and a random rand. Inside
the PCA domain, RId and PCv has to be unique which is ensured by a database lookup. If a
conflict is detected, the PCA recreate RId or PCv with a different random value rand or a new
generation timestamp, respectively. As the PCA is not able to verify the signature σLTCv(req) of
the pseudonym request, due to the encrypted long-term ID idLTCv , the request is forwarded to the
appropriate LTCA.
(6) This authentication request consists of the request signature σLTCv(req) created by v, a hash
digest of the request δ(req) created by the PCA, the resolution ID RIdPCv , and the encrypted
long-term ID EPKLTCA(idLTCv). The PCA signs the authentication request with SKPCA to prove
its ownership. A signature over the whole message is indicated with σ(◦). The LTCA decrypts
idLTCv using SKLTCA and verifies σLTCv(req) with the appropriate public key PKLTCv to check the
correctness of the pseudonym certificate request. Furthermore, the desired pseudonym certificate
information such as expiration time and permissions of the station are checked by the LTCA.
(7) In case of positive verification, the resolution ID RIdPCv is stored in a database of the LTCA
linked to the respective long-term ID idLTCv and PCA identifier idPCA. The verification result is
further used to generate an appropriate response for the PCA.
(8) In case of successful verification, this response contains a hashed digest of the original pseudo-
nym request δ(req) as well as expiration information expPCv of the new pseudonym certificate.
The whole response message is signed by the LTCA using SKLTCA to prove the possession of the
secret key.
(9) After verification of the returned authentication request, the PCA creates a new pseudonym cer-
tificate PC.
(10) The previously generated resolution ID RIdPCv is stored in a database together with the related
idPCv and idLTCA.
(11) Finally, the pseudonym certificate PCv is transmitted to the vehicle.
In order to protect the communication against manipulation and eavesdropping, all data transmitted
between the entities are encrypted with an IES such as ECIES [IEE04] in the proposed protocol. In this
encryption protocol, the sender of a message generates an asymmetric key pair (PKs,r,SKs,r) and a sym-
metric key Ks,r. This set of keys is only used to protect the message transport between a specific sender
s and a receiver r in context of a distinct session. According to the IEEE 1363 standard [IEE04] the
transmitted message is first encrypted with the symmetric key Ks,r, and subsequently Ks,r is encrypted
with the public key of the receiver PKr. This strategy allows for connectionless oriented communica-
tion between the entities (i. e. vehicle, PCA, and LTCA in Figure 5.4) without establishing complex
sessions with an exchange of several packets.
5.4.1.2. Conditional Pseudonym Resolution
Vehicles equipped with valid pseudonym certifi cates are able to use them in VANET communications.
In case of misbehavior detection or critical traffic situations (e. g. car accidents) the resolution of the
pseudonymous short-term identifier may be necessary. The protocol shown in Figure 5.5 and detailed
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in Figure 5.6 allows either for the linking of different pseudonyms or for providing the respective long-
term ID of a pseudonym.
Send report Send resolution 
request 
Send resolution 
response 
Send PC resolution request 
Send resolution identifier 
Send resolution identifier 
Send long-term identifier 
15 
16 
17 
19 
20 
Node (e.g. vehicle) Authority PPA LTCA PCA 
18 
12 Create 
message 
13 
ACK 14 
Figure 5.5.: Generic sequence of successful pseudonym certificate resolution
Based on policies, the LTCA is able to provide different resolution information to an authorized
authority. A misbehavior evaluation authority MEA may need only temporary linking information
of pseudonyms PC1, ...,PCn in form of a pseudonymous long-term ID idPLT . On the contrary, a law
enforcement agency may need to know the non-pseudonymous long-term ID idLTCv of PCv in order to
request additional information idv regarding v ∈ V . For the protocol shown in Figure 5.6, the request
of the long-term ID idLTCb by an authority is assumed in which a PPA must be involved as attesting
notary. During communication in the VANET, node a is able to record short-term IDs idPCb from
received messages, whereby a,b ∈V .
(12) If an event occurs, e. g. relevant misbehavior is detected, a message msg is created by node a
in this step that contains the short-term ID idPCb of a node b which is involved in the related
event. Additionally, a signed record of node b is appended to msg that motivates the pseudonym
resolution. This could be for example a broadcasted message containing a position vector proving
the location of b at the specific time. For simplicity, only one pseudonym is added in this step to
the message that should be resolved. Depending on the purpose, additional short-term IDs with
related records can be added to the message msg.
(13) Before the message is provided to the authorized authority, the whole message content is signed
with the private key of a PC of node a as indicated by σPCa(◦) in the protocol. The authority
acknowledges the receipt of the report with a signed answer.
(14) Based on regulations defined in a policy the pseudonym resolution request must optionally be
supported by other entities such as privacy protection agencies. If this support is needed, the
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Node a : msg = (list(idPCb ,recordb,σPCb(recordb)),σPCa(◦)) (12)
Node a→ Authority : msg (13)
Authority→ PPA : (msg, idPCb ,rt,σAuthority(◦)) (14)
Authority← PPA : resPPA = (δ(msg, idPCb), tc,rt,σPPA(◦)) (15)
Authority→ PCA : (msg, idPCb ,resPPA,rt,σAuthority(◦)) (16)
PCA : eRId = EPKLTCA(RIdPCb ,δ(msg, idPCb), te) (17)
Authority← PCA : resPCA = (δ(msg, idPCb),eRId,rt,resPPA,σPCA(◦)) (18)
Authority→ LTCA : (resPCA,σAuthority(◦)) (19)
Authority← LTCA : (δ(msg, idPCb), idLTCb , texp,σLTCA(◦)) (20)
Figure 5.6.: Protocol showing the successful conditional pseudonym resolution
authority extracts the pseudonym PCb to be resolved and forwards the original message along
with idPCb to the respective PPA. Furthermore, the desired resolution type rt (e. g. full identity
resolution or pseudonym linking information) is appended. The whole request is signed with
the private key SKAuthority of the authority. Subsequently, the PPA verifies the signature with
the public key PKAuthority and checks whether the authority is authorized to request pseudonym
resolution information from the PKI.
(15) If the PPA supports the resolution request, a digest δ of the request data is generated by using a
hash function. Subsequently, the digest, the current time tc, and the confirmed resolution type rt
are signed and sent to the authority.
(16) After receiving the response from the supporting PPA, the authority signs msg, idPCb , and the
confirmation from PPA with its private key SKAuthority. Subsequently, this signed data is sent to
the PCA.
(17) If the PCA can successfully verify the signatures and permissions of the authority and the PPA,
the appropriate resolution ID RIdPCb is read from its database. In order to prevent misuse of
RIdPCb , it is encrypted with the public key of the related LTCA.
(18) Subsequently, the PCA generates a response with the digest of message msg and the pseudonym
ID idPCb that should be resolved, the encrypted resolution ID RIdPCb , and the confirmation of
PPA. The whole response is signed and sent to the authority.
(19) When the authority receives the data from the PCA, the response resPCA is signed by the authority
and sent to the appropriate LTCA. The ID of the responsible LTCA can be extracted from the
encryption header of eRId.
(20) First, the LTCA verifies all signatures and certificates from the authority, PPA, and PCA as well
as their permissions included in the respective certificates. Afterwards, the LTCA checks that
all contained digests δ(msg, idPCb) are equal. The kind of pseudonym resolution is based on the
type rt that must be confirmed by the PPA and the PCA. In the presented protocol a request
for the long-term identity is assumed. Therefore, the LTCA provides the identifier idLTCb that
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is linked to the given resolution ID RIdPCb . The timestamp texp denotes the expiry date of the
provided long-term identifier. In order to guarantee authenticity and integrity of this information
a signature is created by the LTCA over the whole responded data, indicated by σLTCA(◦).
5.4.2. Security and Privacy Analysis of CoPRA
The following attacker analysis considers both a single attacker and multiple cooperating attackers that
have access to pseudonymous information (e. g. PCv, idPCv or RIdPCv) but aim for obtaining uncon-
trolled access to the long-term information of a specific vehicle v ∈ V . Alternatively, attackers may
aim to get only pseudonym linking information in order to track a specific vehicle within the VANET.
We analyze the properties of privacy with respect to unlinkability of PCs and disclosure of long-term
information. The privacy protection is mainly related to the cooperation level of involved entities.
CoPRA provides a flexible mechanism to conditionally resolve pseudonyms without affecting the
privacy of other pseudonyms. Due to the split of duties, one entity alone cannot break privacy by
linking arbitrary pseudonyms to the long-term certificate. Since PCA and LTCA can independently
verify the correctness of requests according to local policies, malicious authorities cannot arbitrarily
obtain resolution information. The following sets of authorities would have to cooperate in order to
create an unauthorized request.
• PCA and LTCA are compromised and maliciously cooperate. If both CA types are compromised,
an attacker could create a database in which both CAs collect linking information between issued
PCs and related long-term certificates. In this case, both PCA and LTCA violate the PKI policy
by not following the acquisition protocol shown in Figure 5.4. Security mechanisms have to
ensure that PKI operators are not able to manipulate certified software implementations or install
malware.
• The authority (e. g. MEA), the PPA, and the PCA are compromised and maliciously cooperate.
Assuming that the PCA is compromised, arbitrary resolution IDs could be requested by a ma-
licious MEA implementation. Security mechanisms have to be applied that ensure the integrity
of MEA and PCA software implementations. In addition, the application of several independent
monitoring instances is proposed, i. e. PPA1, ...,PPAn.
• A vehicle v ∈ V , the authority, and the PPAs are compromised and maliciously cooperate. The
report of fake events created by node v is considered, since resolution information is provided
based on the event type. Only misbehavior reports msg containing a signed record should be
usable to request pseudonym linking information. If a resolution to the long-term ID is requested,
for example in the case of a hit-and-run offense, additional support by external authorities such
as PPA1, ...,PPAn as well as manual interaction should be dictated by the MEA policy. The latter
case is not further considered in this dissertation.
The central PKI entities must further be resistant against relevant threats such as replay attacks and
denial of service (DoS) attacks. In addition, the general protective goals of security, i. e. confiden-
tiality, integrity, authenticity, authorization, non-repudiation, availability, and revocation have to be
considered.
• Confidentiality We recommend to encrypt all data while it is transmitted between the entities in
order to ensure its confidentiality. For infrastructure entities and vehicles with cellular network
135
5. Central Long-term Identification of Attackers
connection it is reasonable to apply transport layer security such as SSL to establish a secure
channel that is used to transmit all data. If the vehicles have to transmit their misbehavior reports
via RSUs it is reasonable to encrypt single reports with the asymmetric pseudonym keys applying
an integrated encryption scheme such as ECIES [IEE04]. In this case the previously encrypted
packets can be directly transmitted as soon as a RSU comes into communication range of the
vehicle.
• Data Integrity The integrity of transmitted data between all entities has to be protected. In
both cases, if transport layer security or an integrated encryption scheme is applied, a message
authentication code is used to protect the message integrity.
• Authenticity The authenticity of all entities is ensured with digital certificates. The entities
of the PKI and the misbehavior evaluation infrastructure are equipped with certificates issued
by the root CA. The vehicles and roadside stations are equipped with pseudonym certificates
issued by a PCA. Both, the classical certificate formats such as X.509v3 and the VANET specific
formats such as ETSI TS 103 097 [ETS13b] or IEEE 1609.2 [IEE13] allow to include application
specific permissions. Based on a certification policy and permissions included in the certificate a
specific role is assigned to the certificate holder. In the secure connection establishment or in the
decryption process of received reports the authentication and authorization of the communication
endpoints is verified.
• Non-repudiation The non-repudiation of an origin is ensured by digital certificates. As long as
the messages are signed and the related private key is not compromised or maliciously excluded
the messages can be assigned unambiguously to a single entity. The non-repudiation of the re-
ceipt of a message is ensured between a VANET node and the MEA by a signed acknowledgment
of received misbehavior reports. If the node do not receive the acknowledgment it must assume
that the report is not transmitted successfully. The communication between the infrastructure en-
tities is secured by transport layer security that ensures the non-repudiation of message receipt.
• Revocation The revocation of certificates is applied to exclude attackers or compromised entities.
According to the PKI design of the C2C-CC [BSS+11] entities of the security infrastructure such
as LTCA, PCA, MEA, or PPA are actively revoked by utilizing CRLs. Nodes of the VANET,
however, are passively excluded by issuing certificates with a short lifetime.
• Availability The availability ensures that legitimate users of the service have in general access
to that service. DoS attacks should be limited in order to increase the availability of CoPRA. In
our proposal digital signatures are used in combination with the revocation of certificates to limit
DoS attacks. In particular, requests and responses are only accepted and processed if the message
signature and the sender’s certificate is valid and not revoked. Therefore, an attacker must spend
cryptographic effort in signing operations to mount a DoS attack. Indeed, an attacker could flood
the authorities with invalid signed messages. As a result, sender certificates are handled first and
untrusted senders are processed with low priority.
• Replay Protection The replay of resolution requests sent by external attackers is detected and
directly filtered out at all entities. A digest δ(msg, idPCb) is used in this case as unique identifier of
a resolution task, having involved vehicle b ∈V . It has to be further considered that the recordb,
which is part of a message msg, contains variable location data and timestamps. Finally, the
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integrity and confidentiality of transmitted data between vehicles, authorities, PPAs, PCA, and
LTCA is ensured.
5.4.3. Comparison of Pseudonym Resolution Protocols
In this section we provide a comparison of related schemes considering most relevant aspects such as
the enlargement of pseudonym certificates and overhead in PC acquisition and PC resolution by means
of computation and data size. Table 5.1 subsumes the comparison of CoPRA with related schemes that
are proposed for pseudonym resolution in the context of misbehavior detection in ITS communications.
An overview and introduction of the related protocols V-Token, SRAAC, and CAMP is provided in
Section 5.1.2.
In the first row, the effect of pseudonym resolution is compared by means of overhead in pseudonym
certificates. Since PCs are appended to messages in the wireless communication, the overhead should
be optimized to a minimum. This parameter is most relevant from communication architecture perspec-
tive. The second row shows the amount of data that needs to be stored at the CAs in order to support
Table 5.1.: Comparison of Pseudonym Resolution Schemes for VANETs
Topic of comparison V-Token SRAAC CAMP CoPRA
[SKMW10] [FAEV06] [WWKH13] [BPB13]
Overhead in PCs ≥ 61 Bytes 0 Bytes 8 Bytes 0 Bytes
Certificate acquisition 0 Bytes ≥ 64 Bytes ≥ 44 Bytes ≥ 8 Bytes
overhead at CA per cert. per cert. per cert. per cert.
Performance relevant DSS encryption shared secret no no
algorithms in the cert. operation interpolations additional additional
acquisition process (e. g. [Sha79]) overhead overhead
Certificate acquisition connection connection
connection type oriented oriented connectionless connectionless
(vehicle↔ PCA) (blind signature) (MI-DSS*)1 oriented oriented
[Cha88, JJM07]
Resolution overhead ≥ 61 Bytes ≥ 64 Bytes ≥ 32 Bytes ≥ 1 KB
within the PKI
Performance relevant shared secret shared secret DSS sign DSS sign
algorithms in the cert. interpolations interpolations and verify and verify
resolution process (e. g. [Sha79]) (e. g. [Sha79]) operations operations
pseudonym resolution. In contrast to the V-Token protocol, SRAAC, CAMP, and CoPRA manage the
resolution information centrally by storing data in a database. In the third row, the performance rele-
vant algorithms are compared that are applied in the certificate acquisition process. In this comparison,
only operations are considered that are necessary to add resolution information in form of a V-Token
in [SKMW10], a Tag in SRAAC [FAEV06], a Linkage Value in CAMP [WWKH13, oTRA12] or a
Resolution-Id in CoPRA. The V-Token concept applies cryptographic operations based on the digital
1Jakobson’s magic-ink signatures with DSS are described in [Jak97]
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signature standard (DSS), and SRAAC uses cryptographic shared secret interpolations. Consequently,
these concepts create significant overhead in the acquisition phase. However, both concepts provide
protection against colluding PCAs and LTCAs. This protection can not be cryptographically achieved
with CoPRA since no cryptographic operations are entailed for the generation and storage of resolution
information. The CAMP solution proposed by the U.S. Department of Transportation is comparable
with CoPRA. In this approach resolution information is stored at dedicated linkage authorities (LAs).
The LAs, however, have no information about the long-term information of the vehicles and the LTCA
gets the Linkage Value only in encrypted form. The CAMP approach is designed to revoke pseudonyms
in case of misbehavior detection. According to Whyte et al. [WWKH13] a long-term ID of a misbehav-
ing station can only be set to an internal black list but is not provided to a MEA. The type of connection
required between vehicle and pseudonym certificate provider (PCA) is compared in the fourth row.
According to Section 5.4 the request of pseudonym certificates from the PKI should be connectionless
oriented. This allows interruption of pseudonym acquisition with later continuation. In the last two
rows, the communication overhead and performance-relevant cryptographic protocols in the resolution
process are compared.
As shown in Table 5.1 the application of CoPRA does not affect wireless vehicular communication
performance since no additional data is added to pseudonym certificates. Also no additional crypto-
graphic operations are introduced in the pseudonym acquisition phase. For evaluations of CoPRA a
testbed PKI implementation based on IEEE 1609.2 [IEE13] was used with LTCA - PCA server sep-
aration, running on a quad core CPU with 2.7 GHz. Using this environment, the processing of one
pseudonym certificate request takes 179 ms at the CAs, and a request with 50 public keys can be
processed within one second.
Avoiding additional delay in the pseudonym acquisition phase is important since every vehicle in the
network requires at minimum 1500 pseudonym certificates per year [BSS+11]. The storage of reso-
lution information is in the magnitude of megabytes and, therefore, not critical for PKI operation. In
case of pseudonym resolution several bytes of data have to be transmitted between involved entities
and several signing and verification processes are required when CoPRA is applied, cf. rows 5 and
6 of Table 5.1. However, it is assumed that the conditional resolution of pseudonyms is rarely per-
formed compared to the pseudonym acquisition process. Consequently, CoPRA is the optimal choice
if resolution information inside certificates must be omitted due to low overhead requirements, connec-
tionless certificate acquisition is required and resolution operations are rarely performed. The CAMP
approach described by Whyte et al. [WWKH13] is comparable with CoPRA but it only fits in with
the specific public key architecture of the American CAMP project [oTRA12]. Our proposal is de-
signed to be compatible with the European PKI approach published by ETSI [ETS12a, ETS12b] and
the C2C-CC [BSS+11].
5.4.4. Performance Analysis of Pseudonym Resolution
Applying a testbed implementation, the performance of pseudonym resolution with CoPRA is analyzed
in the following. Figure 5.7 shows the latency in milliseconds of pseudonym resolution processes. On
the x-axis, the number of pseudonyms to be resolved, contained in a single request, is increased. Ac-
cording to Section 5.3.1 a misbehavior report typically contains several pseudonymous identifiers idPC
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from different stations, i. e. reporter, suspected nodes, witnesses. In this evaluation the performance of
linkability resolution of involved pseudonyms is analyzed.
In Figure 5.7, the measured latency at involved PKI entities is shown. According to the protocol
described in Section 5.4.1.2 the MEA assembles the pseudonym resolution request and subsequently
sends it to the PCA. In a next step the PCA checks the content of the request by verifying the contained
misbehavior report with included CAMs. This step mainly causes the increase of latency at the PCA
with increasing number of desired PC resolutions. We analyzed that the increase of latency is linear.
Every additional PC in the resolution process adds approximately 45 ms. The remaining operations
at the MEA and LTCA are relatively constant. General overhead for every pseudonym resolution
is introduced by DSS operations in the protocol. Every message between MEA, PCA, and LTCA is
signed and encrypted at the sender and decrypted and verified at the receiver using ECC-256 and ECIES
according to IEEE 1609.2 [IEE13].
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Figure 5.7.: Latency in the pseudonym resolution process using CoPRA
In summary, CoPRA avoids additional data overhead in pseudonym certificates and does not create
significant latency in the pseudonym certificate acquisition process. As discussed in Section 5.4.2
the privacy of vehicles that are not involved in misbehavior events is not affected and for involved
vehicles only the linkability of pseudonymous certificates is resolved temporarily. Furthermore, the
proposed solution is resistant against relevant security attacks such as discrediting of benign nodes and
replay attacks. A performance analysis based on a prototypical implementation shows finally that a
conditional pseudonym resolutions can be done in acceptable time. Since MRs of different observers
may be received at different times in the magnitude of minutes or hours the performance requirements
for pseudonym resolution are relaxed.
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5.5. Evaluation of Suspected Nodes
Based on reported misbehavior and the conditional pseudonym resolution protocol a central identifica-
tion of attackers is proposed by the author of this dissertation. We propose a three step mechanism to
evaluate misbehavior reports and suspected nodes with a central MEA.
a) Verification of received evidence (cf. Section 5.5.2)
b) Aggregation of syndromes (cf. Section 5.5.3)
c) Assessment of suspects (cf. Section 5.5.4)
These mechanisms were developed by the author of this dissertation [BNPB12]. Joël Njeukam has
implemented and evaluated the concept of suspect assessment by simulating benign and malicious
misbehavior reporting vehicles as part of his Master thesis [NSKB11] which was supervised by the
author of this dissertation. Based on the software, developed in this Master thesis, the concept was
refined and further evaluated within this dissertation.
The novelty and benefit of our approach is that we focus on the long-term perspective to permanently
exclude attackers and faulty nodes from active V2X communications. Most related work focus on
the local short-term exclusion of misbehaving nodes. Together with our approaches for misbehavior
reporting (cf. Section 5.3) and conditional pseudonym resolution (cf. Section 5.4) the mechanism
discussed in this section aims to identify the responsible nodes, based on the fundamentals of fault
diagnosis.
The central evaluation of suspects benefits from misbehavior observations sent by different indepen-
dent nodes. In contrast to the local attacker identification, the central MEA can collect misbehavior
reports over a long period of time and is furthermore able to access pseudonym resolution information.
In the following subsections notations are used as defined in Section 5.5.1. In Section 5.5.2 the evi-
dence provided by misbehavior reports is analyzed as described and processed with mechanisms based
on fault diagnosis as detailed in Section 5.5.3. In addition, reported trust statements of suspects are
analyzed in order to assess the involved nodes as explained in Sections 5.5.4 and 5.5.5. The evaluation
of our concept is discussed in Section 5.5.6 and a security and vulnerability analysis is provided in
Section 5.5.7.
5.5.1. Notations
Nodes of a VANET are elements of a set V according to the notations defined in Section 4.4.1. In
addition to these notations the following donations are used in this chapter.
• S: Denotes a set holding reported information regarding a misbehavior scenario. A session can
consider different types of misbehavior that are reported for a similar time and location.
• SMR: Set containing MRs according to the description given in Section 5.5.2
• VS: Set of nodes that are involved in SMR as reporters, suspects or witnesses
• VSS ⊆VS: Set of nodes that are involved as suspects in SMR
• VSR ⊆VS: Set of nodes that are involved as reporters in SMR
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5.5.2. Verification of received evidence
Due to limitations of the communication range in VANETs, shadowing effects or missing possibilities
of sending reports to the infrastructure, the central MEA may not be able to obtain all misbehavior
reports from nodes that are involved in a session. Furthermore, attackers who aim to discredit benign
nodes by sending fake MRs should be detected. The following considerations are checked before
starting the evaluation of a session as discussed in Sections 5.5.3 and 5.5.4.
a) Satisfying independent reporters: Either all suspected nodes have reported respective MRs or
sufficient independent witness reports must be gathered by the MEA. If for example a witness
node w1 detects and reports a position overlap of its neighbors a and b at time k, it is necessary
that respective reports from nodes a and b concerning the same overlap at time k are obtained by
the MEA. This scheme aims to avoid blacklisting of benign nodes and, as a consequence, force
colluding attackers to spatially and temporarily synchronize their attacks. As a result, the effort
for colluding attacks increases with every additional cooperating malicious node required for a
successful attack.
b) Confirmation of misbehavior by witnesses: A received MR, stating a misbehavior that suspects
nodes a and b at time k (e. g. to overlap each other), has to be confirmed by witness nodes wi
with i = 1, ...,n with n ∈ N. Determining the value of n is further discussed in Section 5.5.6 and
is addressed by Petit et al. [PFK11].
We propose that syndromes reflecting different kinds of detectable misbehavior should have different
weights. For example, the violation of the maximum communication range (MCR) or the observation
of violations of plausible movement (PM) provide probably higher evidence for misbehavior than a
violation of a map related position (MRP) or a vehicle overlap (VO) detection. We propose to assign
a weight to every kind of reported syndrome. If a node reports an observed misbehavior as witness
then the weight should be lower compared to a misbehavior where a reporter is actively involved.
This is relevant in particular for vehicle overlap detections. In a next step, the conditional pseudonym
resolution is utilized to filter multiple reports sent by the same node. Subsequently, the received reports
are assigned to a session under consideration of location and time of the observed misbehavior. The
nodes are extracted from the MRs and are assigned to the sets VS, VSS , and VSR .
In order to check if sufficient reports were gathered for one of the suspects s ∈ VSS the weights of
syndromes related to the MRs of the session are added up per suspect. If the sum is larger than a
threshold it is assumed that satisfying independent reporters are involved to allow an identification of
the attacker or faulty node. The configuration of the syndrome weight and the threshold is related to
assumptions and experiences about having cooperating attackers that aim for discrediting benign nodes.
In Figure 5.8 an example is shown concerning the verification of received evidence. There are four
MRs sent by different reporters that are related to observed misbehavior of a node a. MR1 reports a
vehicle overlap of node a and b whereby either a or b is the reporter. MR2 and MR3 consider the same
overlap of node a and b but these reports are sent by witness nodes that are not actively involved in the
overlap. As already mentioned, reports that contain the reporter as suspect should be weighted higher
than reports sent by witnesses. The fourth report MR4 shows an implausible movement of node a.
Whenever another report is received and added to the session the sum of weights for the affected
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suspects are updated. If the sum is larger than the predefined threshold, the processing of the session is
continued with the aggregation of syndromes.
VO detection of node 𝑎 and 𝑏 with active 
participation  
VO detection of node 𝑎 and 𝑏 as witness 
𝑤𝑉𝑂𝑎 
𝑤𝑉𝑂𝑝 
VO detection of node 𝑎 and 𝑏 as witness 
𝑤𝑉𝑂𝑝 
Session related to suspect 𝑎  
𝑤𝑉𝑂𝑎 +  𝑤𝑉𝑂𝑝 + 𝑤𝑉𝑂𝑝 + 𝑤𝑃𝑀 > 𝑡ℎ𝑟𝑒𝑠ℎ𝑜𝑙𝑑  ? 
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Detection of PM violation of node 𝑎 
𝑤𝑃𝑀 
MR4 
Figure 5.8.: Example of received evidence associated to one suspect of a session
5.5.3. Aggregation of Syndromes
In the aggregation process of syndromes we propose to apply a causal model. The reports contain evi-
dence about a misbehavior event which should result in a binary decision whether the misbehavior has
happened or is bogus. As introduced in Section 5.1.3 fault diagnosis models have different properties.
Our causal model for syndrome aggregation is a static model since all misbehavior reports related to
similar time and location are combined in a session having a set SMR. The reports of each session are
processed subsequently in a static way. It is, for example, not relevant if first an implausible movement
is detected and subsequently a vehicle overlap or vise versa. In addition, time delays and lags in the
reporting of misbehavior are not relevant for the diagnosis as long as the time synchronization is en-
sured in the local detection process on the VANET nodes. The syndrome aggregation method applies
further a quantitative model to process first principle observations of abnormal behavior. A qualitative
model is not necessarily needed as long as a representation for humans is not required. For the ag-
gregation of syndromes we propose to apply a deterministic causal model. The nodes of the network
process the location-related information and filter observed events with high uncertainty. Nevertheless,
the uncertainty concerning observed misbehavior is considered by trust statements provided for every
suspected node. After the aggregation of syndromes the assessment of suspects is computed based on
these trust statements as further detailed in Section 5.5.4. The proposed concept for central misbehavior
evaluation is utilizing a hybrid approach considering deterministic and probabilistic models.
After the MEA has verified that sufficient reports from independent observes are received a causal
model is applied to aggregate the syndromes (detected and reported misbehavior). In the optimal case,
this process confirms that one suspect node in the set VSS is inferred to be the cause of the syndrome.
However, it might happen that not a single node of the set VS is inferred to be the potential cause.
If, for example, a vehicle overlap is observed two signed messages with corresponding position
vectors should prove the overlap. In the same way, a PM violation should be attested by two signed
messages that show the position jump based on location and time. Considering the example used in
Section 5.5.2 and illustrated in Figure 5.8 the report of vehicle overlaps create an ambiguity group
containing both nodes. A diagnosis of this syndrome, shown on the left hand side of Figure 5.9, creates
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such an scenario. In this example the nodes a and b are part of the ambiguity group. If there is another
report in the session SMR that proves a PM violation of suspect a then this node is inferred to be the
responsible node as long as only a single cause is assumed. However, in the context of misbehavior
detection in VANETs multiple causes must be assumed to be possible. If cooperating physical attackers
create ghost vehicles in a session then all attackers should be identified. As a result, the status of the
suspect is not changed from suspected to unknown as shown in the lower part of Figure 5.9. It has to be
considered that only nodes are suspected and therefore element of VSS if sufficient independent reports
are received as discussed in Section 5.5.2.
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Figure 5.9.: Fault diagnosis using causal models for misbehavior detection in VANETs
5.5.4. Assessment of Suspected Nodes
As soon as sufficient evidence is collected from independent observers and the syndromes are aggre-
gated an assessment of the suspected nodes is performed. If there is only one suspect which means that
the responsible node can be unambiguously inferred from the misbehavior reports it is expected that the
assessment confirms the inference. Otherwise, the suspect should not be considered as attacker or faulty
node. If there are multiple suspects this assessment process is required to identify the responsible node
assuming a majority of benign reporters. In the central suspect evaluation process the reported trust
values tr,n,k with the associated and verified node trust confidence cr,n,k values gained from misbehavior
reports of a session set SMR are processed.
When the nodes are extracted from received reports and assigned to a session SMR, then the time
information k can be ignored in subsequent aggregation operations, cf. Section 5.5.2. Within a session
SMR, all misbehavior reported by the nodes relate to the same event with respect to time and location.
Based on the tuple of (tr,n,cr,n) the assessment of suspected nodes is performed with two equations.
The applied Equations 5.3 and 5.4 are based on strategies for trust and confidence value aggregation,
defined by Ebinger and Bißmeyer [EB09].
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Trust Value Aggregation The aggregated trust tn and confidence cn values related to a suspected
node n ∈ VSS are calculated using the reports of node r ∈ VSR ,r 6= n. The aggregation of multiple trust
estimations must have the following properties.
• The trust values should be weighted in the aggregation process according to its related node trust
confidence value. If the confidence is close to 1 the associated trust value should be considered
much. Otherwise, if the confidence is close to 0 the trust value should be considered less. If the
confidence is equal to 0 then the trust value should be ignored.
• The values provided by the reports should be handled equally. A pair of trust and confidence
provided by a reporter r1 should not be handled differently than a pair provided by a reporter r2.
• The resulting value for trust must be in the range [0,1].
• If all node trust confidence values are 0 then the aggregated trust tn should be considered to be
irrelevant.
In Equation 5.3 different trust values considering the same suspected node n ∈ VSS are combined. The
numerator ensures the weighting of trust values with the associated confidence value by multiplying
each trust value with its associated confidence value. Subsequently, the sum of these values is divided
by a sum of confidence values that is provided by the session reporters. This sum of confidence in the
denominator is used for normalization in order to ensure that the results of the function are in the range
[0,1]. Equation 5.3 can only be applied if the sum of confidence values in the denominator is larger
than 0. If this is not the case, we define tn = 0 irrespective of the trust values in the nominator.
tn =
∑
VSR
r,r 6=n tr,n · cr,n
∑
VSR
r,r 6=n cr,n
, n ∈VSS (5.3)
Trust Confidence Value Aggregation Equation 5.4 shows the aggregated confidence of a node n ∈
VSS calculated from a combination of values from all reporters of a session. The aggregation of multiple
node trust confidence estimations must have the following properties.
• The resulting node trust confidence should be high if the associated trust values from all reporters
agree on each other. If, for example, one reporter provides high trust close to 1 in node n ∈ VSS
and another reporter provides low trust close to 0 then the resulting confidence should reflect this
disagreement. On the contrary, if the trust values confirm each other than the confidence should
increase accordingly.
• The values provided by the reports should be handled equally. A pair of trust and confidence
provided by a reporter r1 should not be handled differently than a pair provided by a reporter r2.
• The resulting node trust confidence must have values in the range [0,1].
The formula shown in Equation 5.4 ensures that the confidence increases if the different nodes agree
on similar trust levels (i. e. the gap between trust values is small) and the reverse if the opinions differ a
lot (i. e. trust value differentials are high). The cardinality |VS| in the denominator defines the number of
different reporters r of a session that have evaluated node n. The fraction in the first bracket expresses
the mean value of differences between all trust values. A small mean difference in the trust values
should result in a large factor. As a consequence, this mean difference is subtracted from 1 in order
to get the final factor. This factor is then multiplied by the sum of confidence values ∑VSr cr,n. The
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resulting factor on the right hand side is limited to the maximum node trust confidence 1 in order to
ensure normalization of the result.
cn =
1− ∑VSRr,r′∈VSR ,r 6=r′ 6=n |tr,n− tr′,n||VSR | · (|VSR |−1)
 ·min(1 , VSR∑
r,r 6=n
cr,n
)
, n ∈VSS (5.4)
Since all required properties are fulfilled by Equations 5.3 and 5.4 the formulas, proposed by Ebinger
and Bißmeyer [EB09,Ebi13], are appropriate for the aggregation of trust confidence pairs in the context
of attacker identification.
In the final assessment process of suspected nodes, the MEA combines the previously calculated
values for trust and confidence. Suspects with an assessment value below a defined threshold are
considered as attacker or faulty node and are consequently excluded from the VANET. The assessment
function, shown in Equation 5.5, multiplies the trust and confidence values using Equations 5.3 and 5.4
as input. The higher the confidence value cn the more the trust value tn is considered for a suspect
n ∈VSS . Suspicious nodes with low confidence values around 0 result in neutral assessments a≈ 0.
an = tn · cn (5.5)
Assuming a benign majority of reporters perform well specified and accurate local misbehavior detec-
tions, a ghost vehicle is rated with a negative trust value and a real vehicle is rated with a positive trust
value.
5.5.5. Discussion of Node Assessment for Misbehavior Evaluation based on an Example
Based on an example the node assessment for misbehavior evaluation is discussed in this section. The
adversary scenario at time frame K = {k0,k1} depicted in Figure 5.10 is used to discuss the node
assessment process. According to this scenario the nodes o1,o2,o3,o4,o5 ∈ Na(k),k ∈ K are in com-
munication range of node a. Node o1 and o2 are actively involved in a vehicle overlap event with the
ghost vehicle a′,a′′ ∈ PIa(k),k ∈ K. Nodes o3,o4,o5 passively and autonomously observe the vehicle
overlap events. It is assumed in this example that the central MEA has received misbehavior reports
from o1,o2,o3,o4,o5,a′,a′′ ∈VS whereby o1 and o2 are also suspects o1,o2 ∈ (VSR ∩VSS) and the other
vehicles are only reporter, i. e. o3,o4,o5 ∈ (VSR\VSS). The reports contain the two overlapping nodes
and the remaining nodes are attached as witnesses to the list of relevant neighbors. If a sufficient
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Figure 5.10.: Example of location-based attack with vehicle-overlap detection
145
5. Central Long-term Identification of Attackers
number of reports are collected (cf. Section 5.5.2), the certificates of the MRs are verified and the
plausibility of the given confidence is checked, applying Equation 5.2. Subsequently, the conditional
pseudonym resolution detects that a′ and a′′ belong to the same station (a′,a′′ ∈ PIa(k) with k ∈ K).
Consequently, the IDs a′ and a′′ are linked to a pseudonymous long-term ID a∗ that is chosen by the
LTCA (cf. Section 5.4.1.2).
At this stage, a trust value to,a∗ and a confidence value co,a∗ exist for every combination of o ∈ VSR
and a∗ ∈ VSS with o 6= a∗. In order to assess the suspects, only o1,o2,a∗ ∈ VSS are considered in the
aggregation process (cf. Equation 5.3 and 5.4) that outputs ta∗ ,ca∗ for all o ∈ VSR that accused a∗ in
their reports. In Figure 5.11, the assessment of node a∗ is illustrated exemplarily. The resulting tuple
(ta∗ ,ca∗) for the suspect a∗ ∈VSS is combined to a final assessment value using the function a(ta∗ ,ca∗).
After also calculating the final values for o1 and o2, the MEA can decide depending on policies and
defined thresholds which nodes should be excluded.
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Figure 5.11.: Example for central node assessment for misbehavior evaluation
5.5.6. Evaluation of Attacker Node Identification
The goal of the central misbehavior evaluation is the identification of attackers from a given set of
suspected nodes that are actively involved in a misbehavior scenario. We aim to verify the hypothesis
that a central MEA is able to identify multiple attackers based on a majority of benign reporters that
observed abnormal behavior according to Section 1.2. A simulation study is conducted to evaluate the
central node assessment as detailed in the following paragraph.
Evaluation Setup A simulation allows a statistical evaluation of the proposed solution under con-
sideration of realistic assumptions and limitations as derived from the long-term FOT described in
Section 3.4.4. For the central evaluation of misbehavior reports it is not relevant to have a detailed traf-
fic flow simulation and detailed communication simulations for the nodes of a VANET. The reporting
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can be considered as interface between the local misbehavior detection, analyzed in Chapter 3, and the
central evaluation of detections. As shown in Figure 5.12 a misbehavior report generator is used to
create a set of MRs that are handed over to the MEA where the reports are processed.
Misbehavior Report 
Generator 
MEA 
   Suspect Assessment 
     Conditional 
Pseudonym Resolution 
     Syndrom Aggregation 
Handover of 
misbehavior 
reports 
PKI 
Long-term CA 
Pseudonym CA      Report and Evidence 
Verification 
Scenario 
Generator 
Misbehavior Report 
Generator 
Root CA 
Resolve 
Pseudonym IDs 
Blacklist 
attacker 
Figure 5.12.: Evaluation setup of central misbehavior report processing and attacker identification
Relevant information for the central evaluation of reports are the number of involved independent
attackers, the number of involved benign nodes and the number of benign witnesses. Based on these
parameters the content of the different misbehavior reports is calculated by a report generator imple-
mentation which provides a set of reports to the MEA implementation. Both the report generator and
the MEA implementation are realized with Java. The software was executed in our experiments on
common commercial off-the-shelf personal computer hardware. Due to the simulation of report gener-
ation different setups with varying parameter were tested in order to evaluate the proposed mechanism.
Furthermore, the simulation allows to replicate and repeat the experiments.
For the verification of received evidence (cf. Section 5.5.2) configuration parameters shown in Ta-
ble 5.2 were applied. If a vehicle overlap is reported than either both suspects and three witnesses
have to report this event or one suspect and five witnesses have to send a report in order to overstep
the configured threshold. In the following description of experiment results, we consider the first case
in which both involved nodes and at least three witnesses that passively observed the overlap send a
report.
Table 5.2.: Configuration of experiments related to report collection of central MEA
Parameter Value
Weighting of vehicle overlap detection with active participation as suspect 1
Weighting of vehicle overlap detection with passive participation as witness 0.4
Weighting threshold for satisfying independent reporters. 3
According to Section 5.5.2 the sum of weights must be larger than this threshold.
Node assessment threshold athld used to distinguish benign and malicious nodes. 0.5
In the simulations the report generator allocated randomly trust and confidence values between be-
nign nodes and ghost nodes according to Table 5.3. In the following description an attacker is assumed
who is causing ghost vehicle overlaps as depicted in Figure 5.10. Using different types of detected mis-
behavior according to the Section 3.2 would allow a simple evaluation of the attacker node by applying
the causal model. We focused in the following evaluation on the most complex scenario in which only
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vehicle overlaps are reported. As a consequence, in every test case several nodes are suspected. Nev-
ertheless, the evaluation results are transferable to other kinds of location-related misbehavior where
only one suspect is available in the session set VSS .
According to Table 5.3 the benign nodes provide positive trust values to other benign nodes and
negative values for detected ghost vehicles. On the contrary, attackers assign a maximal positive trust
value to other attackers and minimum values for benign nodes. Since the confidence depends on the
together traveled distance and duration of two nodes, the confidence value cannot be arbitrarily faked
by an attacker.
Table 5.3.: Value ranges for trust and confidence used for central MEA evaluation
Direction of rating (provider→ target) Trust as range Confidence as range
benign node→ benign node [0.75, 1] [0, 1]
benign node→ faked node [0, 0.5] [0, 1]
faked node→ benign node 0 [0.1, 0.7]
faked node→ faked node 1 [0.1, 0.7]
Based on the simulation setup evaluations of the two most relevant attack scenes are presented in the
following. Each simulation scenario were repeated 10 times. According to the requirements for central
misbehavior evaluation listed in Section 5.2, the simulator generates an incomplete set of misbehavior
reports SMR that is provided to the MEA. In order to consider limited communication links between
reporters and the infrastructure, 30 percent of the simulated observers o ∈ VSR are not able to transmit
their MR to the MEA in the conducted tests.
(1) Attack Scenario with Single Physical Attacker Node In the first configuration the optimal
misbehavior scenario under consideration of the above mentioned constraints is analyzed. In this
case a single physical attacker node creates one ghost vehicle that causes vehicle overlaps that
are detected by benign nodes in the single-hop communication range of the attacker. Reports
that contain several pseudonymous IDs related to the same physical station are filtered by the
MEA. The report generator of the simulator creates for every involved node one report with
random trust and confidence values according to the ranges defined in Table 5.3 for all nodes in
the scene. In order to gain the information on how many witness nodes are needed for reliable
detection of an attacker, the number of benign witnesses is increased (cf. x-axis of Figure 5.13).
This experiment was used to configure the VO weighting parameters listed in Table 5.2. The
two graphs illustrate the assessment value of the benign nodes and the ghost vehicle. The second
graph shows that the decrease of the faked node’s assessment value attenuates with four benign
witnesses.
(2) Attack Scenario with Increasing Number of Cooperating Physical Attacker Nodes In the
second configuration the limitations of the proposed concept are analyzed. In Figure 5.14 the
respective results are shown evaluated with the report generator and the MEA implementation.
In this scene several benign nodes generate misbehavior reports stating that 50 percent of these
benign nodes are actively overlapping a single ghost vehicle. The other 50 percent of the benign
nodes are acting as witnesses. In this simulation the number of malicious reporters is increased in
order to measure the impact of several cooperating attackers. By assigning trust and confidence
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Figure 5.13.: Attack with increasing number of benign witnesses observing a misbehavior event
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Figure 5.14.: Attack with increasing number of maliciously cooperating witnesses providing MRs
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values for suspects according to the configuration listed in Table 5.3, it is sufficient if 35 percent
of the involved nodes belong to independent cooperating attackers in order to hide a real attack.
This result complies with the Byzantines generals problem [LSP82] that states that no solution
involving less than 3m+1 nodes can cope with m attackers. However, the effort for an attacker
is relatively high to mount an attack where several manipulated vehicles are at the same location
at specific time. Using only one manipulated station for this cooperative attack is not possible
since the MEA is able to link different pseudonymous identifiers that belong to the same physical
station.
Based on a threshold value athld as defined in Table 5.2, the attackers can finally be distinguished
from benign nodes. All suspects VSS of a session S that are rated with a value below athld can be
considered to be identified as attacker or faulty node.
Our evaluations based on simulated reports are an appropriate basis for future FOTs since the cen-
tral MEA is using the MR as well-defined interface between VANET nodes and the central MEA.
Additionally, we evaluated the most complex case of misbehavior evaluation with several suspects per
misbehavior session. Based on the scenario with several cooperating attackers and multiple suspects we
have confirmed the hypothesis that a majority of approximately two-thirds benign nodes is required to
identify the attackers. In this complex scenario, the evaluation is based on trust-confidence information
in addition to a causal model. Finally, realistic configurations of the report generator were considered as
listed in Table 5.3. We considered beside others the loss of MRs and fake reports of involved attackers.
5.5.7. Security and Vulnerability Analysis of Central Attacker Node Identification
The MEA has to consider strong security and privacy characteristics in order to prevent attacks and mis-
use. In this analysis the generic security protective goals such as confidentiality, integrity, authenticity,
authorization, non-repudiation, revocation, and availability are discussed. Moreover, specific attacks
such as replay of data, discrediting of benign nodes and cooperative attacks are considered. Finally,
the effects on privacy are discussed. Within the infrastructure, the MEA has to establish connections to
the PKI with respect to conditional pseudonym resolution and to revoke identified attackers and faulty
nodes. As a consequence this security and privacy analysis is closely related to the security and privacy
analysis of CoPRA in Section 5.4.2.
• Confidentiality of MR The MRs provided by nodes of the VANET has to be encrypted. For this
purpose, we propose to apply transport layer security such as SSL or packet based encryption
based on an integrated encryption scheme such as ECIES. Within the infrastructure all commu-
nication between the MEA and the PKI must also be encrypted. In addition the MEA must be
operated in a trusted environment. This implies that data stored by the MEA is not accessible by
outsiders and sensitive information such as private keys are not readable.
• Integrity Protection of MR The data integrity of transmitted data has to be ensured. As dis-
cussed in Section 5.4.2, both the transport layer security and integrated encryption schemes sup-
port this function. In addition, we propose to sign every MR with the reporter’s private key of
the pseudonym certificate as further detailed in Section 5.3.2. In order to prevent manipulation
of data that is stored in the database of the MEA we propose to apply trusted platform modules
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to ensure software and database integrity of the MEA. Outsiders must not be able to insert, alter
or drop information without authorization.
• Authenticity of MEA and Reporters The MEA, the VANET nodes and all entities of the PKI
are equipped with certificates issued by the root CA or a pseudonym CA. According to the PKI
concept, presented in Section 2.2.1, VANET nodes use pseudonymous certificates to ensure au-
thenticity according to privacy protection requirements. These PCs are used to sign and encrypt
locally generated MRs. The MEA uses a certificate issued by the root CA in order to authenti-
cate itself against other entities of the security infrastructure. These certificates authenticate the
respective stations in the security negotiation procedure when a symmetric key is exchanged in
transport layer security (e. g. SSL) or the integrated encryption scheme (e. g. ECIES).
• Authorization of MEA and Reporters The certificates contain information about authorization
of the stations. We propose that every trustworthy node of the VANET is authorized to provide a
MR. The permission should be associated to the trust and assurance level (TAL) that is part of the
pseudonym certificate. The TAL concept is developed by the C2C-CC [WBF+13]. With respect
to misbehavior reporting vehicles and RSUs should be permitted to generate and provide MRs to
the MEA as long as the used PC contains the minimum TAL required for V2X communications.
The MEA is equipped with a certificate that contains required permissions to request conditional
pseudonym resolution and to revoke attacker nodes. The root CA is responsible to ensure that
the MEA considers and follows the rules described in the certificate policy of the PKI. Based
on a regular audit which confirms that the MEA follows the policy the certificate of the MEA is
renewed by the root CA.
• Non-repudiation of an Origin (Reporter of MR) Since every MR is signed with a private key
related to a PC the MEA can verify that the report is generated by an authenticated and au-
thorized VANET node. The conditional pseudonym resolution is applied to identify duplicate
reports generated by the same physical station that is using different pseudonymous certificates
in different MRs. A sender can consequently not repudiate the sending of a MR. The communi-
cation between the MEA and the PKI entities is secured by transport layer security that ensures
the non-repudiation of message receipt.
• Non-repudiation of the Receipt of MR As discussed in Section 5.4.2 the receipt of a MR is
acknowledged by the MEA with a signed message.
• Revocation of MEA and Reporters The revocation of a compromised MEA is manually done
by adding the certificate ID on a CRL. According to the C2C-CC PKI concept [BSS+11] this
CRL lists only entities of the security infrastructure. Updates of the CRL are distributed to all
nodes of the VANET and to all entities of the security infrastructure. As soon as a MEA is
revoked the PCA and LTCA reject for example the request for conditional pseudonym resolution
as well as requests for node revocations.
We propose to perform the revocation and exclusion of reporters by two measures. Since all
nodes of the VANET are registered with a LTCA the respective LTCA is also responsible to re-
ject PC acquisition requests of the blacklisted node. However, as long as the node is equipped
with valid pseudonym certificates it can actively participate in V2X communications. In order
to prevent blacklisted nodes to possibly send fake MRs, we propose to use the online certificate
status protocol (OCSP) to exchange the revocation status between entities of the security infras-
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tructure. By using OSCP the MEA is able to request the status of misbehavior reporters before
their provided report is processed.
• Availability of MEA In order to limit the impact of DoS attacks against the central MEA, every
MR is signed with the pseudonym private key of the respective sender. The MEA checks in the
first step the validity of the sender by verifying its pseudonym certificate and in a second step
the message signature is verified. Reports signed with an invalid signature or involving invalid
certificates are discarded after reception as described in Section 5.3.2. This strategy ensures that
attackers must invest in cryptographic signing operations in order to flood the MEA with invalid
reports. However, the system performing the verification of incoming reports should be equipped
with enough processing power to be able to process a large number of incoming reports.
• Replay of MR As discussed in Section 5.3.1 the observed misbehavior is proven by one or more
signed messages containing location information and corresponding timestamps. The combina-
tion of position and time allows the MEA to assign the report to a misbehavior session. Dupli-
cates and replayed reports are detected and discarded. It has to be considered for both, the DoS
attack and the replay attack, that the MEA is able to check whether different pseudonyms belong
to the same node. Reports from the same node using different pseudonyms are discarded as well.
• Discrediting of Benign Nodes The arbitrary generation of faked misbehavior reports is limited
as discussed in Section 5.3.1. Depending on the type of observed misbehavior the reporter has
to prove the event by adding appropriate signed messages that cannot be faked by an attacker.
Therefore, attackers are not able to blacklist nodes of the VANET arbitrarily.
• Cooperation and Level of Attacker The level of cooperating attackers with respect to the mis-
use of the conditional pseudonym resolution is discussed in 5.4.2. In our concept only the MEA
is responsible to decide whether sufficient evidence was collected to exclude a node from active
participation in a VANET. A compromised MEA is in general able to request the LTCA to ex-
clude and blacklist specific nodes of the VANET as long the MEA knows the long-term ID of the
nodes. As a consequence, the MEA implementation must be operated in a trusted environment.
In order to reconstruct a decision of the MEA we propose to perform a detailed logging at the
MEA with respect to misbehavior report processing.
• Regulatory Compliance The proposed concept for misbehavior detection and evaluation bases
on regulatory compliance. It is required that a large set of nodes of a VANET are equipped
with mechanisms to locally detection misbehavior. The nodes have to perform the misbehavior
detection according to a defined concept that is implemented in the same way at all nodes. If,
for example, vehicles of different manufacturers implement the detection mechanisms differently
then the central evaluation of MRs might not be possible. The MEA should be able to process
reports from vehicles and RSUs of different manufacturers in order to increase the number of
possible reporters. The higher the number of independent reporters the higher the possibility to
identify attackers reliably. As a result, it is important that the MEA is accepted by all stakeholders
of a VANET.
• Privacy The privacy of reports is affected due to the conditional pseudonym resolution as dis-
cussed in the security and privacy analysis of CoPRA in Section 5.4.2. We propose in Sec-
tion 5.4.1.2 to use a pseudonymous long-term ID idPLT that links pseudonymous IDs. This idPLT
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changed over time in order to protect the privacy of drivers. Consequently, the MEA is not able
to gather the real long-term ID of VANET nodes.
5.5.8. Performance Analysis of Central Misbehavior Evaluation
In general, the scalability of a central entity has to be particularly considered since several hundred mil-
lion vehicles can be assumed to be part of a future VANET referencing to the mandate of the European
commission [Com09] and the memorandum of understanding of automobile manufacturers [Con11].
However, the number of processed misbehavior reports is not directly related to the number of nodes
in the network. For example, the network might consist of several million vehicles but only a hand-
ful of attackers are producing inconsistencies on the road that are detected by a handful of vehicles
passing this area. In a first step, the nodes can filter the detected misbehavior. Only reliable detec-
tions are sent to the MEA. In a second step, the impact of a ghost vehicle attack is spatially restricted
and therefore, only a relative small subset of nodes is able to send related misbehavior reports. Re-
ports are created only if misbehavior is autonomously detected. In contrast to other related schemes
(i. e. [CKL+08, MP12, ODS07]), the permanent report of node position and their system state is not
needed. Indeed, by reporting event-based, the dimensions of the infrastructure entities can be realized
smaller and a constant communication link to the infrastructure is not required. The dimensions of the
MEA is therefore only directly related to the number of mounted attacks and false positive detections.
5.6. Exclusion of Attackers and Faulty Nodes
The exclusion of attackers and faulty nodes can only be done in cooperation with the LTCA of the PKI.
In the process of misbehavior evaluation, the MEA needs to conditionally resolve the pseudonymous
IDs of the involved nodes. Consequently, the MEA is in possession of a pseudonymous long-term ID
idPLT that can be linked by the LTCA to the corresponding long-term ID idLTCv of the enrolled vehicle
or RSU v∈V . If subsequently new pseudonym certificates are requested by affected stations the LTCA
can reject these requests. According to the pseudonym certificate acquisition process discussed in
Section 5.4.1.1, the PCA queries the LTCA in every PC request for permission. As proposed by the
author of this dissertation [BSS+11] the lifetime of pseudonym certificates is limited by the following
three parameters.
• Parallel pseudonym number (PPN): The PPN determines the maximal number of valid PCs
that an ITS station may possess for a given time period, e. g. PPN = 10.
• Pseudonym lifetime period (PLP): The PLP determines the maximal lifetime of a pseudonym
certificate, e. g. PLP = 1 day.
• Pseudonym preloading period (PPP): The PPP determines the maximum time period for which
new pseudonym certificates may be requested, e. g. PPP = 1 month.
Using the example values for PPN, PLP, and PPP, an ITS station is permitted to request at maximum
300 different PCs that are valid in a sequencing order. The 10 PCs created last expire also last, at
least one month after the request time. A revocation of PCs by distributing CRLs is not considered in
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the European PKI design [BSS+11, ETS10c] due to its complexity. The main reasons are listed in the
following.
• CRLs in the VANET context may contain a large number of entries resulting in big CRLs.
• The disconnection of vehicles from the infrastructure may delay periodic updates of the CRL. If
vehicles have the most times no connection to the infrastructure, the latest CRL cannot be loaded
from the PKI and consequently the vehicle cannot check whether the certificate of a neighbor is
revoked.
• The application of CRLs increases the latency of the certificate verification process. In a worst
case all entries of a revocation list have to be compared with the certificate that is verified.
The PPP parameter finally determines the amount of time in which VANET nodes can be equipped with
valid certificates. As a consequence, also attackers or faulty nodes might be in the possession of valid
credentials for a relatively long period of time. Even if the MEA has already identified the attacker
and the LTCA has deactivated the corresponding idLTCv , the attacker may still be equipped with valid
PCs. Only after all certificates of the attacker’s PC pool are expired, the attacker is excluded from the
VANET by rejecting its PC request in the acquisition process. As a result, the pseudonym preloading
period should be kept as small as possible to minimize the amount of time in which attackers can
continue with their malicious activities until their exclusion. However, the PPP has to be large enough
to ensure that benign, but isolated ITS stations are constantly equipped with valid PCs.
5.7. Summary
In this chapter a proposal for the central long-term identification of misbehaving stations and their ex-
clusion from V2X communications is presented. The proposed framework aims to ensure the VANET’s
long-term reliability. The analysis of related work has shown that other solutions have not considered
pseudonymous identifiers appropriately and do not sufficiently address scalability and low-overhead
requirements. Our approach is the only concept in the context of misbehavior detection in VANETs
that considers the report of locally detected misbehavior events, the central conditional pseudonym
resolution and the central identification of responsible nodes. Even if the nodes are able to detect the
misbehavior the related node can only be recognized as long as the node is in single-hop communi-
cation range or if its pseudonymous ID is not changed. The long-term recognition of attackers is not
possible by the nodes. In addition, the local nodes might not be able to distinct between abnormalities
created due to an attack or abnormalities created by vehicles in exceptional situations such as an ac-
cident. Our proposal for central evaluation of misbehavior reports is able to collect detections from a
large set of independent observers over a longer period of time.
The proposed framework is based on plausibility checks and the local evaluation of the neighbor
nodes’ trustworthiness by VANET nodes. In case of local detection of misbehavior, the stations send
reports to the central MEA. The reports contain at least the type of detected misbehavior including
related evidence and the pseudonymous IDs of suspected neighbors. Moreover, other neighbors of the
reporter are included as potential witnesses that may also have observed the same misbehavior event.
All contents of the reports are digitally signed, and V2X messages are added to the reports aiming for
attesting the observed misbehavior event. Consequently, cooperating attackers who aim to discredit
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benign nodes have to spatially and temporarily synchronize each other. This requirement drastically
increases the effort for attackers since, by the time of the attack, they all have to be situated in single-
hop communication range of a specific discredited victim. As soon as the central MEA has received
the reports it verifies the contents and signatures, and subsequently allocates the reports to a misbehav-
ior session. A causal model is applied to aggregate the reported syndromes. However, since multiple
causes must be assumed in misbehavior detection the causal model returns multiple suspects in com-
plex misbehavior scenarios. If not a single causer of a misbehavior event (e. g. two unknown neighbors
overlap their vehicle positions) can be uniquely identified trust-confidence pairs provided by the re-
porters are processed. Based on this information, the central MEA starts the evaluation of received
reports as soon as sufficient evidence in form independent misbehavior reports is available. In order to
check whether different pseudonymous IDs, e. g. idPCv′ , idPCv′′ , idPCv′′′ , ... stated in the reports belong
to the same ITS station, the MEA is permitted to request pseudonym linking information in form of
a pseudonymous long-term ID idPLT . In the node assessment process the MEA is able to identify at-
tackers and faulty nodes, based on the majority of benign reporters. As shown by a simulation study a
single attacker can be detected reliably if at least four witnesses are available (cf. Figure 5.13 in Sec-
tion 5.5.6) and less than one-third cooperating attackers are involved (cf. Figure 5.14 in Section 5.5.6).
In cooperation with the PKI, the identified attackers and faulty nodes can finally be excluded from the
VANET by rejecting pseudonym certificate acquisition requests.
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6. Summary, Outlook and Conclusion
In 2011, by signing a memorandum of understanding (MoU) [Con11], European automobile OEMs
have jointly agreed on the implementation and deployment of cooperative ITS in Europe from the year
2015. In the same way, the Ministries of Infrastructure and Environment of the Netherlands, Germany,
and Austria have agreed to deploy ITS at the highway corridor among Rotterdam, Frankfurt/M. and
Vienna, also scheduled from 2015. Both MoUs focus on the application of wireless V2X ad hoc com-
munication as discussed in this thesis rather than merely utilizing cellular networks. As a consequence,
security and privacy protection mechanisms have to be available for vehicles and RSUs that will be
delivered in the near future. However, the mitigation of internal attacks is not sufficiently addressed
by the security solutions currently specified in European standardization groups such as ETSI [Ins13],
ISO [fSI10], and industrial consortia such as the C2C-CC [CC13]. It is therefore required to imple-
ment, even for the day-one deployment, reactive security mechanisms that are able to detect attackers
and faulty stations and exclude them from VANET communication if required. The solution discussed
in this dissertation is compatible with the ITS security design being in the process of standardization at
the time of writing this dissertation. Moreover, the proposed solution has already been partially tested
in FOTs. In order to consider novel attack variants that might arise in future the design for misbehavior
detection and attacker identification is easily adaptable.
In Chapter 1 on page 5 (Problem Statement) we discussed the main problems as well as the goals
that are addressed within this dissertation.
In Chapter 2 the VANET architecture is introduced including its characteristics, participants, and
communication technologies. Since security and privacy protection play an important role for reliable
and trustworthy V2X communication, related mechanisms are also introduced in this chapter. Fur-
thermore, a detailed discussion of the adversary model is included in Chapter 2, as well as test results
gained from location-related attacks. The results were obtained through performing simulations and
tests with real vehicles on a test track.
The core contributions were presented in Chapter 3, 4, and 5. They were summarized in Section 1.5
and are reflected in this conclusion in Section 6.1.
In the following, these main contributions of this dissertation are summarized (cf. Section 6.1). In
Section 6.2 an outlook is provided, and potential future work is discussed.
6.1. Summary of Contributions
The following summary is related to the four scientific questions introduced in Chapter 1. The respec-
tive answers refer to our approaches described in Chapter 3 (Local Misbehavior Detection on VANET
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Nodes), Chapter 4 (Local Short-term Identification of Potential Attackers), and Chapter 5 (Central
Long-term Identification of Attackers).
(1) How is it possible to detect internal misbehaving network nodes?
In Chapter 3 data consistency checks and data plausibility checks were described that can be
applied in vehicles and RSUs in order to detect suspicious behavior of single-hop neighbor vehi-
cles. At first several known message-based and node-based checks were analyzed and classified.
In addition to the known approaches a new consistency check was proposed that detects vehicles
showing position overlaps in their provided location data [BSB10]. The most promising mis-
behavior detection algorithms were implemented and evaluated with prototypical frameworks
to perform the local misbehavior detection on VANET nodes [BB11], [BMBK12], [JBSH11],
and [SJB+10].
A module-based approach was elaborated that is able to utilize different consistency and plausi-
bility tests. In this approach every test module is responsible to verify a specific mobility data
related policy. The results of the modules are aggregated in order to evaluate the plausibility
of received V2X messages and the trustworthiness of the related sender node [SJB+10]. This
module-based plausibility test framework was utilized in a large outdoor field operational test in
order to evaluate its applicability. On the one hand, these tests have shown that location-based
attacks were reliably detected by the use of several specialized data consistency and plausibil-
ity checks [BSP+13]. On the other hand, long-term measurements have proven that the false-
positive rate can be kept in an acceptable range (i. e. ≈ 1.6h) [SES+13, BSS13] by focusing on
neighbor nodes’ movement verifications. These false detections, however, do not result in false
reactions on the node, e. g. by discarding driver warnings. It is proposed that detected misbe-
havior is reported to a central evaluation entity after a filtering is performed on the nodes. The
central entity collects independent reports from different nodes regarding the same event. Only
if the detected misbehavior is confirmed by a specific number of independent reporters a reaction
is initiated. Consequently, the false-positive rate at the nodes is only partly relevant for the final
exclusion of attackers and faulty nodes.
We have further extended the module-based approach by a radar sensor that is able to verify
the indicated location of neighbor nodes [JBSH11]. Most environment sensors, however, can
verify objects only in line of sight. With regard to this limitation we proposed to additionally
check stated vehicle locations based on received second hand location information. The proposed
consistency test detects vehicle position overlaps of single-hop neighbors. In this test it is verified
that only one vehicle is located at a specific position on the road at the same time [BSB10].
Prototypical implementations of the module-based approach, however, pointed out that with an
increasing number of information sources and plausibility modules the performance decreases.
Additionally, the complexity increases dramatically since dependencies between the modules
have to be considered. As a result, the application of particle filters for misbehavior detection was
elaborated [BMBK12]. The particle filter provides a sophisticated way to combine information
sources and allows for the direct plausibility evaluation of location-related data.
Within this dissertation we confirmed the hypothesis that mobility data contained in received
V2X messages can be used to detect misbehavior as defined in Section 1.2. Even sophisticated
attacks can be detected that are caused by internal attackers who send messages with faked loca-
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tion data aiming to create non-existing ghost vehicles.
(2) Are VANET nodes able to identify attackers under consideration of privacy protection
mechanisms?
As analyzed in Chapter 4 local detection of misbehaving VANET nodes is possible. However,
the long-term identification of the responsible causer is challenging. The results of a study per-
formed by the author of this dissertation on ID changes in VANETs [BSS13, SES+13] within a
large outdoor test show that ID changes were not reliably detected. In the majority of all cases,
nodes were not able to recognize each other after a period of a few minutes. This circumstance
limits the possibilities of local misbehavior detection, since attackers can be identified by their
pseudonymous ID only for a short period of time. Furthermore, VANET nodes are not able to
exchange large amounts of data that is related to misbehavior detection via ad hoc communi-
cation due to the limited bandwidth. Therefore the local attacker detection mechanism suffers
from the lack of information that would increase the time of identifying attacker nodes. How-
ever, we proposed to determine the trustworthiness of neighbors in the single-hop communication
range [BMBK12, EB09], even if processed on a local basis, the trust profile may only be valid
until the next ID change of the neighbor. In summary, a long-term identification of nodes is
locally not sufficiently possible.
(3) Is a central identification of attackers feasible in order to support the long-term operation
of the VANET?
In Chapter 5 of this dissertation, a central misbehavior evaluation authority (MEA) was pro-
posed for more reliable and long-term identification of attacker nodes. The concept is based on
misbehavior reports sent by VANET nodes, that have independently observed inconsistencies in
location-related information and implausible node behavior [BNPB12]. The report structure is
provided in a way that VANET nodes must add information proving the observed misbehavior.
This approach prevents attackers to arbitrarily blackmail benign nodes of the VANET. As dis-
cussed in Chapter 4, the central MEA is able to collect several reports from different observers
that have autonomously detected the same misbehavior. Furthermore, the central MEA is able
to check whether different pseudonymous identifiers, reported in context with a specific attack
scene, belong to the same node. Based on reports provided by independent misbehavior ob-
servers, and a conditional pseudonym resolution, the MEA is able to identify attacker nodes and
exclude them from active VANET participation. Even if a reported location-based attack is con-
structed by cooperating attackers the responsible nodes can be identified having a majority of
two-thirds benign observers that provide misbehavior reports.
(4) Is it possible to apply a central attacker identification scheme that meets relevant privacy
protection requirements?
Protecting the drivers’ privacy in VANETs is an essential requirement for the network’s future
deployment and acceptance. Vehicles must not be trackable over long periods of time by mon-
itoring their V2X communication. Furthermore, VANET infrastructure entities such as traffic
management centers, the PKI or the MEA must not be able to link the pseudonymous identi-
fiers to the vehicle’s long-term ID. Moreover, it should not be possible to obtain information
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whether two pseudonymous IDs belong to the same network node without providing evidence
for misbehavior.
Within this dissertation a conditional pseudonym resolution protocol was proposed that allows
the MEA to merely identify whether particular pseudonyms were used by the same physical
node [BPB13]. However, the MEA is only permitted to request this information for nodes that
are involved in detected misbehavior attested by a reporter through signed data. Consequently,
the hypothesis was confirmed that long-term privacy of a driver can be preserved, and especially
the privacy of uninvolved nodes is not affected by the proposed central attacker identification
solution. Moreover, the resolution is spatio-temporally related to a specific misbehavior situation.
A resolution linking among different misbehavior scenarios is excluded.
The proposed concept for misbehavior detection and attacker identification might be relevant for
other ICT domains as discussed in Section 1.5. In general, misbehavior detection in cyber-physical
systems could be related to our proposals and attacker identification in communication networks ap-
plying short-term pseudonymous identifiers. As a consequence, our proposals might be interesting for
enterprise networks that handle physical input and output and systems that have to consider frequently
changing identifiers.
6.2. Outlook
In this section, both future research topics and potential extensions are outlined with respect to misbe-
havior detection and attacker identification in VANETs.
Within this dissertation a generic location-based attack was analyzed by using an exemplary V2X
malicious software. However, other location-based attack variants and application-specific attacks
might require additional misbehavior detection mechanisms. Additional sensors and information sources
could be considered in future work to further increase the misbehavior detection accuracy, and to min-
imize the false-positive rate on the VANET nodes. In particular, since the number of vehicles equipped
with cameras (be it for traffic signage recognition, weather condition detection, or parking assistance) is
growing, these systems could be additionally used to optically verify the position claimed by adjacent
V2X nodes. Furthermore, the proposed misbehavior detection solutions were evaluated over a long
period of time under real-world conditions without attackers. The results show that the message-based
false-positive rate exceeded the expectations. The main reason for this was the unreliable transmission
of mobility data and its inaccuracy. Assuming further advancement and optimization of V2X com-
munication systems in the future, a significantly improved level of accuracy of mobility data can be
expected to be available for misbehavior detection.
A large-scale integration of misbehavior detection frameworks on vehicles and RSUs and the oper-
ation of a central misbehavior evaluation authority in a real pre-productive environment is necessary
to identify potential deployment issues. Even if the local misbehavior detection solution was already
deployed on several test vehicles within the research related to this dissertation, the transmission of
misbehavior reports and their evaluation at the central MEA has only been evaluated in a proof-of-
concept manner. At least for the central misbehavior report evaluation and conditional pseudonym
resolution the development of policies is required that need to be accepted by the responsible VANET
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stakeholders. For instance, a threshold has to be specified by which misbehaving ITS station are con-
sidered to be attackers, and consequently become excluded from active VANET communications. The
conditional pseudonym resolution is likewise based on policies that specify which type of misbehavior
report content justifies the request of temporary pseudonym linking information.
Furthermore, in future work the mechanism for attacker node exclusion could be elaborated in more
detail. In this dissertation, the approach is followed as discussed within the European context (i. e.
ETSI [ETS10c, ETS12a, ETS12b] and C2C-CC [BSS+11]) to reject new certificate requests of identi-
fied attackers. However, this passive approach may allow the attacker to continue his or her malicious
activities until the certificates are expired. A more active solution could be applied to promptly exclude
identified attackers from active network participation. Additionally, remote diagnosis and remote up-
date mechanisms could be elaborated in future work that would allow the reactivation of faulty ITS
stations after repair and reset of manipulated software.
6.3. Conclusion
The approaches discussed in this dissertation aim on the extension of the existing VANET security
solution by two important building blocks: misbehavior detection and attacker identification. For the
large-scale and long-term operation of a VANET in a productive environment it is required to apply
an extended security framework as proposed in this dissertation in order to permanently exclude at-
tackers. Within this dissertation new concepts and mechanisms for misbehavior detection in VANETs
were developed based on results gained in a large field operational test involving authentic attacking
scenarios. We are the first who propose the reporting of misbehavior and the central long-term iden-
tification and exclusion of attackers. The proposed concepts were tested and evaluated further with
close-to-market VANET security infrastructures. By making attacks on VANETs unattractive it is the
goal of this research to make V2X communications more reliable and trustworthy for drivers on the
long-term perspective.
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Definition Synonyms Description Details
API
Application
Programming
Interface
An API is a particular set of specifications
that software programs can follow to commu-
nicate with each other.
Assessment
An assessment value is used to express a com-
bination of trust and confidence that node b
assigns to node a. It is denoted as ab,a(k) ∈R
with values in the range [−1,1].
AU Application Unit Hardware unit in an ITS station running the
ITS applications
CA Certificate
Authority
A certificate authority is an entity that issues
digital certificates.
CAM
Cooperative
Awareness
Message
CAMs are sent by vehicles and roadside units
multiple times a second (typically up to 10
Hz), they are broadcasted unencrypted over a
single-hop and thus receivable by any receiver
within range. They contain the vehicle’s cur-
rent position and speed, along with informa-
tion such as steering wheel orientation, brake
state, and vehicle length and width.
CAN Controller Area
Network
A CAN is a vehicle bus standard designed to
allow microcontrollers and on-board devices
to communicate with each other.
CCU Communication &
Control Unit
Hardware unit in an ITS station running the
communication stack
Confidence Certainty
The confidence value is always related to an
opinion (i.e. a trust value). According to
[Rie07], modeling the confidence of an opin-
ion provides information on how much ev-
idence an opinion is based, or to state that
there is no evidence available. In this work,
opinions are denoted as trust values and the
confidence value is used as respective weight-
ing factor.
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DoS Denial of Service A DoS is a form of attack on a computer sys-
tem or networks.
DENM DNM
Decentralized
Environmental
Notification
Message
A DENM transmission is triggered by a coop-
erative road hazard warning application, pro-
viding information to other ITS stations about
a specific driving environment event or traf-
fic event. The ITS station that receives the
DENM is able to provide appropriate HMI in-
formation to the end user, who makes use of
these information or takes actions in its driv-
ing and traveling.
DSS Digital Signature
Standard
FOT Field Operational
Test
FOTs are large-scale testing programs aim-
ing at a comprehensive assessment of the effi-
ciency, quality, robustness and acceptance of
solutions.
G5A
ITS road safety
communication
(802.11p)
Frequency band between 5.875 GHz and
5.905 GHz - reserved for ITS road safety
communication
G5B
ITS non-safety
communication
(802.11p)
Frequency band between 5.855 GHz and
5.875 GHz - reserved for ITS road non-safety
communication
G5C C-WLAN
5GHz WLAN
communication
(802.11a)
GNSS GPS Global Navigation
Satellite System
Generic term for an Global navigation satel-
lite system (GPS, GLONAS, Galileo)
HMI Human-Machine
Interface
The HMI is the interface where interaction
between humans and machines occurs.
HSM Hardware Security
Module
A HSM is targeted at managing digital keys,
accelerating cryptographic processes and for
providing strong authentication to access crit-
ical keys.
I2V I2C, I2V Infrastructure-to-
Vehicle
Communication between infrastructure com-
ponents like roadside units and vehicles
I2I Infrastructure-to-
Infrastructure
Communication between multiple infrastruc-
ture components like roadside units
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ITS
Intelligent
Transportation
Systems
Intelligent transport systems (ITS) are sys-
tems to support transportation of goods and
humans with information and communication
technologies in order to efficiently and safely
use the transport infrastructure and transport
means (cars, trains, planes, ships).
IVC
ITSC, ITS
Communi-
cations
Inter-Vehicle
Communication
Combination of V2V and V2I
LTC Long-Term
Certificate
Realization of an ETSI Enrolment Credential.
The long-term certificate authenticates a sta-
tion within the PKI, e. g.e. g., for PC refill
and may contain identification data and prop-
erties. In ETSI standards the LTC is named
enrollment certificate [ETS10c].
LTCA
Long-Term
Certificate
Authority
Realization of an ETSI Enrollment Credential
Authority that is part of the PKI and respon-
sible for issuing long-term certificates.
MCR
Maximum
Communication
Range
Is a specific plausibility check that compares
a stated position with local specifications of
the maximum reception range.
MEA
Misbehavior
Evaluation
Authority
System that collects misbehavior reports in
order to identify the causer of observed incon-
sistencies that may disturb regular V2X com-
munications.
MR Misbehavior
Report
Message structure that contains information
about observed inconsistencies that may dis-
turb regular V2X communications.
MRP Map Related
Position
Is a specific plausibility check that compares
a stated position with local map data.
MBF Maximum Beacon
Frequency
Is a specific plausibility check that checks
the beacon transmission frequency with local
specifications of the maximum allowed fre-
quency.
MTD
Maximum
Transmission
Delay
Is a specific plausibility check that checks the
single-hop transmission delay of V2X mes-
sages with local specifications of the maxi-
mum allowed delay.
OEM
Original
Equipment
Manufacturer
Refers to a generic car manufacturer
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OBU On-Board Unit
An OBU is part of the V2X communication
system at an ITS station. In different imple-
mentations different devices are used such as
a CCU and a AU
PC Short Term
Certificate
Pseudonym
Certificate
A short term certificate authenticates stations
in ITS-G5A communication and contains data
reduced to a minimum. In ETSI standards the
PC is named authorization ticket [ETS10c].
PCA
Pseudonym
Certificate
Authority
Certificate authority entity in the PKI that is-
sues pseudonym certificates
PKI Public Key
Infrastructure
A PKI is a set of hardware, software, poli-
cies, and procedures needed to create, man-
age, distribute, use, store, and revoke digital
certificates.
PM Plausible
Movement
Is a specific plausibility check that verifies
that adjacent nodes are following a locally
specified mobility model.
PPA Privacy Protection
Authority
A PPA controls and monitors other authori-
ties in order to ensure the adherence of pri-
vacy protection rules.
Pseudo-
nymity
According to Pfitzmann et al. [PH10] a sub-
ject is pseudonymous if a pseudonym is used
as identifier instead of one of its real names.
Pseudonym comes from Greek "pseudonu-
mon" meaning falsely named (pseudo: false;
onuma: name). Thus, it means a name other
than the "real name".
PV Mobility
Data
Position Vector
The position vector is periodically broad-
casted by all VANET nodes and specified cur-
rent absolute position of this node. Details
about the position vector can be found in Sec-
tion 2.2.2 on page 18
RSU
IRS, ITS
Roadside
Station
Roadside Unit
A RSU is a stationary or mobile ITS station
at the roadside acting as access point to the
infrastructure.
SAS Suddenly
Appearing Station
Is a specific plausibility check that detects
nodes which appear suddenly in a not plau-
sible vicinity to the receiver.
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Trust
Trust is modeled as
the subjective
probability that an
entity behaves as
expected.
The trust that node b ∈ V has regarding node
a ∈ V at time k is denoted as tb,a,k ∈ R. Trust
has values in the range [0,1], where 0 denotes
maximal distrust and 1 denotes maximal be-
nignity. New nodes start with a balanced trust
value of 0.5.
UTC Coordinated
Universal Time
UTC is the primary time standard by which
the world regulates clocks and time.
V2I C2I Vehicle-to-
Infrastructure
Ad hoc vehicle to roadside infrastructure
communication using a wireless local area
network
V2V C2C Vehicle-to-Vehicle Ad hoc vehicle(s) to vehicle(s) communica-
tion using a wireless local area network
V2X C2X
Vehicle-to-Vehicle
(V2V) and/or
Vehicle-to-
Infrastructure
(V2I)
Ad hoc vehicle(s) to vehicle(s) or vehicle(s)
to infrastructure communication using a wire-
less local area network
VIN
Vehicle
Identification
Number
Unique serial number of a vehicle
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and helpdesk of the college.
01/2003 - 12/2009
Self-employed in the field of web application development. Primary
active in creating dynamic web applications and product management
systems for national and international customers.
08/2001 - 08/2003 Tenovis Service GmbH & Co. KG in Dortmund, Germany
Helpdesk and online service for telephone systems.
IT Service Engineer in the 2nd level support.
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C.5. Supervision of Diploma-, Master- and Bachelor-Theses
C.5. Supervision of Diploma-, Master- and Bachelor-Theses
10/2012 - 04/2013 Master thesis of Henrik Schröder
Supervised by Prof. Dr. Michael Waidner from Darmstadt University of
Technology, Germany, Security in Information Technology
Analysis of Attack Methods on Car-to-X Communication Using Practi-
cal Tests
06/2012 - 09/2012 Bachelor thesis of Tobias Gundlach
Supervised by Prof. Dr.-Ing. Horst Wieker, Hochschule für Technik und
Wirtschaft, Germany
Implementation of the Automated Evaluation of Security Related Log
Data for simTD
11/2011 - 5/2012 Master thesis of Sebastian Mauthofer
Supervised by Prof. Dr.-Ing. Matthias Hollick from Darmstadt Univer-
sity of Technology, Germany, Secure Mobile Networking (Department
of Computer Science)
Security in VANETs: Assessment of Vehicle Trustworthiness using Par-
ticle Filters
03/2011 - 09/2011 Master thesis of Joël Njeukam
Supervised by Prof. Dr.-Ing. Ralf Steinmetz and Dr.-Ing. André König
from the Darmstadt University of Technology, Germany, Multimedia
Communications Lab (Department of Electrical Engineering and Infor-
mation Technology)
Development of an Automated Revocation Mechanism based on Mis-
behavior Detection in a Car-to-X PKI
08/2010 - 01/2011 Bachelor thesis of Daniel Quanz
Supervised by Prof. Dr.-Ing. Sorin A. Huss from the Darmstadt Univer-
sity of Technology, Germany, Integrated Circuits and Systems (Depart-
ment of Computer Science)
Implementation of a Vehicle Plausibility Check based on Communica-
tion Data and Sensor Data
04/2010 - 10/2010 Bachelor thesis of Christian Schmidt
Supervised by Prof. Dr. Ulf Schemmert from the University of Applied
Sciences Leipzig (HfTL), Germany
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C. Curriculum Vitae
Implementierung und Evaluierung von Angriffen in der VANET Simu-
lationsumgebung VSimRTI
02/2010 - 8/2010 Master thesis of Christian Stresing
Supervised by Prof. Dr.-Ing. Matthias Hollick from Darmstadt Univer-
sity of Technology, Germany, Secure Mobile Networking (Department
of Computer Science)
Intrusion Detection in VANETs through Verification of Vehicle Move-
ment Data Applying a Plausibility Model
10/2009 - 04/2010 Diploma thesis of Mohammed Douiri from Koblenz-Landau University,
Germany
Supervised by Prof. Dr. Rüdiger Grimm from the Koblenz-Landau Uni-
versity, Germany
Analyse und Evaluierung der Angriffserkennung in Car-to-Car Netzw-
erken
C.6. Review Work
• International Conference on Advances in Vehicular Systems (VEHICULAR), Technologies and
Applications 2013 and 2014
• IEEE Transactions on Vehicular Technology (TVT) 2013
• IEEE Vehicular Technology Conference (VTC) 2013-Spring
• International Conference on Computer and Communication Technology (ICCCT) 2011, 2012
and 2013
• IEEE Vehicular Networking Conference (VNC) 2012
• IEEE International Conference on Wireless and Mobile Computing, Networking and Communi-
cations (WiMob) 2011 and 2012
• European Symposium on Research in Computer Security (ESORICS) 2012
• IEEE Wireless Communications and Networking Conference (WCNC) 2011
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